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ith migration once again very much in the political spotlight, there 
is a real need to deepen the debate and define future policies. That 
is why the publication of this book is very timely. The decision to 
look at experiences in different parts of the world is most interesting. The 
debate in the EU – where we are facing one of the most difficult migration 
crises in decades, particularly at our southern borders, will remain lively. 
The debate is also animated in countries like the United States where it has 
been triggered by the “comprehensive migration reform” proposed by the 
White House in 2013.  
Migration remains a complex societal phenomenon. Effectively 
managing migration flows means taking account of all the economic, social 
and human dimensions, and, obviously, of their external implications. 
Relations with countries of origin and transit need to be upgraded, as well 
as the link between migration and development policies.  
This book contributes to a rational and forward-looking reflection 
about labour migration policies, bearing in mind the contribution that 
migration can bring to reducing skills and labour shortages and, more 
broadly, to addressing the consequences of long-term demographic trends 
in the EU, with an ageing population and a shrinking workforce. In this 
context, it is also important not to forget the positive cultural impact 
migration has on societies, contributing to diversity, new ideas and 
innovation. The comparative approach – looking also at migration policies 
in Latin America, the United States and Canada – allows us to learn lessons 
from other countries’ experiences and their often-different migration 
traditions and perspectives. What emerges clearly is that the challenges 
faced in terms of effectively managing economic migration, and its 
interaction with economic, labour and social policies, are rather comparable 
for many countries.  
The responses have also evolved over time as a reaction to specific 
situations: an economic crisis, acute shortages and increased demand in 
certain sectors, or simply as a response to public perceptions. The EU, 
however, seems less able at the moment – compared to other developed 
W
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countries and regions – to attract the economic migrants it needs to enhance 
its economic competitiveness, particularly highly skilled ones. The challenge 
before us, to use President Juncker’s words, is for Europe to become “at least 
as attractive as the favourite migration destinations such as Australia, 
Canada and the US”. This urge was also clearly reflected in the Strategic 
Guidelines the European Council adopted on 26 June 2014, when stating that 
Europe must develop strategies to maximise the opportunities of legal 
migration.   
Labour migration has been one of the most difficult policies to 
harmonise at European level: EU member states are strongly attached to 
their competence in this area, which helps to explain the complexity, to say 
the least, of the EU acquis on the matter. But we did manage to lay the 
foundations of such a common policy. Eight directives have been adopted, 
harmonising admission conditions and rights of non-EU nationals residing 
in the EU for different purposes. This includes highly skilled workers, 
through the Blue Card and Intra-Corporate Transferees Directives,1 and less-
skilled workers – no less needed – through the Seasonal Workers Directive.2  
The first section of this book debates a provocative and interesting 
question in relation to migrants’ rights: Is there a real trade-off between the 
rights granted to migrants and the openness of migration policies? In other 
words, is the restriction of such rights a pre-condition for more open 
admission policies, as argued by one of the contributors to this book? This is 
a relevant question in the current context of economic crisis, and at EU level 
the debate on rights to be granted to non-EU nationals has taken place 
regularly with the member states and the European Parliament when 
negotiating equal treatment clauses. In some cases, this has resulted in 
exceptions to some social security rights, e.g. family or unemployment 
benefits, for certain categories of non-EU nationals (typically, those staying 
temporarily and/or low-skilled). This also reflects the national laws and 
practices in most EU member states, which tend to restrict social security 
                                                   
1 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment and Directive 
2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an Intra-
Corporate Transfer.  
2 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on the condition of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
employment as seasonal workers.  
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rights and benefits – particularly non-contributory ones financed through 
general taxation – granted to temporary migrants, as compared to long-term 
and permanent residents.3 
My answer to the question would be threefold: first of all, contrary to 
a widespread perception, most empirical studies have shown that the fiscal 
impact of migrants – the ‘burden’ of migrants on the host state’s public 
finances and social security system – is negligible, i.e. neither significantly 
positive nor negative, and is in most cases positive when it relates to labour 
migrants, particularly if they are highly educated or highly skilled.4 
Secondly, reducing migrant workers’ rights might not only reduce the 
attractiveness of the EU for those migrants we do want to attract – bearing 
in mind that access to social security, educational systems and conditions for 
family reunification, to name just a few, can be as important as wages and 
other working conditions – but may also lead to unfair competitive 
advantages for those employing migrants and therefore negatively affect 
local workers. Thirdly, when assessing costs and benefits, it would be 
misleading to reason only in purely economic terms: the impact of migrants 
in a host society needs to be considered in a broader context, and account 
has to be taken of the broader societal costs of having ‘second-class’ workers 
and individuals, with fewer rights and possibly perceiving themselves as 
being discriminated against. A labour migration policy that relies heavily on 
temporary migration schemes – characterised by more limited rights granted 
to migrants – may entail high costs in terms of social disruption and lack of 
cohesion within society.  
This leads me to the multifaceted question of integration of migrants, 
addressed in Section I of the book, which is an essential component of any 
well-managed migration policy, and is also closely linked to many other 
policies (employment, education and social policies, for example). While this 
area remains primarily a member state’s responsibility, some provisions 
regarding integration have been introduced in the EU acquis on legal 
migration and a number of tools and platforms have been developed at EU 
                                                   
3 See the European Migration Network (EMN) study on “Migrant Access to Social 
Security and Healthcare: Policies and Practice” (2014), available on the EMN website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/index_en.htm). 
4 OECD (2013), “The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in OECD Countries”, in International 
Migration Outlook 2013, Paris: OECD Publishing; see also E. Guild, S. Carrera and K. 
Eisele (2013) (eds), Social Benefits and Migration. A Contested Relationship and Policy 
Challenge in the EU, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
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level to support and provide incentives for member states’ actions, especially 
to facilitate exchange of knowledge and best practice and favour dialogue 
with relevant stakeholders (such as the network of National Contact Points 
on Integration, the European Integration Forum, the European website on 
Integration, and EU Handbooks and Modules on integration). Projects 
developed at national level have been financed through the European Fund 
for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, covering, for example, the 
organisation of language classes, orientation courses, intercultural dialogue 
and efforts in schools and education systems. Additionally, a smaller share 
of the Fund has been used to support transnational projects, to further 
capitalise on valuable experience of integration policies and practices. 
Member states’ cooperation has also led to significant progress in the field of 
monitoring migrants’ integration outcomes, leading notably to a set of 
common, comparable indicators. Over the years, this type of ‘soft’ 
harmonisation has led to a certain approximation of member states’ 
integration policies. But much remains to be done in this sensitive area, for 
example, regarding migrants’ political rights and the path towards 
citizenship, and we must bear in mind that any measures to favour 
integration need to take into account the different national and local contexts 
and to involve all the stakeholders concerned. 
One of the key aspects of integration, on which I believe we need to 
engage further – at both EU and national level – is how to increase the labour 
market participation of migrants already residing in the EU, and put to use 
the often untapped potential of skills and talents they have, to their own 
advantage and to the benefit of the host society. This requires first of all close 
coordination with economic and social policies, which at EU level has taken 
place mainly via the European Semester process and the EU2020 Growth 
Strategy, with growing attention in the country-specific recommendations to 
non-EU nationals’ labour market integration in those countries with the 
biggest gaps in terms of the employment and unemployment of non-EU 
nationals and nationals (for example, Belgium and Sweden), as well as on 
social inclusion of migrants. Secondly, it is essential to work on the 
improvement of national systems for the recognition of skills and 
qualifications, knowing that the over-qualification rate of non-EU nationals 
is more than double that of EU citizens. Through the equal treatment clauses 
in the legal migration directives (for example, in the Blue Card, the Single 
 FOREWORD  v 
Permit5 or the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directives), the regime of the 
Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications of EU citizens has 
been extended to certain categories of non-EU nationals, thereby facilitating 
the process of recognition of qualifications for certain professions. Even in 
those cases, however, the recognition procedures in practice vary 
considerably amongst member states and are often lengthy and 
burdensome, representing an additional hurdle for migrants wishing to 
integrate a member state’s labour market.  
More needs to be done as well to enhance intra-EU mobility of non-EU 
nationals legally residing in a member state, so that the EU is perceived – like 
the US or Canada – as a single area of migration. A mobile workforce, 
including legally residing non-EU nationals, is essential to improving the 
EU’s ability to rapidly fill labour and skills shortages across the internal 
market. In that respect, we have managed to establish a very advanced and 
far reaching intra-EU mobility scheme in the Intra-Corporate Transferees 
Directive, whereby member states have accepted – for the first time – to 
allow non-EU nationals to stay and work on their territory based on a permit 
issued by another member state, thus going well beyond the right to travel 
under the Schengen rules. Enshrining the principle of the “mutual 
recognition” of residence (and work) permits in a legal migration directive – 
requiring a high level of trust between member states’ authorities – 
represents a real milestone in this area. I am confident that a similar system 
will also be applied soon to the mobility of students and researchers within 
the EU – to contribute to the creation of a single European area of research 
and study – and possibly to other categories of non-EU nationals (for 
example, Blue Card holders).     
The issue of skills and qualifications, as well as of intra-EU mobility, 
are of course closely linked to the broader questions related to the 
identification and anticipation of labour market needs and shortages, and of 
the role that an active policy for the admission of economic migrants can play 
in that respect. A number of analytical tools have been developed at EU level 
over the years to facilitate the collection and analysis of labour market 
information, analyse skills mismatches and trends, as well as foster labour 
mobility within the EU: for example, the EU Skills Panorama, bringing 
together data on skills trends in occupations, shortages and mismatches; the 
                                                   
5 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to 
reside and work in the territory of a member state and on a common set of rights for 
third-country workers legally residing in a member state. 
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European Vacancy and Recruitment reports, focusing on sector and 
occupation demand, growing occupations, difficult-to-fill vacancies and 
skills requirements; CEDEFOP analytical reports and forecasts on shortages; 
the EURES network and Mobility Portal, providing information, advice and 
job-matching services for the benefit of workers and employers throughout 
the EU. The development of these useful tools has, however, also shown the 
difficulties of such an exercise and the limits of what can be achieved in terms 
of reliable forecasts, hampered by lack of sufficiently precise, reliable and 
comparable information and characterised by unavoidable delays in 
responding to rapidly evolving trends. 
This is the reason why I believe that more direct engagement of 
economic stakeholders at EU level – businesses and trade unions 
representatives – in the process of gathering labour market information and 
assessing needs, and to discuss and examine how to improve the EU 
attractiveness, particularly for highly skilled migrants, is essential for the 
development of a well-managed EU labour migration policy. A structural 
dialogue at EU level with the social partners was already identified by the 
Commission, in its Communication on the future of Home Affairs policies,6 
as one of the key developments in this area, and flagged as well in the 
Guidelines adopted by the European Council on 26-27 June 2014, as a means 
to contribute to “maximise the opportunities of legal migration”. It will be 
for the next Commission to set up the future platform on labour migration 
and use it to underpin and stimulate future policy developments in this area.   
One last aspect considered in this book, which offers different views on 
the subject, is whether it would be useful and appropriate to have an EU 
“immigration code”. This is an idea that the Commission had put forward in 
its Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme7 as a means to 
consolidate, rationalise and simplify the legal migration acquis. Viewed in 
hindsight, it was probably premature to include such an initiative at a stage 
where several pieces of legislation in this area were still being negotiated; to 
                                                   
6 European Commission (2014), Communication on an open and secure Europe:  
Making it happen, COM(2014) 154, 11.3.2014, Brussels.   
7 European Commission (2010), Communication on Delivering an Area of Freedom,  
Security and Justice for Europe’s Citizens: Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm  
Programme, COM(2010) 171, 20.4.2010, Brussels. 
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be fair, however, the negotiation process lasted far longer8 than the 
Commission hoped or expected. I can understand the arguments of those 
who say that – after having struggled to adopt eight pieces of legislation on 
legal migration, with a ninth directive hopefully close to adoption9 – it is now 
time to pause for breath and focus on effective implementation and practical 
application of the substantial body of legislation in force. I do agree that 
enforcement of the acquis in this area must be given a high priority, as this is 
essential to ensure harmonisation at EU level of admission rules and for the 
actual enjoyment by non-EU nationals of the rights enshrined in the various 
directives. At the same time, we have to admit that the ‘sectoral approach’ in 
the area of legal migration has led to a certain fragmentation of the legal 
framework and that there is room – or even a need – to rationalise and 
streamline it, in order to ensure more coherence and clarity of the rules, while 
maintaining some differentiation between the various categories of migrants 
where needed and appropriate. In my view, then, the “immigration code” is 
something that needs to be seriously considered in a medium- to long-term 
perspective, after a careful weighing of the risks that reopening the acquis 
might entail in terms of member states’ possibly more restrictive approaches 
and the opportunities of providing clearer, simpler and more coherent rules, 
with the support of the European Parliament, traditionally more open on 
legal migration policies and favourable to a common EU approach.  
In conclusion, I believe we can be proud of what we have achieved so 
far at EU level, in slightly more than ten years, in a policy area that is very 
sensitive and still young, compared to other EU policies: we have established 
common rules on the admission conditions and the rights of non-EU 
nationals residing in the EU for work purposes, for family reunification, for 
study and research, as well as for long-term residents; we have supported 
and helped member states to improve their integration policies; and we have 
made important steps towards an enhanced intra-EU mobility of non-EU 
nationals. At the same time, as this book highlights, there are still areas 
                                                   
8 It took almost four years to have the Directives on Seasonal Workers and Intra-
Corporate Transferees – both of which were presented by the Commission in July 2010 – 
adopted by the co-legislators.  
9 European Commission (2013), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament  
and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country  
nationals for the purposes of research, studies, pupil exchange, remunerated and  
unremunerated training, voluntary service and au pairing (recast), COM(2013) 151,  
25.3.2013, Brussels. 
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where we can progress further towards the development of an effective EU 
labour migration policy. I would particularly highlight the following aspects: 
The need to further increase synergies, at both national and EU levels, 
between migration policies, on the one hand, and economic, employment 
and education policies, on the other hand. This will be crucial to maximising 
the benefits migration can bring in fostering economic growth and 
enhancing EU competiveness on the world stage. The management of 
migration flows should also be more clearly embedded in the EU’s overall 
external relations policy, which will help to ensure more coherence and 
consistency in the Union’s action towards third countries and to better 
anticipate possible challenges and crises. At EU level, this will also entail 
closer coordination between all the institutional actors involved with 
migration and its external dimension. 
It is absolutely necessary to promote a more active engagement of the 
economic stakeholders, particularly business, in the migration debate, as a 
pre-condition for changing the public discourse on migration and for making 
the EU more competitive and attractive, particularly for the highly skilled.   
It is important to continue to work on the integration of migrants, 
which is essential to ensuring that they are not discriminated against and can 
fully enjoy their rights while at the same time play an active role in and 
contribute to the host society. The possibility for the Commission to play a 
more active role in benchmarking member states’ policies, and the results 
achieved, will have to be further considered. 
Finally, it is essential to ensure that the common EU rules on legal 
migration already in force are effectively implemented and applied by all 
member states, so that they can have a real – and positive – impact on the 
admission of non-EU nationals to the EU, as well as on their rights. Further 
changes to the legal framework, including possible consolidation and 
streamlining, will depend on the capacity of the current rules to ensure that 
the benefits of legal migration for the EU are maximised and that the 
objective of enhancing the EU’s attractiveness and competitiveness is fully 
achieved.  
Cecilia Malmström 
Commissioner for Trade (former Commissioner for Home Affairs)  






1. THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF EU LABOUR 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 
SERGIO CARRERA, ELSPETH GUILD AND 
KATHARINA EISELE 
he European Union’s attempt to formulate and design a common 
policy covering the conditions for entry and stay of third-country 
workers has not been exempted from controversy. The added value 
for ‘more EU’ in such a traditionally domestic policy domain has been lately 
dressed up with the need to ensure the attractiveness of Europe’s 
immigration policies in increasingly competitive national and transnational 
settings. The underlying idea is to shape current and future contours of 
labour immigration control policies with the goal of offering ‘attractive’ 
conditions for certain categories of third-country nationals. Here the EU sees 
itself playing a role. Increasingly, priority has been given to encouraging 
third-country workers labelled as “highly qualified or skilled” or “talented” 
to choose the EU instead of other international destinations such as the US 
or Canada, and in this way meet the perceived needs of EU member states’ 
labour markets.1  
Discussions among policy-makers and scholars on EU labour 
immigration policies cannot be properly understood without briefly looking 
                                                   
1 European Commission (2005, pp. 5 and 7); the Policy Plan states: “the vast majority of 
Member States need these workers [highly skilled workers], because of shortfalls in the 
labour market pool of highly qualified workers. Furthermore, recent studies highlight 
for example that 54% of Med-MENA first generation immigrants with a university 
degree reside in Canada and the USA, while 87% of those having a lower than primary 
or a secondary level education are in Europe. In response to this situation a common 
special procedure to quickly select and admit such immigrants, as well as attractive 
conditions to encourage them to choose Europe could be devised.” A similar argument 
has been presented in European Commission (2011). 
T
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at their background and general legal context. The transfer of immigration 
policy to shared competence between the EU and member states with the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 officially opened the doors to the progressive 
building of a common policy. This was accompanied with the adoption of 
the first multi-annual programme for EU Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) policies in October 1999 – the Tampere Programme2 – where 
the European Council adopted for the first time a common policy agenda 
outlining the priorities and a list of milestones to guide the progressive 
development of a common EU immigration policy.  
The 1999 Tampere Programme called for the construction of a common 
immigration policy guided by fair treatment of legally residing third-country 
nationals, and an integration policy of granting rights and obligations 
comparable to EU citizens. It also identified as a priority the establishment 
of a common European approach to labour immigration that would 
approximate national legislation on conditions for entry and residence of 
third-country workers.3  
Fifteen years later, that political goal has been stymied by a multiplicity 
of controversies between European and member state instances, where the 
agreed objectives and milestones have not easily materialised into concrete 
legislative outputs.4 Some member states have been reticent about the 
effective transfer of competences in these domains to EU instances.5 The 
resulting scenario has been one where a common EU immigration policy is 
still a project in the making, and one of its most important unfinished 
features relates precisely to the lack of common supranational rules covering 
entry and residence conditions for the purposes of employment, i.e. labour 
immigration.  
The institutional and decision-making framework covering the 
making of EU immigration policy can be found in the Lisbon Treaty. Since 
the end of 2009 the Treaty has introduced far-reaching modifications to the 
previous EU policy-making framework. Article 79 TFEU states: 
1. The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at 
ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair 
treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States 
[…]. 
                                                   
2 European Council (1999). 
3 Ibid., paragraphs 18 and 21. 
4 Wiesbrock (2010). 
5 Carrera and Formisano (2005); Carrera (2007).  
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2. This Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine 
volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third 
countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or 
self-employed. 
This provision put an end (at least formally) to previous open debates 
as to whether the EU actually had an attributed legal competence to legislate 
in the labour immigration field. While Article 79 TFEU excludes European 
harmonisation on issues related to ‘quotas’, “it does offer a clear possibility 
for Europeanisation to move forward in dealing with other administrative 
aspects of labour immigration, such as those that are part of the admission 
processes and other conditions and rights of residence.”6  
The Europe 2020 Strategy identified as one of its key flagship initiatives 
the need of labour immigration to respond to member states’ needs and 
priorities and to attract highly qualified third-country nationals in a context 
of growing global competition. In policy discourses the EU seems somehow 
a less advantageous or appealing destination in comparison to other 
competing countries.7 The European Commission has confirmed this 
attractiveness and ‘competition-for-talent’ policy paradigm in its May 2014 
Communication “An Open and Secure Europe – Making it Happen”. The 
Communication underlined that “Europe must attract new talent and 
compete on the global scale” and that: 
[D]emographic changes, in particular the shrinking of the working 
population in Europe, coupled with significant skill shortages in certain 
sectors…hinder the EU’s productivity and thus its economic recovery. 
Increasing global competition for skills and talents affects labour 
                                                   
6 Carrera, Faure, Guild and Kostakopoulou (2011, p. 7).  
7 The Europe 2020 Strategy identifies “Youth on the move” as a flagship initiative which 
has the aim “to enhance the performance and international attractiveness of Europe’s 
higher education institutions and raise the overall quality of all levels of education and 
training in the EU, combining both excellence and equity, by promoting student mobility 
and trainees’ mobility, and improve the employment situation of young people.” In 
addition, the flagship initiative “An Agenda for New Skills and Jobs” aims “to promote 
a forward-looking and comprehensive labour migration policy which would respond in 
a flexible way to the priorities and needs of labour markets”, p. 18, see European 
Commission (2010); see also European Migration Network Study (2013); and speech by 
former Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion L. Andor (2012). 
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markets in many Member States and will be a decisive factor for 
Europe’s economic prosperity in the decade ahead.8 
The European integration process covering the development of a 
European immigration policy now has timely momentum. The third EU 
multi-annual programme covering EU AFSJ policies – the Stockholm 
Programme9 – comes to an end in December 2014. Discussions began in early 
2014 at various EU institutional venues concerning priorities to guide the 
policy agenda for the period 2015-2020 and the next generation of EU 
immigration policy. 
The European Council Conclusions of 26-27 June 201410 adopted the 
new Strategic Guidelines for legislative and operational planning of AFSJ 
policies for the next five years.11 The Guidelines identify as a key priority to 
“better manage migration in all its aspects” by addressing shortages of 
specific skills and attracting ‘talent’. The Conclusions highlight that in order 
for the EU to remain an attractive destination for “talents and skills”, 
coherent and efficient rules maximising the opportunities for legal 
immigration should be developed.12 
This demonstrates that there is a well-developed policy agenda where 
the attractiveness of EU immigration policies for selected groups of ‘wanted’ 
or ‘welcomed’ third-country workers seems to constitute a central policy 
objective. This book studies the attractiveness of EU labour immigration 
policy from a number of disciplinary, thematic and comparative 
perspectives. On 14 February 2014, in Brussels, Belgium, the Justice and 
Home Affairs Section of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and 
the former Directorate-General for Home Affairs (DG Home) of the 
European Commission co-organised an Expert Seminar entitled “Rethinking 
Attractiveness of Labour Migration Policies: Comparative Perspectives on 
the EU, USA, Canada and Beyond”. The event aimed to analyse and clarify 
the determinants and challenges characterising discussions focused on the 
attractiveness of labour migration policies in different supranational and 
international settings with the view to providing scholarly and fact-based 
                                                   
8 European Commission (2014, p. 3); similar claims have been outlined in European 
Commission (2013). 
9 Refer to European Council (2009). 
10 European Council (2014). 
11 Carrera and Guild (2014). 
12 Refer to p. 2 (para. 6) and p. 19 of the European Council (2014).   
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input for informed policy-making in the next generation of EU labour 
immigration policies.  
The Expert Seminar brought together a high-level group of European 
Commission officials representing relevant DGs and services dealing 
directly or indirectly with migration-related policies, as well as 
representatives from other European institutions, including from the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC), the Committee of the Regions, the Council and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). Scholars and experts with in-depth 
knowledge of migration studies also attended. The full programme of the 
Expert Seminar is reproduced in Annex 1 of this book. The event fell within 
the scope of NEUJOBS, a research project financed by the European 
Commission under the 7th Framework Programme and coordinated by the 
Economic Policy Section at CEPS. For more information about the project see 
www.neujobs.eu.  
This book presents the main results and contributions of the Expert 
Seminar. The panel discussions of the Seminar were structured around a set 
of ‘policy challenges’ in the following manner: Challenge 1 on Rights and 
Discrimination; Challenge 2 on Qualifications and Skills; Challenge 3 on 
Matching Demand and Supply; and Challenge 4 on The Way Forward in the 
EU: A Post-Stockholm Programme Strategy.  
The book integrates all four challenges into four main sections, 
outlined successively below, taking into account the general framing and 
specific set of questions for discussion in each of the panels.  
Section I of the book, which corresponds to the Seminar’s Challenge 1 
on “Rights and Discrimination”, concentrates on the role played by rights 
and non-discrimination in making the EU more or less attractive to foreign 
labourers. Challenge 1 was discussed in the context of the perception in other 
parts of the world that racism and xenophobia are on the rise in the EU. The 
following questions in particular were addressed:  
 What role do rights relating to security of residence, access to 
employment and services, and family reunification play as 
determinants of immigration? What role do discrimination, racism and 
xenophobia play?  
 What are the competitive disadvantages of openness of immigration 
policies? Is there a trade-off between the openness of migration policies 
and the granting of rights (i.e. more openness, fewer rights)?  
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Section II of the book is developed on the basis of Challenges 2 and 3 
of the Seminar, which dealt with “Qualifications and Skills” and “Matching 
Demand and Supply”, respectively. The recognition of foreign qualifications 
and skills represents a factor of vital importance for making labour markets 
and economies more accessible to third-country workers. The discussion in 
Challenge 2 was centred on obstacles and challenges regarding the 
recognition of foreign qualifications and professional experiences, as well as 
the insufficient integration or socio-economic inclusion of skills of third-
country nationals in EU member states. Challenge 3 focused on the policy 
priority given to better job matching and filling the labour market shortages 
of member states. In this context, labour immigration policies are supposed 
to be “needs-based” in accordance with member states’ priorities and follow 
as a consequence a predominantly utilitarian or selective approach. The 
deliberations covered questions such as:  
 What are the main outstanding issues in the EU and what are the most 
relevant obstacles to the recognition of foreign qualifications and 
skills?  
 Beyond formal recognition of qualifications and skills, what are the 
informal barriers that non-EU nationals face for entry into EU labour 
markets? Are there any other barriers that they face? If so, how to 
overcome them?  
 Can labour market “needs” be effectively determined? Is it actually 
possible to have a functioning labour market matching system in light 
of the temporariness of labour demands and individuals’ changing 
intentions?  
Section III of the book addresses some international experiences and 
approaches and re-examines some of the assumptions underlying the 
competition for talent narrative. This section covers the cross-cutting 
comparative perspectives and experiences from the US, Canada and South 
America as regards the control of movement of non-nationals for 
employment purposes. Countries such as the US and Canada are too often 
uncritically presented in EU official policy documents as more attractive 
destinations and therefore in competition with the EU in what has been 
denominated as ‘the global race for talent’. Yet, are these countries and 
migration control regimes indeed so ‘attractive’ and ‘competitive’, and if so 
what makes them more attractive in comparison to the EU and member 
states?  
Section IV of the book is based on Challenge 4 on “The Way Forward 
in the EU – A Post-Stockholm Programme Strategy”. During the last 15 years 
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the EU has at last progressively developed a body of legislation and 
supranational standards governing the conditions of entry and residence for 
third-country nationals and their rights when in the EU, including some 
limited employment-related dimensions for specific categories of 
immigrants. Still, an unfinished component in the EU immigration policy 
framework relates to that of labour immigration. Challenge 4 focused on the 
main issues concerning possible future EU legislative developments and 
practical mechanisms to better ensure coordination and support for EU 
labour migration policies. Questions addressed included, among others: 
 What are the pros/cons of further legislative consolidation or even 
codification of EU labour immigration policy? Is the moment ripe for 
a consolidation of EU legislation on labour immigration? What would 
be the advantages and disadvantages? 
 What should be key priorities for the EU in the years to come? What 
concrete initiatives should the European Commission focus on? 
This book integrates these policy challenges and main questions 
covered during the Expert Seminar and elaborates on them in the various 
chapter contributions. There are a number of unchallenged assumptions and 
expected outcomes underlying policy and academic debates over the 
attractiveness, selection and competition rationale of controlling the 
movement of persons across borders for reasons of working or seeking 
employment, and these call for further reflection and discussion. This is one 
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2. RETHINKING MIGRANT RIGHTS 
MARTIN RUHS 
1. Introduction 
In 1990, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW). The Convention stipulates 
a very comprehensive set of civil, political, economic, and social rights for 
migrants, including those living and/or working abroad illegally. Hailed as 
a major achievement in the struggle for improving the rights of migrants, the 
CMW has become a cornerstone of the human rights-based approach to 
regulating labour immigration advocated by many national and 
international organisations concerned with the protection of migrant 
workers. 
In practice, ratification of the 1990 convention has been disappointing, 
both in absolute and relative terms. Although the CMW was introduced 
more than 20 years ago, so far fewer than 50 countries have ratified it – and 
the great majority of these countries are predominantly migrant-sending 
rather than migrant-receiving. This makes the CMW the least ratified 
convention among all the major international human rights treaties. It has a 
quarter of the ratifications of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(passed a year before the CMW) and less than half of the ratifications of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (passed 16 years after 
the CMW). 
“Migrant rights are human rights” is a common argument made by 
migrant rights advocates around the world. But nation states, especially 
major migrant-receiving countries, do not see it that way. Despite having 
signed general human rights treaties, most nation states, especially major 
immigration countries, are clearly reluctant to ratify international 
conventions that limit their discretion and ability to restrict the rights of 
migrants living and working in their territories. 
Why have so few countries ratified the CMW? The existing literature 
has identified a host of legal issues and complexities as well as a lack of 
RETHINKING MIGRANT RIGHTS  11 
campaigning and awareness of the CMW and other international 
conventions as key factors.1 
I argue in my new book2 that the primary explanation for the low level 
of ratifications of international migrant rights treaties lies with the effects of 
granting or restricting migrant rights on the national interests (however 
defined) of migrant-receiving countries. This may sound like an obvious 
point, but the dearth of discussion about the multifaceted costs and benefits 
of specific migrant rights for receiving countries – and migrants and their 
countries of origin – suggests that this is an important gap in analysis and 
debates that needs to be urgently addressed. 
2. Migrant rights as instruments of labour immigration policy 
There is a large gap between the rights of migrant workers stipulated in 
international human rights law and the rights that migrants working in high-
income countries experience in practice. Many UN agencies and other 
international and national organisations concerned with migrant workers 
have responded to the widespread restrictions of migrant rights by 
emphasising that migrant rights are human rights that are universal, 
indivisible, and inalienable; they derive from a common humanity and must 
be protected regardless of citizenship. 
A key argument and starting point of my book The Price of Rights is that 
we need to expand current debates and analyses of migrant rights by 
complementing conversations about the human rights of migrants with a 
systematic, dispassionate analysis of the interests and roles of nation states 
in granting and restricting the rights of migrant workers. This is because the 
rights of migrant workers not only have intrinsic value as underscored by 
human rights approaches but also play an important instrumental role in 
shaping the effects of international labour migration for receiving countries, 
migrants, and their countries of origin. 
For example, whether or not migrants enjoy the right to free choice of 
employment and other employment-related rights in the receiving country’s 
labour market is likely to affect their productivity and earnings, remittances, 
and competition with local workers. The fiscal effects of immigration 
critically depend on whether and how migrants’ social rights (including 
access to public services and welfare benefits) are restricted. Migrants’ 
incentives and behaviour in and beyond the labour market – for instance, the 
                                                   
1 See, for example, the introduction in de Guchteneire, Pécoud and Cholewinski (2009). 
2 Ruhs (2013).  
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extent to which they acquire language and other skills relevant to 
employment and life in the host country – will be influenced by whether or 
not they have – or are on a path to acquiring – the rights to permanent 
residence and citizenship. 
Because rights shape the effects of labour immigration, migrant rights 
are in practice a core component of nation states’ labour immigration 
policies. At its core, the design of labour immigration policy requires 
simultaneous policy decisions on: how to regulate the number of migrants 
to be admitted, e.g. through quotas or points-based systems; how to select 
migrants, e.g. by skill and/or nationality; and what rights to grant migrants 
after admission, e.g. temporary or permanent residence, access to welfare 
benefits, and limited or unlimited rights to employment. When receiving 
countries decide on these three issues, the impacts on the ‘national interest’ 
(however defined) of the existing residents in the host countries are likely to 
be of great significance. Policy decisions on the number, selection, and rights 
of migrant workers can also be influenced by their consequences for the 
interests of migrants and their countries of origin, whose actions and policies 
can play an important role in supporting, sustaining, or undermining 
particular labour immigration policy decisions in migrant-receiving 
countries. 
The important implication of this approach is that migrant rights 
cannot be studied and debated in isolation of admissions policy, both in 
terms of positive and normative analysis. To understand why, when, and 
how countries restrict the rights of migrant workers, and to debate what 
rights migrant workers should have, we need to consider how particular 
rights restrictions are related to policies that regulate the admission, i.e. the 
numbers and selection, of migrant workers. 
3. Trade-offs between ‘access’ and ‘rights’ 
In The Price of Rights, I examine labour immigration policies in over 45 high-
income countries, as well as policy drivers in major migrant-receiving and 
migrant-sending states. A key finding is that there are trade-offs in the 
policies of high-income countries between openness to admitting migrant 
workers and some of the rights granted to migrants after admission. Greater 
equality of rights for new migrant workers tends to be associated with more 
restrictive admission policies, especially for admitting lower-skilled workers 
from poorer countries. The tension between ‘access’ and ‘rights’ applies to a 
few specific rights that are perceived to create net costs for the receiving 
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countries, especially the right of lower-skilled migrants to access certain 
welfare services and benefits.  
The trade-off creates a dilemma. From a global justice point of view, 
both ‘more migration’ and ‘more rights’ for migrant workers are ‘good 
things’. The World Bank believes that more international labour migration, 
especially low-skilled migration that is currently most restricted, is one of 
the most effective ways of raising the incomes of workers and their families 
in low-income countries. At the same time, rights based organisations such 
as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and many activists campaign 
for greater equality for rights for migrant workers. But the trade-offs 
between access and rights means that we cannot always have both – more 
migration and more rights – so a difficult choice needs to be made. 
Most low-income countries around the world are acutely aware of the 
trade-off between access to labour markets in high-income countries and 
some migrant rights. Few migrant-sending countries are willing to insist on 
full and equal rights for fear of reduced access to the labour markets of 
higher-income countries. As I discuss in my book, some migrant-sending 
countries have explicitly rejected equality of rights for their nationals 
working abroad on the grounds that it constitutes a restrictive labour 
immigration policy measure. 
International debates about the global governance of migration have 
almost completely ignored the trade-off between openness and rights. 
Participants in the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 
New York and the Global Forum on Migration and Development in Sweden 
in 2014 should openly debate the desirability of restricting specific rights, for 
how long, under what circumstances, and so on. We need a reasoned debate 
between organisations that advocate more migration to promote 
development, such as the World Bank, and those primarily concerned with 
the protection and equality of rights, such as the ILO. 
How to respond to the trade-off between openness and rights is an 
inherently normative question with no one right answer. I argue that there 
is a strong case for advocating the liberalisation of international labour 
migration, especially of lower-skilled workers, through temporary 
migration programmes that protect a universal set of ‘core rights’ and 
account for the interests of nation states by restricting a few specific rights 
that create net costs for receiving countries, and are therefore obstacles to 
more open admission policies. 
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4. The case for a ‘core rights’ approach 
We should start discussing the creation of a list of universal ‘core rights’ for 
migrant workers that would include fewer rights than the 1990 UN 
Convention of the Rights on Migrant workers with a higher chance of 
acceptance by a greater number of countries – thus increasing overall 
protection for migrant workers including in countries that admit large 
numbers of migrants. Importantly, the list of core rights could complement 
rather than replace the existing UN conventions for migrant workers. 
There is an important precedent within the UN system for a core rights 
approach, i.e. for stressing the fundamental importance of specific rights 
from a larger list of rights. In 1998, the ILO passed the Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, commonly known as “core 
labour standards”. The declaration commits member states to respect and 
promote principles and rights in four categories, whether or not they have 
ratified the relevant conventions. These categories are: freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, 
the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of child labour, 
and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation. 
The ILO Declaration therefore identified a short list of fundamental 
rights that are given pre-eminence over other ILO conventions. The core 
labour standards were adopted in the context of dwindling numbers of 
ratifications of ILO conventions and a general criticism that the ILO’s labour 
standards were not effective enough at protecting workers’ rights in a 
rapidly globalising world. So there is a direct parallel with the migrant 
workers conventions. 
Exactly which rights should be on this shorter list of core rights is an 
important question to debate. In my view, the core rights should protect 
basic civil and labour rights, such as the right to keep your own identity 
documents, the right to equal access to the protections of the courts and the 
right to equal employment conditions.  
But core rights do not need to include extensive social rights. Core 
rights should exclude, at least for a limited period of time, access to income-
based benefits such as social housing and low-income support. In practice, 
these welfare benefits are already restricted under most labour immigration 
programmes around the world.  
An important caveat: The list of core rights should complement rather 
than replace the existing convention, which should continue to play an 
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important role as an ideal toward which we should strive. Ideals and 
aspirational principles matter in global efforts to improve the lives of 
migrants. In today’s world, what migrants need most are core rights that are 
protected now. It might be counter-intuitive, but given the reality of labour 
immigration policy, when it comes to protecting migrant rights, less is more.  
References 
de Guchteneire, P., A. Pécoud and R. Cholewinski (2009) (eds), “Introduction”, in 
Migration and Human Rights: The United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers’ 
Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ruhs, M. (2013), The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration, 




3. ARE THERE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN 
OPENNESS, NUMBERS AND RIGHTS IN 
BRITAIN’S IMMIGRATION POLICY? 
BERNARD RYAN 
Introduction  
Over the past decade and a half, the United Kingdom has seen a significant 
increase in levels of labour migration, both from within the European 
Economic Area (EEA), and from outside it. Throughout the 1980s, and until 
the mid-1990s, the percentage of foreign-born individuals in the employed 
workforce was consistently in the 7-8% range.1 Since 1997, the share of the 
foreign-born employed has more than doubled, increasing from 1.9 million 
(7.3%) in the first quarter of 1997 to 4.5 million (14.7%) in the final quarter of 
2013.2 In absolute terms, the increase has been greatest among those born 
outside the European Union, whose numbers increased from 1.3 million to 
2.7 million (up 115%). In percentage terms, the increase has been greatest 
among those born in EU states, whose numbers grew from 638,000 to 1.7 
million (an increase of 168%).  
These trends in the labour market have contributed to the high degree 
of salience of immigration policy in public opinion.3 The trends and the 
public’s response to them inspired the post-2010 Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Government’s target of reducing net migration to below 100,000 
per annum, which has led to policies such as caps for skilled workers and 
strict income tests for family migration. At the same time, it is not clear how 
                                                   
1 See Aldin, James and Wadsworth (2010, p. 58). 
2 Based on Labour Force Survey data (most recently for February 2014), published in 
Office for National Statistics, Labour Market Statistics (Table EMP06).  
3 From 2000 onwards, opinion polling found that immigration began to appear 
prominently among the issues facing the United Kingdom classed as “important” by 
respondents: see Blinder (2012, p. 5).  
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differently a Labour Party-led Government would address the issue, given 
that its leaders have apologised repeatedly in recent years for having opened 
the labour market to the nationals of central and Eastern Europe member 
states in 2004.4  
The terms of the political immigration debate have therefore changed 
in response to the increased numbers of migrants. Against this background, 
the question here is whether there is evidence of a linkage in the immigration 
policy debate between openness and numbers on the one hand, and rights 
on the other.  
1. What role do rights relating to security of residence, access to 
employment and services, and family reunification play as 
determinants for immigration?  
One way of posing the question of a trade-off is to ask whether rights can be 
a determinant of immigration. In the United Kingdom’s case, the answer 
requires separate treatment of EEA and non-EEA migration.  
EEA workers have a full set of rights from an early stage, including 
access to the labour market, public services and benefits, family reunification 
and security of residence. Among these, it is likely that an unrestricted right 
to work is the primary driver of migration. This is seen in the fact that most 
EEA migrant workers who work in the United Kingdom themselves seek out 
job opportunities (either in person, or using online communication), while 
active employer recruitment is only a secondary factor. Other rights are 
likely to be less relevant to an initial decision to migrate, and instead likely 
to be more relevant to the facilitation of long-term stay.  
In contrast, non-EEA labour migration is mainly employer-led, with 
ties to individual employers in most cases, and very little scope to move in 
and out until settlement is obtained. It is also selective, with a strong 
emphasis on higher skills and qualifications. Each of these factors means that 
rights concerning benefits, family life and security of residence probably do 
play a significant part in facilitating migration, i.e. non-EEA workers with 
the opportunity to migrate may be unwilling to move unless these rights are 
available. This will be especially true if legally or practically they cannot 
‘come and go’ between the United Kingdom and their state of origin. It will 
                                                   
4 For example, in a speech on immigration policy by shadow Home Secretary Yvette 
Cooper to the IPPR on 7 March 2013: “We know Labour got some things wrong on 
immigration in Government…We should have kept transitional controls for Eastern 
Europe.” 
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also be especially the case for the highly skilled, who are more likely to have 
options as to their place of employment. 
2. Is there an actual trade-off between the openness of migration 
policies and the granting of rights, i.e. more openness, fewer 
rights? 
The other way of posing the question of a trade-off is to ask whether greater 
openness to migration, and/or greater numbers of immigrants, is associated 
with a reduction in the rights available. Some potential examples of such 
trade-offs can be seen in the United Kingdom context, even if they do not 
always entail fewer rights.  
In the case of EEA migration, the main examples have concerned 
access to social benefits, where openness to migration for EU workers has 
been associated with curtailment of rights. Three examples over the past 20 
years may be given:  
 In 1994, a test of ‘habitual residence’ in the common travel area5 was 
introduced in relation to means-tested benefits. These are non-
contributory benefits, and include income support, income-based job-
seekers’ allowance, housing benefit and council tax benefit. 
 On 1 May 2004, to coincide with the enlargement of the EU and the 
opening of the UK labour market to A8 nationals,6 a ‘right to reside’ 
test was added to the habitual residence test. The effect of this test has 
been to deny access to means-tested benefits to EEA/Swiss nationals 
who, though actually resident, do not have a right to reside deriving 
from EU free movement law. It is significant therefore that, as things 
stood at that time, a ‘jobseeker’ or a former worker qualified for a right 
of residence as long as he could “provide evidence that [he was] 
seeking employment and ha[d] a genuine chance of being engaged.”  
 From 1 January 2014, to coincide with the removal of labour market 
restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian nationals, two further changes 
have been made. 1) A requirement of three months’ actual residence in 
the common travel area has been added to the habitual residence test. 
                                                   
5 This comprises the United Kingdom, Ireland and the United Kingdom’s crown 
dependencies (the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man).  
6 A8 nationals are the nationals of the A8 countries that joined the EU in 2004: Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lativa, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Cyprus 
and Malta also became member states that year. 
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2) Job-seekers, and former workers who worked for less than 12 
months before becoming unemployed, do not retain a right of 
residence for more than six months unless they “can provide 
compelling evidence that [they are] continuing to seek employment 
and ha[ve] a genuine chance of being engaged.” 
In the case of non-EEA migration, something akin to an openness and 
numbers/rights trade-off is seen in the differentiated rights of labour 
migrants, as part of a selective immigration policy.  
A first set of policies has given a relatively high level of rights to 
categories of economic migrant considered especially desirable. Under the 
highly skilled migrant programme and its successor (2002-2011), those who 
met a points test had unrestricted access to the labour market from the outset. 
In their case, a right to settlement, and therefore full access to social benefits, 
could be obtained after five years. Currently, those in investor and 
entrepreneur categories can obtain settlement in two years (investors only) 
or three years (both categories), and benefit from a more relaxed approach 
to absences during the qualifying period. When they acquire settlement, they 
acquire a general right to work and access to social benefits. In all the cases 
listed here, family rights have been available from the outset.  
A second set of policies concerns skilled workers with a job offer. The 
long-established position has been that such workers have family rights from 
the outset, but full access to the labour market and to social benefits only 
once they acquire settlement. The period to settlement was previously four 
years, but was increased to five years in 2006. More recently – as part of the 
policy of reducing overall migration numbers – the Coalition Government 
has written into the immigration rules that, from 6 April 2016, skilled 
workers and their families will no longer be automatically eligible for 
settlement after five years. Instead, eligibility for settlement will be limited 
to workers who earn more than £35,000, or are in an exempt category 
(shortage occupations, PhD-level jobs, ministers of religion). Those who do 
not qualify will have a maximum stay of six years, and will not be permitted 
to apply to enter as a labour migrant for a further 12 months. 
A third level covers workers on temporary labour migration 
programmes, which have primarily been in agriculture and food processing. 
When these have been in effect in the United Kingdom the workers in 
question have not had access to family rights or security of residence. The 
rationale appears to have been to discourage long-term stay. (There are no 
such schemes at present.) 
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3. Further remarks 
In light of this review of the British case, we may conclude that the thesis of 
a numbers and openness/rights trade-off in immigration policy has some 
explanatory value but is nevertheless incomplete in several respects.  
Staying within the logic of a trade-off, one issue is whether the focus 
should be on the openness of policy or on the numbers of migrants. The 
recent British experience suggests that increased numbers are a more 
important constraint on – or driver of – changes to rights regimes than the 
openness of policy per se. Indeed, the recent past has illustrated how 
increased numbers of one category of migrant (EEA) can lead to effects in 
the policy sphere on other unrelated groups (non-EEA).  
A second point is that the logic of a trade-off may work better for 
lower-skilled workers, i.e. it is only in relation to them that it can plausibly 
be said that rights are restricted in order to facilitate a policy of admitting 
migrants.7 In other cases, the logic appears to be the opposite, with rights 
given (or denied) in order to make the United Kingdom more (or less) 
attractive, either for initial entry or for eventual stay. Thus the current policy 
is to deny certain rights to skilled workers in order to limit numbers, while 
the highest level of rights has been accorded to the most sought-after 
migrants (previously, the highly skilled; now, investors and entrepreneurs) 
in order to attract them to Britain.  
Thirdly, even if one accepts that trade-offs can exist, the potential of a 
‘high road’ remains, based on the defence of the historic gains in the fields of 
social and labour rights, and a requirement that any migration policy respect 
those principles. That would not preclude an open migration policy but 
would tend to prevent a levelling-down of generally applicable social rights 






                                                   
7 This is the thesis developed in relation to policy openness, in Ruhs (2013). 
TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN OPENNESS, NUMBERS AND RIGHTS IN BRITAIN’S POLICY?  21 
References 
Aldin, V., D. James and J. Wadsworth (2010), “The Changing Shares of Migrant 
Labour in Different Sectors and Occupations in the UK Economy: An 
Overview”, in M. Ruhs and B. Anderson (eds), Who Needs Migrant Workers: 
Labour Shortages, Immigration and Public Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Blinder, S. (2012), UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and 
Level of Concern, February Briefing, The Migration Observatory at the 
University of Oxford.  
Labour Force Survey data (most recently for February 2014), published in Office for 
National Statistics, Labour Market Statistics (Table EMP06), 
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/february-
2014/statistical-bulletin.html.  
Ruhs, M. (2013), The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Speech on immigration policy by shadow Home Secretary Yvette Cooper to the 




4. LABOUR MIGRATION, TEMPORARINESS 
AND RIGHTS 
RYSZARD CHOLEWINSKI 
1. Labour migration, temporariness and rights 
Recent global debates on international migration, and especially those 
relating to migration and development, are increasingly couching labour 
migration in the context of temporary and/or circular migration and 
mobility. Indeed, it is being argued that mobility is a term that better 
captures the largely temporary nature of movements today. However, this 
emphasis on temporariness can be problematic from the perspective of 
ensuring the protection of the human rights of migrant workers, and their 
right to non-discrimination and equality of treatment in particular. Rights of 
access to employment in terms of the ability to change employers, access to 
vocational training, freedom of association and collective bargaining, social 
protection, family reunification and security of residence are most likely to 
be affected adversely. 
The overemphasis on labour migration as largely a temporary 
phenomenon is also unhelpful for a number of other reasons. First, it tends 
to view migrants as essentially ‘commodities’ to be ‘traded’ and only 
required in times of economic prosperity and buoyant labour markets. 
Second, such a focus entrenches unjustified distinctions between 
skilled/qualified migrants and middle-skilled and low-skilled migrants, 
implying that the former for whom there is an intense global competition 
among countries (and mainly developed countries) deserve greater rights 
protection, a position that is also reflected in legislation and policy in a 
number of EU member states. However, this approach ignores the obvious, 
namely the real labour market needs that often remain unrecognised for 
lower-skilled migrant workers largely because they are perceived as a 
potential ‘burden’ in terms of being more difficult to integrate and less 
mobile in the labour market than more skilled migrants, especially in the 
event of an economic downturn. Third, not addressing real labour market 
needs with migrant workers at all skill levels can be costly to employers, for 
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example, in re-training new workers, and also increases precariousness in 
the labour market as the available low- and middle-skilled jobs for which the 
need remains unrecognised are often filled by short-term contract workers, 
agency workers, and migrant workers in an irregular situation. Moreover, 
trade unions contend that many jobs filled by temporary migrant workers, 
including at middle- and lower-skilled levels, are actually ‘permanent’ jobs, 
given the structural nature of such labour market shortages. 
2. Flawed policy debates 
Current political debates on international migration, as well as some policy 
and academic discourses, are framed in an inappropriate way. Often, these 
debates lock their participants in a ‘zero sum game’, a ‘them versus us’ focus, 
advocating ‘rights versus numbers’. There is a trade-off between more open 
admission policies and the granting of rights to migrant workers (meaning 
greater openness results in fewer rights1) – or, as indicated above, migrants 
are regarded as commodities with economic ‘utility’. These debates are not 
conducive to well-informed policy as they are fixed in a ‘race to the bottom’ 
paradigm. They engender discrimination and further inequalities within and 
between countries as well as between workers, thus undermining social 
cohesion. Unequal treatment between migrant workers and nationals can 
only depress the wages and working conditions of all workers. From a global 
perspective, these arguments are often articulated by economists based in 
developed countries, even though they also have their proponents in some 
developing countries, not least in the context of discussions on the 
movement of service providers under General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) Mode 4 and the perceived need for a greater openness to 
lower-skilled workers in respect of whom developing countries are seen to 
have a “competitive advantage”. Such arguments, however, should no 
longer be tolerated in the context of current discussions on the post-2015 UN 
development agenda, which will apply to all countries (developing and 
developed) and where promotion of equality is seen as an important element 
both in terms of empowerment and inclusion of marginalised groups, 
including migrants, and the furtherance of greater equality between and 
among countries through, inter alia, policies for planned, well-governed and 
regular migration.2 
                                                   
1 See e.g. M. Ruhs (2013). 
2 See the Focus Areas Document of the Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals, Focus area 12: Promote Equality. 
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While these debates generally recognise that there is a core set of rights 
that needs to be protected in respect of all migrant workers, they struggle to 
articulate what this actually entails and often fail to see that the fundamental 
rights enshrined in international human rights and labour standards should 
in principle be accorded to all human beings and workers, including migrant 
workers and irrespective of their migration status. It is important also to 
view these arguments in the broader context of today’s migration 
governance, which, while connected by and large with labour market issues 
or related economic and social considerations, is often ultimately dominated 
by short-term political priorities or interior policy concerns. 
3. Protection of the rights of migrant workers: 
Non-discrimination and equality of treatment as the guiding 
principle at the global level 
The ILO has been engaged in labour migration since its inception in 1919. In 
underlining the “protection of the interests of workers when employed in 
other countries other than their own” in its 1919 Constitution,3 the ILO 
recognised that the exploitation of one group of workers distorts attempts to 
apply a level playing field within and among countries, which can result in 
social unrest and a breakdown of public order. 
Fundamental principles and rights at work are increasingly in 
jeopardy in various parts of the world. Some countries attempt to ‘cherry 
pick’ their rights by focusing on what is more acceptable to them, although 
often failing to recognise that many of their ‘favoured’ standards can only be 
effectively taken forward if the foundation of fundamental rights – namely, 
equality of treatment and non-discrimination in employment, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, abolition of forced labour, and 
elimination of child labour – is not undermined. With regard to equality of 
treatment and non-discrimination, the two principal ILO instruments, Equal 
Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) – ensuring the application to all 
workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers 
for work of equal value – and the Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) have been widely ratified.4 While 
there is no explicit reference in Convention No. 111 to discrimination on the 
                                                   
3 ILO Constitution, 1919, Preamble. 
4 E.g. Conventions No. 100 and No. 111 have been ratified by 171 and 172 countries 
respectively (including all 28 EU member states). 
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basis of nationality (although such a ground can be added),5 the ILO 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) has underscored that migrant workers are 
covered on other grounds prohibited under this instrument, whilst also 
being subject to discrimination on multiple grounds.6 
Moreover, the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 
(No. 97) contains a strong equality of treatment clause that also influenced 
the adoption of similar provisions in EU free movement law,7 and Part II of 
the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 
143) calls for the adoption of a national policy to promote and guarantee 
equality of opportunity and treatment for migrant workers.8 Conventions 
Nos. 97 and 143 have been ratified by 11 EU/EEA member states (Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, United Kingdom) and 6 EU/EEA member states (Cyprus, Italy, 
Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden) respectively. 
The application of the principle of non-discrimination and equality of 
treatment has been challenged in the EU through the pursuit of a “sectoral” 
approach to regulating labour migration from third countries as opposed to 
the originally intended “horizontal” approach,9 with the result that high-
                                                   
5 Article 1 of Convention No. 111 reads: “For the purpose of this Convention the term 
discrimination includes-- (a) any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of 
race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has 
the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment 
or occupation; (b) such other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or 
occupation as may be determined by the Member concerned after consultation with 
representative employers’ and workers’ organisations, where such exist, and with other 
appropriate bodies”. 
6 International Labour Conference (2012, paras. 776-781). 
7 See Groenendijk (2010, p. 17). 
8 See Convention No. 143, Article 10: “Each Member for which the Convention is in force 
undertakes to declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote and to 
guarantee, by methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of 
opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, of social security, 
of trade union and cultural rights and of individual and collective freedoms for persons 
who as migrant workers or as members of their families are lawfully within its territory.” 
9 See European Commission (2005); the horizontal approach was espoused in a Directive 
proposed by the Commission in 2001, which did not find consensus in the Council and 
was withdrawn, see European Commission (2001). 
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skilled migrants from third countries with “blue card” status can enjoy a 
higher degree of rights’ protection than less-skilled migrant workers.10 These 
distinctions, however, should also be viewed in the context of the most 
privileged group of third-country nationals, namely those who are family 
members of EU citizens. 
Nonetheless, it has been possible to preserve non-discrimination and 
equality of treatment in key areas in the single permit directive and the 
seasonal workers directive,11 such as terms of employment and working 
conditions and social security, including in respect of the export of pensions. 
In contrast, in other regions of the world the picture is less positive. For 
example, the principle of non-discrimination and equality of treatment is not 
a feature of the 2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Rights of Migrant Workers, and in negotiations on a follow-up 
instrument it continues to be challenged with the concept of ‘fair treatment’ 
being preferred to equality of treatment. Under an initiative to promote 
understanding and a positive image of migrants in Southeast and East Asia, 
the ILO has found that much work remains to be done to ensure the 
application of the equal treatment to migrant workers. While approximately 
80% of the respondents surveyed in four destination countries in this region 
recognised the need for migrant workers, close to 60% did not think that 
regular migrant workers should have the same rights and working 
conditions as national workers.12 In the Middle East, some countries have 
put in place or are giving consideration to introducing national minimum 
wages, but with lower levels for migrant workers, while in others there is 
effectively no national comparator because the vast majority of workers in a 
                                                   
10 Compare the text of Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment, with that of Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for 
third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a member state and on a 
common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a member state, and 
especially the more favourable provisions in the former addressing family reunification, 
access to the labour market for family members, and intra-EU mobility. 
11 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
employment as seasonal workers.  
12 The destination countries in question were Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore and 
Thailand. Moreover, in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, approximately 80% of the 
respondents felt that migrant workers in an irregular situation could not expect to have 
any rights at work. 
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particular sector, such as construction or domestic work, are migrants, and 
discriminatory treatment between different national groups of migrant 
workers is also pervasive. 
Consequently, the EU and its member states have a vital role to play to 
ensure that fundamental principles and rights at work, including non-
discrimination and equality of treatment, which are also enshrined in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, are duly valued and promoted in 
discussions on labour migration. Policy debates openly questioning the 
continued application of these principles and proposing that increased 
labour mobility, but with reduced rights, can enhance development 
outcomes are profoundly flawed. Reinforcing these principles rather than 
undermining them is today justified more than ever in light of the need to 
advance human rights and social justice, and the growing consensus that 
eradicating global inequalities is a critical part of an equitable and sustained 
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5. MIGRANT INTEGRATION IN 2020 




Economic crisis, declining welfare services and increasing unemployment 
might not in themselves cause xenophobic and racist attitudes and 
behaviours, but they can provide fertile ground for them to flourish. After 
the Islamophobia of the 2000s, prejudice against Roma and xenophobia 
towards irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Asia and Africa are on 
the rise in the early 2010s. Concomitantly, across the EU, in countries either 
crisis-ridden or doing fairly well despite the economic downturn, far right 
parties have been gaining in electoral strength. 
EU programmes encouraging the exchange of good practices in 
migrant integration and the 11 common basic principles guiding integration 
policies in the EU (introduced in 2004) seem to have reached a saturation 
point. There is a need for innovative approaches. Taking stock of the fact that 
integration happens at the local and regional level, we propose “integration 
partnerships”. These would bring together native and migrant stakeholders, 
state authorities and civil society, educators, professional associations and 
trade unions, cultural associations, and, where relevant, international 
organisations, with the state and local authorities, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and hometown associations of the countries of origin 
of large migrant groups. Integration partnerships are intended as voluntary, 
grass-roots initiatives, albeit supported by a common institutional 
framework to be introduced at the EU level. The notion of integration 
partnerships is inspired by the “mobility partnerships” that have brought 
together a variable geometry of EU countries with a third country for labour 
management. Here we propose a variable geometry of one EU country with 
several countries of origin, with strong involvement of local and regional 
authorities and non-state actors. 
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2. The challenge 
Muslims might be under the negative spotlight to a lesser degree than they 
were a few years ago, but prejudice against Roma, for instance, has attracted 
a lot of attention since 2010. Irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Asia 
and Africa crossing the EU’s southern borders have also attracted a lot of 
attention since the late 2000s and particularly after the Arab spring in 2011. 
Concomitantly, in many EU countries, whether they are crisis-ridden or 
doing fairly well despite the economic downturn, far right parties have been 
gaining in electoral strength. 
Whether in periods of growth or recession, socio-economic data for 
employment, education, health and housing demonstrate that equal and 
proportional inclusion of migrants in vital spheres of life has not yet been 
achieved. With regard to employment, migrants suffer from low 
employment rates, concentration in specific segments of the labour market, 
low wages, poor working conditions and under-representation in senior 
positions in the workplace. Their educational attainment is on average lower 
than that of other groups, they are under-represented in university track 
schools and in higher education, and tend to be concentrated in poorly 
resourced, ethnically and socially homogenous schools. Migrants are 
generally in worse health, have higher death rates and are more likely to be 
exposed to risk than the overall population. They often live in poorer 
housing conditions and are less likely to own property than the rest of the 
population. Migrants tend to reside in poorer urban districts with fewer 
public facilities and a high proportion of migrant residents.1 
Migrant integration is a common challenge for state and civil society 
stakeholders, and at different levels of governance (local, regional, national, 
European). Indeed, migrant integration has been a key priority for 
individual member states and the EU as a whole since the 1990s. While 
integration remains a field of member state competence and actually is best 
implemented at the local level, the EU has taken a proactive approach. It set 
up a full toolkit of anti-discrimination legislation (the RED directives of 
2000); introduced the Common Guiding Principles for Migrant Integration 
(2004); and finalised the EU long-term resident status directive (2003), thus 
providing for a common standard of rights and duties for long-term settled 
third-country nationals. In addition, the EU supports integration policies at 
member state and local level by promoting the exchange of good practices 
and the networking of actors through, for instance, the European Web Site 
                                                   
1 See also Triandafyllidou and Ulasiuk (2013). 
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for Integration. It also funds several types of research and civil society 
programmes through the European Fund for Integration of Third- Country 
Nationals, the Research Framework Programmes and other policy 
initiatives. 
Nonetheless, policies for migrant integration appear to have stalled in 
the ‘old’ host countries, notably those that have experienced immigration 
since the 1950s and 1960s and thus have a history of immigrant integration 
policies. Actually, migrant integration has been transformed into a migrant 
flow management tool through the introduction by several EU countries, e.g. 
the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Germany, of pre-migration language 
and integration tests at the countries of origin of prospective migrants.2 In 
the meantime, ‘recent’ hosts, notably countries that have experienced 
immigration in the last 20 years, such as the southern European countries 
and Ireland, are left to their own devices, adopting rather reluctantly and 
hesitantly policies and programmes for the socio-cultural integration of 
immigrants. Recent discourses on the failure of multiculturalism, such as 
those pronounced by UK Prime Minister David Cameron in 2010 and by 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2011, contribute to an overall negative 
climate surrounding migrant integration. There is not only a new emphasis 
on civic assimilation policies but also on what Cameron has called a new 
“muscular liberalism” that does not tolerate deviance from the majority 
liberal secular norms. Researchers have spoken of an emerging new liberal 
intolerance3 or nationalist intolerance.4 
3. Addressing the challenge: Developing integration 
partnerships 
This section explores a bottom-up and decentralised approach: it proposes 
to set up an institutional framework for “integration partnerships” that 
would promote cooperation and synergies among stakeholders at the 
regional and local level.  
Integration partnerships are intended as a common EU-level 
institutional framework for cooperation between host country and a number 
of stakeholders with a view to addressing jointly the specific challenges that 
native and post-migration minorities and migrant populations may face in a 
given city or region. Such stakeholders include state authorities and civil 
                                                   
2 See individual country chapters in Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014). 
3 Mouritsen and Olsen (2013). 
4 Kouki and Triandafyllidou (2013). 
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society, migrant stakeholders, educators, professional associations, 
employers and trade unions, cultural associations and, where relevant, 
international organisations, with the state and local authorities, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and hometown associations of the 
countries of origin of large migrant groups.  
They are conceived as voluntary partnerships that involve one migrant 
host country (and one or more regions within that country) and one or more 
countries of origin. The partnership involves several actors at local and 
regional level, both state and non-state, and is based on a sense of ownership 
from these local and regional actors.  
Recent research5 has shown that integration challenges are most 
effectively addressed at the local and regional rather than the national level, 
and that migrants’ countries of origin may have a positive role to play in 
contributing to the integration of migrant populations in their country of 
residence. Such contributions can take the form of collaboration for training 
teachers and educators, providing textbooks and educational materials, 
elaborating common curricula, organising cultural activities that help make 
the migrant or minority population more accepted in its region, enhancing 
trade and business opportunities, or forming partnerships of professional 
associations. In other words, they can help in decisive ways to configure 
cultural diversity as a positive and creative feature in a society rather than as 
a cultural threat or economic liability. 
As a policy instrument they are inspired by the much contested notion 
of “mobility partnerships” introduced by the European Commission in 2007 
to help manage legal migration and combat irregular migration from 
important sending and transit countries outside the EU. “Diversity 
partnerships” share with mobility partnerships the effort to bring to a 
negotiation and cooperation table stakeholders that have different levels of 
power. In the case of mobility partnerships such stakeholders involve one 
country of origin and one or more EU countries. The topics that are included 
in the partnership and the timing for the achievement of its goals are 
negotiated among the parties. The mobility partnership provides the 
framework through which to engage in dialogue and to adopt common 
targets, engage in common tasks and ultimately achieve some outcomes that 
are considered valuable to all parties involved. 
Similar to this idea, integration partnerships can involve a wider range 
of topics or a more restricted scope, depending on the challenges that specific 
                                                   
5 See INTERACT project: www.interact.eu. 
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migrant groups pose and the means available for addressing the related 
issues in a given region or city. They can have a very ambitious set of goals 
or a more restricted one and can develop along different timelines. The 
important thing in the integration partnerships is that they bring the 
different diversity stakeholders together and engage both majority and 
minority actors in dialogue and cooperation. 
Integration partnerships are conceived as start-up schemes with very 
little seed funding, which will come up with concrete proposals for 
initiatives that may or may not require a substantial state intervention of 
public financial support. They are aimed at mobilising not only financial but 
also human and social capital resources among both immigrant and majority 
populations, thus contributing to a more inclusive society for all. The 
advantage of the integration partnerships is that they provide a common 
institutional framework, created by the state and activated at the regional or 
local level, for the different actors to meet, engage in dialogue, identify 
common concerns, conceive of solutions that are of mutual benefit, and 
proceed with implementing the agreed solutions, taking ownership of such 
programmes rather than experiencing them as top-down command-and-
control policies or bottom-up initiatives that are not sustainable in the long 
run. 
The integration partnerships idea is inspired by the need for more 
dynamic, flexible and interactive policy instruments in the overall area of 
managing migrant socio-economic integration while securing social 
cohesion. Integration partnerships can assume different shapes and sizes 
depending on the region or city and of course the relevant migrant 
populations. They are dynamic because they point to the common challenges 
that cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity raises in European 
societies, without reifying culture or ethnic identity. They rather pay 
attention to the grievances that people feel and the ways to address these 
grievances by balancing the interests and concerns of both host societies and 
migrants. 
Integration partnerships propose a holistic approach to migrant 
integration, bringing together several policy areas within a given region or 
city, e.g. education, employment, civic or political participation, seeking to 
create economies of scale and multiplier effects.  
Economies of scale: by addressing several policy areas within a common 
institutional framework for cooperation, the integration partnerships can 
achieve economies of scale.  
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Multiplier effects are intended in the sense of cultivating an overall 
climate and policy approach that recognises cultural diversity as integral to 
the given city’s or region’s local identity and that celebrates such diversity as 
an enriching and positive feature. To this end integration partnerships can 
become points of contact and cooperation between immigrant groups with a 
view to discussing common challenges and considering how to address 
them. The German Forum for Integration or several inter-faith dialogue 
initiatives taken up in the UK can serve as examples of how such multiplier 
effects and an overall positive integration climate can be reinforced. 
An obvious policy area where integration partnerships can have a 
strong effect is the field of combatting discrimination in employment or 
housing. Migrants can come together with local authorities to devise 
information campaigns seeking to change negative stereotypes or may 
engage in common self-help projects that address housing needs. In 
addition, countries of origin can contribute to the development of 
transnational economic activities that boost trade and create business 
opportunities for migrants and countries of origin alike, with the 
participation and support of businesses, trade unions, and professional 
associations in the host country. 
Another example comes from migrant education: while expanding 
provisions for support classes for migrant children may entail significant 
financial and organisational costs for local and regional authorities, when 
such courses are embedded in wider integration partnerships such costs can 
be mitigated. For instance, the integration partnership can work towards 
providing volunteer teaching assistance, or by parents and other local actors 
offering their premises for classes or fundraising.  
Integration partnerships are intended as flexible schemes where the 
interested parties would define the policy areas where joint work is needed 
and in which direction.  
The policy areas that we envisage should be covered include: 
 education of migrant children, exchange of handbooks, bilingual 
teachers; 
 religious education provision – imams and religion teachers; 
 religious practice, temples, priests; 
 workplace sensitivities (dress code, special dietary requirements); 
 support hometown associations: for every euro they raise, pay them an 
additional euro; 
 training and retraining of unemployed third-country nationals; and 
 language courses for unemployed third-country nationals. 
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An integration partnership can cover one or more of these domains 
and provides the framework within which the specific agreement and the 
participating countries and actors will be specified. 
References 
Kouki, H. and A. Triandafyllidou (2013), “Muslim Immigrants and the Greek 
Nation: The emergence of Nationalist Intolerance”, Ethnicities, Vol. 13, No. 6, pp. 
709-728. 
Mouritsen, P. and V. Olsen (2013), “Liberalism and the diminishing space of 
toleration”, in J. Dobbernack and T. Modood (eds), Tolerance, intolerance and 
respect: Hard to Accept?, London: Palgrave, pp. 127-159. 
Triandafyllidou, A. and I. Ulasiuk (2013), “Cultural diversity: Advantage or 
liability?”, Policy Brief No. 2013/04, Global Governance Programme, EUI, 
Florence, July.  
Triandafyllidou, A. and R. Gropas (2014), European Immigration. A Sourcebook, 





QUALIFICATIONS, SKILLS AND NEEDS 
 37 
 
6. QUALIFICATIONS, SKILLS AND 
INTEGRATION 
MARIA VINCENZA DESIDERIO 
uman capital is the single most important resource for 
contemporary knowledge economies. As stated in the Europe 2020 
strategy,1 the availability of a highly skilled and productive 
workforce is a key driver of smart growth and innovation in such economic 
systems. While the global talent pool continues to expand, international 
professionals are also increasingly sought after by a growing number of 
countries. Against this background, the opportunities that each country can 
offer skilled individuals to make full use of their qualifications and 
competences across borders are crucial to its comparative attractiveness, 
economic competitiveness and growth. Efficient systems for the recognition 
of foreign-acquired diplomas, skills and work experience are an essential 
instrument to realise this potential.  
The difficulties that skilled workers and professionals face in obtaining 
the recognition of qualifications and competences acquired in their countries 
of origin are a major barrier to international mobility and to the optimal 
integration of foreign workers in the receiving countries’ labour markets, in 
terms of employability, jobs-skills matching and career paths. It is difficult 
to entirely disentangle each of the different elements that negatively affect 
the labour market outcomes of skilled immigrants as compared to their 
native counterparts. Nevertheless, it has been largely acknowledged that the 
lower returns to foreign education and work experience are, together with 
the limited mastery of the host country’s language, the two main reasons 
explaining higher over-qualification rates for immigrants relative to the 
native-born.2 According to a Eurostat pilot study on the indicators of 
immigrant integration,3 in 2009, the over-qualification rate of third-country 
                                                   
1 European Commission (2010). 
2 Shuster and Desiderio (2013); see also Bonfanti and Xenogiani (2014).  
3 Eurostat (2011). 
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nationals was 15 percentage points higher than for natives (36% and 21%, 
respectively) on average across the EU. Corresponding figures for most of 
the other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries are similar if not greater. These findings point to a 
significant waste of human capital through migration, which needs to be 
addressed, especially as the global economy becomes increasingly 
dependent on skills, and international competition for talent intensifies.   
Lengthy, cumbersome and costly procedures for the recognition of 
foreign-acquired credentials represent a particularly stubborn obstacle for 
qualified immigrants to access regulated professions, as the practice of such 
professions is generally conditional on formal recognition. For example, long 
retraining periods, such as those required in the United States for obtaining 
full recognition of foreign medical credentials, may discourage foreign 
qualified professionals to go through the recognition procedure, thus 
hampering their ability to put their skills to best use in the host economy. 
From the receiving country perspective, this skill ‘waste’ is of particular 
concern for those professions – such as, typically, the health and care 
professions – in which there are growing shortages of workers with domestic 
qualifications. This skill ‘waste’ also represents a loss for an immigrant’s 
country of origin, which may have invested significant public funds in 
education and training of its citizens, and, lacking adequate recognition of 
their credentials in the countries of destination, is less likely to see the best 
return for this investment in terms of knowledge and capital transfers.  
Access to unregulated professions by foreign-qualified immigrants is 
not formally conditional on qualification recognition. However, the 
unfamiliarity of employers with foreign education and workforce training 
systems and foreign professional standards may translate into relative 
disadvantages for migrants as compared to natives and domestically 
qualified foreigners in the recruitment process, as well as in terms of career 
paths and opportunities for upward professional mobility. This is 
particularly the case of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), for 
which hiring immigrants is not a frequent recruitment practice. Notably, 
SME employers in OECD countries tend to perceive credentials issued by 
developing countries’ educational institutions as a risk, as they are less likely 
to be able to assess the actual ‘value’ of such credentials during the 
recruitment process. The information costs, and perceived risks associated 
with foreign qualifications and experience, mean that employers may prefer 
domestically qualified candidates, even if they have inferior credentials than 
their immigrant counterparts. When immigrants with foreign credentials are 
hired, it is not unusual for them to be initially employed at lower levels of 
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responsibility, or to earn lower wages than employees with domestic 
qualifications.  
Over the past five to ten years, many EU member states and OECD 
countries have adopted measures to improve the recognition of foreign 
qualifications, as part of the policy efforts aimed at fostering immigrant 
integration and at unlocking the economic potential of skilled migration. The 
Migration Policy Institute (MPI) has recently concluded research examining 
good practice for the recognition of foreign credentials in Europe and North 
America and has assessed how countries can cooperate more fully to 
recognise each other’s qualifications.4 The MPI’s research has identified three 
main groups of measures implemented at the national level that can help 
improve the productive use of foreign-acquired skills: 
 Measures to facilitate access to information on the recognition 
procedures and their outcomes for migrants, employers and 
regulators.  
In many EU member states and OECD countries, the path towards 
recognition presents a high degree of complexity. This complexity 
stems from a fragmentation of responsibility for assessing foreign 
credentials across multiple institutions (competent authorities) within 
each country, which may result from administrative decentralisation 
and/or public safety concerns. While it is unlikely and in some cases 
undesirable that the multiplicity of authorities in charge of recognition 
will be drastically eliminated – for example, it is in the public interest 
that foreign medical credentials are assessed by the health authority 
rather than by a generalist education authority – efficient and user-
friendly information services that guide the foreign professionals 
through the complexity of the national recognition system can be 
particularly helpful. In Austria, for example, where the recognition 
process is particularly complex,5 dedicated ‘one-stop-shops’ providing 
comprehensive information and guidance have recently been 
established in Wien, Salzburg, Linz and Graz, to encourage 
immigrants to seek recognition of their foreign-acquired credentials. 
New technologies also offer a big opportunity to facilitate access 
to information on recognition procedures. Thus dedicated Internet 
                                                   
4 MPI project on “Brain Waste & Credential Recognition”; the project was funded by the 
Delegation of the European Union to the United States for the period 2012-13, see 
www.migrationpolicy.org/topics/brain-waste-credential-recognition.  
5 OECD (2012).   
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portals detailing national recognition procedures have proliferated 
over the past five years. Such tools only achieve their full potential 
when they provide multilingual information, including in the idioms 
most frequently spoken by the main immigrant groups in each 
country. Moreover, databases that compile the results of foreign 
credentials assessments, which can then be made accessible to the 
different assessing bodies, can make recognition procedures faster and 
more standardised. The new German federal law on the recognition of 
foreign qualifications (Berufsqualifikationsfeststellungsgesetz, BQFC) 
which entered into force in April 2012, has provided for the 
compilation and mutual accessibility of a database on recognition 
outcomes by all competent authorities, with the aim of ensuring 
consistency across the recognition decisions, and speeding-up 
assessment processes. Opportunities to make these kinds of databases 
accessible to the wider public – and, notably, to the employers – could 
be explored as a measure likely to reduce significantly the uncertainty 
and information costs associated with the recruitment of a foreign-
qualified professionals.     
 Measures to facilitate early and timely recognition.  
The first insertion in the labour market can have a particularly 
persistent scarring effect for migrants, influencing their career paths 
and prospects for professional development in the medium-long 
term.6 On the one hand, employers typically attribute greater value to 
work experience acquired in the host country than to foreign 
credentials. On the other hand, the longer migrants stay in a receiving 
country without getting their foreign credentials recognised, the less 
likely they are to bother trying. For these reasons, foreign-qualified 
professionals should be provided with the opportunity to get their 
credentials assessed (if not recognised) at the earliest possible point in 
their migration trajectory, and ideally pre-departure. Australia has 
been a pioneer in this respect. Pre-departure assessment of foreign 
qualifications was introduced for the first time as a mandatory 
requirement for admission under the General Skilled stream in 1999. 
Since July 2012 this requirement applies to all candidates under the 
new Skill Select programme. Similarly, since May 2013, admission to 
Canada under the Federal Skilled Worker Program has been made 
conditional on credential assessment. In the EU, the German BQFC has 
                                                   
6 Capps, Fix and Yi-Ying Lin (2010).   
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foreseen the possibility for migration candidates to apply for 
recognition from their countries of origin prior to departure. The BQFC 
has also set a time limit for the issuance of recognition decisions (three 
to four months depending on the complexity of the case). Indeed, the 
timeliness of the recognition procedure is key to improving the 
economic contribution of foreign-qualified migrants to the host-
country’s economy.  
 Credentialing procedures tailored to foreign-trained professionals 
and allowing for early labour market access.  
To improve the efficiency of recognition procedures for regulated 
professions, governments may work with regulators to ensure that 
foreign-trained professionals get as much credit as possible for the 
education and work experience they acquired abroad. In most cases, 
automatic recognition of foreign credentials in regulated professions is 
not possible, as such credentials are not entirely comparable with local 
standards. Thus, the issuance of the authorisation to practice a 
regulated profession to foreign-trained professionals is generally 
conditional on compensatory measures, warranting that skills gaps are 
filled. To facilitate and encourage recognition and ensure that foreign-
professionals can contribute as early as possible their full set of skills 
to the host country’s economy, compensatory measures should be 
specifically designed for foreign-qualified professionals. Thus tailored 
training modules to fill in specific skills gaps – known as bridging 
courses – are preferable to less targeted options requiring immigrants 
to retake entire years of general professional training in their receiving 
country. Bridging courses are widely used in Australia and have 
recently gained momentum also in the EU member states, e.g. Sweden. 
On-the-job training and opportunities of supervised work or 
conditional registration while completing licensing requirements 
should also be promoted as far as possible, as such measures allow a 
candidate to familiarise his- or herself with the local working 
environment – and thus to acquire local job-specific language and 
networks – and help counteract the risk of deskilling associated with 
long interruptions in professional practice. Work-based compensatory 
measures are commonly applied in Canada. To maximise the cost-
efficiency of compensatory measures for the recognition of foreign 
qualifications and support the optimal labour market integration of 
foreign professionals, training modules could be coupled with tailored 
language courses.  
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Moreover, MPI’s research on the recognition of foreign 
credentials has showed that mutual recognition agreements can also 
be well-suited to serve the objectives of facilitating access to 
information on recognition procedures, ensuring standardised 
procedures and consistency in recognition outcomes, providing the 
opportunity for obtaining recognition at the earliest possible stage in 
the migration process, and setting credentialing procedures tailored to 
the specific needs of foreign qualified professionals.7  
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7. CHALLENGES IN SKILLS 
IDENTIFICATION, ANTICIPATION AND 
MONITORING 
NATALIA POPOVA 
kills identification, anticipation and monitoring are a challenge 
throughout both origin and destination countries. There is no uniform 
definition of “skills”: in many EU countries “skills” are defined in terms 
of occupational skills and/or educational attainment levels. Further, there is 
no single formula for skill needs analysis; however, from the experience of 
the European Union member states, what has proved to be useful is a holistic 
approach: a combination of qualitative analysis, e.g. case studies, focus 
group discussions, as well as quantitative data, e.g. surveys, skill audits, 
model-based projections. Long-term skill forecasts are usually carried out at 
the national level, whereas short-term forecasts are conducted at the regional 
or local levels, often through the network of the Public Employment Services 
(PES).  
It should be noted that skill forecasting methods could only provide 
useful insight, rather than exact measurement, of skills demand in the future 
in response to labour market trends and developments. These exercises 
could offer very useful information to a broad range of users in the areas of 
career guidance, employment, and training and labour migration policy 
design.1  
In many origin countries, skill forecasting methods are either non-
existent or implemented on a limited basis, often due to data scarcity. 
Further, economic globalisation and the presence of a large informal sector 
are additional complicating factors, making the exercise of skills 
identification and skills matching even more challenging. Experience 
demonstrates that skills needs analyses are often attached to ad hoc project 
initiatives, which remain at pilot level and are not implemented in a 
                                                   
1 Kolyshko, Panzica, Popa and Popova (2013). 
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systematic way. Thus it is of key importance that these types of interventions 
do not remain stand-alone initiatives but are rather incorporated in a broader 
set of education and training reforms.2 
In this context, skills and labour market matching remains a challenge, 
both for potential and return migrants. Access to skills recognition processes, 
especially for low- and medium-skilled migrant workers, is often limited. 
Migrants frequently encounter difficulties in articulating their experiences 
from the destination countries into better human resources development 
opportunities on their return. There has been an intense policy debate on the 
perceived positive link between return migration and the socio-economic 
progress of origin countries; yet the reality is much more complex and there 
is often little empirical analysis to illustrate this important relationship, also 
in terms of labour market re-integration, and what factors play a role in 
facilitating or impeding it.3 
A recent labour migration survey in Ukraine, implemented with EU-
funding and ILO technical support and covering 27,000 households and 
more than 43,000 individuals, extrapolated that the migrant flow (defined in 
this case as those working or searching for a job abroad at any time during 
the preceding two and a half years) was 1.2 million or 3.4% of the population 
aged 15 to 70. The average duration of stay abroad was five months. Almost 
two-thirds of the labour migrants have completed general secondary 
education. Female migrant workers have higher levels of education than 
men; however, they are more often engaged in occupations of lower status. 
Almost a quarter (23.7%) of Ukrainian migrant workers were engaged in 
occupations different from those they had held in Ukraine.4 In a similar 
survey conducted in Moldova, covering 6,040 households, reaching 11,230 
persons between the ages of 15 and 64, nearly one-fifth (17%) of Moldova’s 
working-age population was currently employed or searching for a job 
abroad over the last 24 months. Labour migrants often occupy low-skilled 
jobs (42.3%), and only 11.3% of Moldovan migrant workers were able to find 
work in the same sector in which they had worked prior to leaving the 
country.5  
In order to respond to continuously changing labour market demand, 
education and training should be provided from a lifelong learning 
                                                   
2 Alquezar, Avato, Bardak, Panzica and Popova (2010). 
3 Cantarji, Lipcanu, Panzica, Popova, Vladicescu, Toarta and Vremis (forthcoming). 
4 Ukraine Labour Migration Survey (2013). 
5 Moldova Labour Migration Survey (2013). 
CHALLENGES IN SKILLS IDENTIFICATION, ANTICIPATION AND MONITORING  45 
perspective, meaning that people of all ages will have equal and open access 
to quality learning opportunities. This will contribute to keeping individual 
employability throughout life, preventing long periods of unemployment 
and poverty.  
For initial training, the skill supply should put vocational and general 
secondary education on a convergence path. Secondary education should 
reinforce the core work skills, such as learning how to learn, mathematical 
literacy and basic competences in science and technology, communication in 
the mother tongue, etc., to allow individuals to adapt to new labour market 
situations and acquire new skills throughout their careers. Specific 
occupational skills can be provided either at secondary vocational and post-
secondary level or through training, preferably in the workplace.  
Continuous or adult training is not sufficiently developed in many 
origin countries. This fact is explained by several factors: the lack of 
conceptual framework, the need for an effective social partnership in 
education and training, as well as funding availability. Thus the possibilities 
for unemployed workers to be retrained or for employed persons to upgrade 
their skills are often limited. Last but not least, reforms are needed to 
improve the functioning of the training market and to create incentives for 
employers and workers to train.  
Almost all European countries have developed or are in the process of 
establishing qualification frameworks, providing additional mechanisms to 
align education and training to labour market needs. Regardless of where 
training takes place, it can lead to qualifications, which are recognisable and 
portable. The establishment of a National Qualifications Framework (NQF) 
sets out the levels against which a qualification can be recognised. The 
accreditation of qualifications ensures quality and transparency for both 
learners and employers.  
The creation of NQFs is a long-term process. A short to medium-term 
solution and a stepping-stone for developing a full-fledged framework can 
be the establishment of sector occupational requirements committees with 
trend-setting companies in each sector. The validity of the work of these 
committees depends very much on the quality of the companies invited to 
participate and on the level of tripartite involvement, meaning the 
involvement of government, employer and worker representatives.  
The above tools refer mainly to the formal education system, but 
recognition of prior (non-formal/informal) learning is also viewed as a 
means of enhancing employability, labour mobility and career prospects. In 
many origin countries, a large share of employment is informal. Validation 
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of prior learning can help workers to move into the formal economy. That is 
why appropriate tools should be adapted, benefiting from the experience in 
the EU. In this area, a recent example is the technical assistance delivered 
within the EU-funded ILO project “Effective Governance of Labour 
Migration and its Skill Dimensions”. The project worked for the 
establishment of a system for recognition of qualifications and validation of 
‘non-formal and informal learning’ in Moldova and Ukraine.6 In turn, this 
type of assistance could contribute to improving the overall quality and 
relevance of education and training in the two countries. In Ukraine, 15 
occupational profiles were designed in tourism, construction and 
agriculture, in collaboration with the relevant government institutions and 
the social partners. Based upon this initial phase, it appears necessary to 
support the national stakeholders in establishing a normative framework for 
a consistent design process of the occupational standards for all sectors as 
well as for testing the mechanism of the recognition of prior learning in other 
sectors. In Moldova, six occupational standards were developed for blue-
collar jobs in the agriculture and construction sectors. This was coupled with 
the creation and capacity building of a team of national experts in 
occupational standards, as well as designing practical tools and 
recommendations for the amendment of the legal framework.  
A ‘one size fits all approach’ to technical assistance does not work, 
since policy, process, practice, procedures and institutional logic are 
country-specific. At national level, providing capacity building for skill 
needs analysis is important and should be part of the overall improvement 
of labour market information systems. This will help origin countries to 
move to more evidence-based employment and human resources policy. 
Here, the main targeted institutions should be the Ministries of Labour, the 
Public Employment Services and the national statistical offices. However, 
this type of assistance is not sufficient.  
Efforts to improve skills identification and matching should be 
combined with comprehensive education, training and labour market 
reforms, aimed at strengthening governance and fostering policy coherence 
across key institutions and the social partners to deliver on employment 
goals. These coordinated efforts will also result in improved coordination 
and information exchange between the education system and the labour 
market, thus providing the basis for up-to-date skills information and 
forecasting.  
                                                   
6 Mansfield and Downey (2013). 
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At organisation and systems level, skills development, training 
organisations and training delivery systems should be strengthened by 
promoting a lifelong learning approach, as highlighted also by the ILO 
Recommendation 195 on Human Resources Development, 2004. This frame 
should be translated at system level by designing and implementing policies 
aimed at identifying occupational requirements, which can be translated into 
occupational and educational standards. The success of these policies 
depends on the endorsement of the tripartite constituents; therefore, 
provision to them of adequate capacity building is crucial. 
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8. LABOUR MARKET NEEDS AND 
MIGRATION POLICY OPTIONS: 
TOWARDS MORE DYNAMIC LABOUR 
MARKETS 
MARTIN KAHANEC 
emographic changes present almost all EU member states with 
worrying trends, such as ageing populations, scarcity of skilled 
labour, lack of entrepreneurial and innovative dynamism, and 
financial risks in social security systems. The Great Recession has aggravated 
the difficulties through rising risk aversion and economic decline, but also 
economic nationalism and worsening attitudes towards immigrants and 
minorities. These challenges result in a growing competition for diminishing 
human capital, create holes and gaps in the EU’s social fabric, and 
undermine the sustainability of the welfare state in Europe. 
Mobility within the EU and immigration from third countries enhance 
efficient allocation of economic resources and thus provide for growth and 
welfare. They also increase the flexibility of labour markets and enable 
economies to adjust to economic shocks. In particular, they help to satisfy the 
demand for skilled workers and reduce mismatching in the labour market. 
Skilled migrants help to generate jobs for unskilled workers, which is 
important in particular during economic crises.  
Interregional mobility within the EU is rather low by international 
standards, however. The situation is better when it comes to immigration to 
the EU from third countries, as immigration to the EU is substantial and the 
migrants who come are generally rather skilled.1 However, Europe is losing 
in the global competition for skilled migrant workers, and migrants tend to 
downgrade into jobs below their level of qualification.2  
                                                   
1 Zimmermann (2005); Kahanec (2013). 
2 Kahanec (2013). 
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What migration policy frameworks can help Europe to effectively 
govern international flows of workers and alleviate some of the challenges 
enumerated above? What migration policy frameworks can enhance labour 
matching in Europe, and help Europe to reinvent itself as a global leader in 
innovation and knowledge-driven economic progress? These are the 
questions and narrowly defined perspectives on migration policy that this 
contribution sheds light on.  
Let us first consider a laissez-faire approach under which it is the supply 
of and demand for migrant workers that drive migration flows, with the 
state merely facilitating the process but not seeking to actively affect the size 
or directionality of migration flows. This policy approach best describes 
mobility within the EU’s internal market, and is supported by several studies 
that highlight the benefits of enhanced mobility for EU labour markets.3  
More broadly, however, we need to note that although the laissez-faire 
approach is relatively cost-efficient, it may be insufficient to tackle actual or 
perceived risks of immigration, or negative attitudes towards migrants. This 
is because migrants are perceived as competitors not only in the labour 
market but also in access to welfare benefits and public goods. Another 
problem with an orthodox laissez-faire approach may be that rich countries 
with compressed income distribution, such as most EU member states, tend 
to attract low-skilled immigrants.4 Therefore, migration policies that select 
migrants on skills may be needed precisely in the EU, if the grand objective 
of migration policy is contributing to a skill-driven knowledge economy. 
Finally, declining sectors, rather than innovate, might adopt low-cost 
strategies and hire cheaper immigrant workers to preserve their 
competitiveness. This would again be a problem in view of the aspiration to 
become a leader in terms of innovation, research and development.  
One way of addressing some of the actual or perceived risks is to 
impose general immigration quotas. Whereas such quotas would perhaps 
assuage the fear of mass immigration and at least in theory provide policy-
makers with an ‘emergency brake’, aggregate quotas are usually rather 
arbitrary and unrelated to labour market skill matching.  
A more nuanced approach is positive selection of skills in shortage in 
the labour market. Its main difficulty is the problematic identification of skill 
shortages. Labour shortages signal imperfections and sluggish adjustment in 
                                                   
3 Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010); Kahanec, Zimmermann, Kurekova and Biavaschi 
(2013). 
4 Roy (2014).  
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the labour market. Economists view skill shortage as a temporary deviation 
from an equilibrium, which then prompts adjustment through wages, labour 
supply or labour demand. However, there may be market failures, such as 
lack of information, adjustment costs, labour market regulation, inflexible 
industrial relations and skill formation systems, which all potentially delay 
the adjustment and result in lasting skill mismatches.  
Measurement of skill and labour shortages is a complex task. The key 
issue is whether what we observe is a ‘real’ shortage (not enough people with 
a given skill, relative to the demand, for any reasonable wage) or a problem 
of matching and wage adjustment, such as when the wage offered is too low 
or the reservation wage is too high (though there are in principle enough 
workers with the demanded skill). In the literature a number of alternative 
measures of skill shortages have been proposed.5 These include the 
unemployment-to-vacancy ratio, wage premium, elasticity of labour supply, 
and difficulties to fill vacancies reported by employers. For all these 
measures of shortage variation over time as well as across industries, 
occupation and region need to be considered.  
There are, however, a number of conceptual and practical problems 
with the proposed measures. To list just a few, first, the indicators of shortage 
generally produce conflicting results. One way to alleviate this issue is to 
look at several indicators and by doing so triangulate real shortages. Such an 
approach may be practical, but it does not solve the conceptual challenge. 
Second, the measurement of supply of skills is problematic as it requires the 
analyst to assign all potential workers, i.e. also those not currently working, 
to skill groups. This is particularly difficult with regard to the possibility that 
workers can adjust and amend their skills, and some skills are more general 
and readily adjustable whereas other types of skills are more rigid. Finally, 
what matters from the policy perspective is not only current but also future 
skill and labour mismatching. The need to forecast the supply as well as 
demand for labour and skills exacerbates the aforementioned challenges.  
These arguments indicate that migration policy based on a preferential 
treatment of immigrants, nominally satisfying narrowly-defined measured 
demand for skills, may be self-defeating. To search for a policy alternative 
that addresses the shortcomings of an orthodox laissez-faire approach and 
avoids the challenge of measurement of skill and labour shortages, it is 
useful to briefly discuss skill-based selective frameworks.  
                                                   
5 Zimmermann, Bonin, Fahr and Hinte (2007). 
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A number of countries apply selective migration policies that favour 
the immigration of skilled workers, including points-based systems applied 
by, e.g. Australia, Canada or the UK (although in the last it is being 
deconstructed), but also a number of EU member states applying various 
special provisions for skilled immigrants.6 Especially the points-based 
approaches provide a systematic and transparent regulatory framework. 
There is also evidence that selective migration policies lead to changes of 
migration flows, which are in line with policy objectives, and that they 
increase the employability of migrants from given origins.7  
However, depending on their design, selective migration policies tend 
to be costly. The costs are especially high for migration policies that are based 
on identification of skill and labour shortages in the domestic labour market. 
Although some of the burden can be shared with immigrants, e.g. if there is 
an automated pre-screening based on self-reported variables, identification 
of skill needs as well as the regular adjustment, fine-tuning and monitoring 
of the system involve significant pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs. 
Additionally, skill-based selection frameworks generally select migrants 
based on only a small set of observable characteristics that are only proxies 
for the true determinants of migrants’ employability and labour market 
potential. Furthermore, they are not a system of quick response, should new 
shortages emerge or old shortages wither away. Finally, they reduce the risk 
but do not prevent subsequent downgrading into jobs below migrants’ 
measured skills; hence integration policies need to complement migration 
policies. 
Based on these considerations, I propose that an immigration 
framework suitable for addressing the EU’s desire to become a leading 
global knowledge-based economy would involve a gradual liberalisation of 
mobility between the European Union and selected third countries. This 
should start with liberalisation of visa regimes, a stepped up engagement 
through mobility frameworks at various levels and possibly for specific 
sectors and occupations, work permit liberalisation and facilitation, and 
enhanced transparency and simplification of immigration procedures. Step-
by-step liberalisation should start with a smaller set of selected countries 
with whom the EU already has established cooperation frameworks, 
                                                   
6 Kahanec and Zimmermann (2011). 
7 CIC (2010); Birrell, Hawthorne and Richardson (2006); Grangier, Hodgson and McLeod 
(2012). 
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possibly including some advanced economies but also some of the countries 
covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
In order to facilitate inflow of workers with demanded skills and better 
labour market matching, the preferred migration policy framework should 
select immigrants on general skills. Although it may be tempting to favour 
immigrants possessing skills that one would evaluate to be in shortage, the 
conceptual problems of such an approach do not seem to justify its possible 
benefits. An approach based on selection of general skills is also considerably 
cheaper and more transparent to administer, given that it does not require 
costly evaluation of which specific skills are in shortage.  
Any immigration framework should also involve enhancement of 
complementary migrant integration policies, including skill transferability, 
recognition of social rights, reduction of informational gaps, transparency 
towards the general public, including dissemination of results from relevant 
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9. FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: 
THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS AND 
THE RECOGNITION OF 
QUALIFICATIONS IN THE EU 
KATHARINA EISELE 
n recent years the EU has repeatedly called for a forward-looking, 
flexible and comprehensive labour migration policy – in particular under 
the Europe 2020 Strategy – stressing that it can contribute to smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth.1 The European Commission emphasised 
in March 2014 that “Europe must attract new talent and compete on the 
global stage.”2 However, the repudiation of professional qualifications and 
academic diplomas still constitutes one of the major challenges to effectively 
attract foreign workers to the EU: the recognition of foreign qualifications 
and skills is of vital importance for making labour markets and economies 
more attractive and accessible to third-country workers, but no EU-wide 
system exists.  
To recall, the practice of certain professions in the member states can 
be contingent on having a specific qualification, for example the professions 
of architects or engineers. The requirements for obtaining such professional 
qualifications may differ across the EU, and a person who was a fully 
qualified professional in one member state would not necessarily be able to 
carry out his/her profession in another member state.3 To tackle this 
problem, the EU adopted consolidated rules on the recognition of 
qualifications in 2005. Thus for nationals of an EU member state Directive 
                                                   
1 See for example on the Europe 2020 Strategy, European Commission Communication 
(2010, p. 18); see also Carrera, Faure, Guild and Kostakopoulou (2011). 
2 European Commission (2014, p. 4).  
3 For a detailed study, see Schneider (1995).  
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2005/36/EC (Professional Qualifications Directive) provides the legal 
framework for the recognition of professional qualifications by the host 
member state for regulated professions pursued on either an employed or 
self-employed basis.4 For a limited number of professions the Professional 
Qualifications Directive allows for automatic recognition, such as doctors, 
dentists and nurses. For a large number of professions the so-called “general 
system” provides for the mutual recognition of qualifications in which 
member states proceed on a case-by-case basis (in principle access to a 
regulated profession is granted to a person who can demonstrate that he/she 
is fully qualified in the home member state). 
The Professional Qualifications Directive was updated in 2013 to 
affirm the underlying principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust.5 
The changes concern, among other things, the use of modern technologies in 
recognition procedures to speed up processes (introduction of the Internal 
Market Information System), but also better access to information, the 
modernisation of harmonised minimum training requirements, and 
common training principles.  
Today, about 740 categories of regulated professions exist in all EU 
member states.6 In October 2013, the Commission announced the start of an 
evaluation of national regulations on the access to professions.7 The aim is to 
improve access to regulated professions with a view to promoting the 
mobility of qualified professionals in the EU’s internal market as well as to 
facilitate the cross-border provision of services.  
While there are specific rules applicable to EU nationals on the 
recognition of professional qualifications, no EU framework exists that 
applies to third-country nationals. The fact that there is no common EU 
                                                   
4 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 
2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, consolidated version of 24 March 
2011. 
5 Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 
2013 amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications 
and Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal 
Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’). 
6 See “Regulated Professions Database” of the European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?fuseaction=h
ome.home. 
7 European Commission Communication (2013). 
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framework for third-country nationals in place, nor a framework that 
regulates the recognition of qualifications from outside the EU, is one of the 
main outstanding issues.  
Yet the scope of application of the Professional Qualifications Directive 
is extended to certain groups of third-country nationals, namely:  
- family members of EU citizens under Directive 2004/38/EC (Citizens’ 
Directive);8  
- refugees under Directive 2004/83/EC;9   
- long-term residents under Directive 2003/109/EC;10  
- EU Blue Card holders under Directive 2009/50/EC (EU Blue Card 
Directive);11  
- researchers under Directive 2005/71/EC.12 
This extension of the Professional Qualifications Directive applies, 
however, with geographical limitations, which adds considerably to the 
variable geometry: while the Citizens’ Directive binds all EU member states, 
the EU Blue Card Directive and Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term 
residents are not applicable to the UK, Ireland and Denmark. Directive 
2004/83/EC on refugees binds the UK and Ireland, but not Denmark. By 
contrast, Directive 2005/71/EC on researchers does not apply to the UK and 
Denmark, but Ireland opted in. 
It is interesting to note that the preamble of the EU Blue Card Directive 
states that “professional qualifications acquired by a third-country national 
in another Member State should be recognised in the same way as those of 
                                                   
8 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States. 
9 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted. 
10 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents. 
11 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment. 
12 Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting 
third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research. 
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Union citizens. Qualifications acquired in a third-country should be taken 
into account in conformity with Directive 2005/36/EC”.13 In line with the 
wording member states are thus not obliged to recognise the professional 
qualifications acquired by a third-country national (before submitting an EU 
Blue Card application) in another member state in the same way as those of 
EU citizens. 
Directive 2004/83/EC on refugees provides that member states must 
ensure equal treatment between beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary 
protection status and nationals in the context of the existing recognition 
procedures for foreign diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications.14 Similarly, long-term residents, EU Blue Card holders and 
researchers (as well as holders of a single permit under Directive 
2011/98/EU15) enjoy equal treatment with nationals of the member state 
concerned as regards the recognition of professional diplomas, certificates 
and other qualifications in accordance with the relevant national 
procedures.16  
This equal treatment rule raises some fundamental questions: first, the 
equal treatment concerning recognition of qualification is granted in relation 
to nationals of a member state – however, qualifications that nationals have 
obtained are normally not subject to recognition procedures (if not obtained 
abroad). Second, one may wonder what exactly is meant by the addition “in 
accordance with the relevant national procedures”. A fair system must 
ensure that member states cannot invoke national rules and procedures to 
circumvent the equal treatment accorded by the respective directives. Third, 
it is not specified whether the equal treatment covers qualifications issued 
by member states and those issued by third states alike.  
                                                   
13 See Recital 19 of Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009. 
14 See Article 27(3) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004.  
15 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to 
reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for 
third-country workers legally residing in a Member State; the third-country workers 
referred to under Art. 12 are defined in Art. 3(1)(b) and (c) of Directive 2011/98/EU on 
a single permit. 
16 Art. 11(1)(c) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003; Art. 14(1)(d) of 
Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009; Art. 12(a) of Council Directive 
2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005; Art. 12(1)(d) of Directive 2011/98/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011. 
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The lack of an EU-wide recognition of qualifications has been criticised 
in relation to the EU Blue Card Directive that aims to attract “highly 
qualified” third-country nationals. “Many EU countries do not have 
adequate legal frameworks for recognizing qualifications from outside the 
EU. In addition, there is no common EU framework for determining 
qualifications earned in external countries. Consequently, a degree that one 
Member State recognizes as qualifying for a Blue Card may be rejected by 
another Member State.”17 
Looking at member state level, Germany adopted a new law on the 
recognition of professional qualifications that entered into force in April 
2012.18 This law aims to reduce the formal and informal barriers in 
Germany.19 Key features of this law relate to: 
- the general legal entitlement for a recognition procedure independent 
of the country of origin; 
- the entitlement for a recognition procedure includes all unregulated 
professions for which no recognition procedure exists; 
- strict time limits for more efficient procedures; 
- the request for recognition can be made while being abroad; 
- previous work experience is taken into account. 
Finally, another interesting rule introduced under German law is a 
new visa for foreign professionals holding a university degree (either a 
German degree or a comparable foreign one), permitting them to search for 
employment for up to six months in Germany provided they dispose of 




                                                   
17 Gümüs (2012, p. 446); see also Eisele (2013, p. 25). 
18 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Feststellung und Anerkennung im Ausland erworbener 
Berufsqualifikationen vom 11 Dezember 2011, Bundesgesetzblatt Jhg. 2011 Teil I Nr. 63, 
2515. 
19 See Braun (2012).  
20 Article 18c Aufenthaltsgesetz (German Residence Act). 
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10. RETHINKING ATTRACTIVENESS:  
THE CASE OF SOUTH AMERICA 
DIEGO ACOSTA ARCARAZO 
his chapter brings the experiences of America into the debate. South 
America is a key region for the EU when discussing migration for at 
least two reasons. First, it has a special partnership with the EU since 
1999. The importance of this partnership, and its impact on migration, has 
been the subject of various Commission Communications1 and Council 
statements.2 Second, and perhaps surprisingly, there are an increasing 
number of EU citizens residing in South America,3 some of whom 
unfortunately find themselves in an irregular situation. A recent study 
conducted for the International Centre for Migration Policy and 
Development (ICMPD) and for Brazil’s Ministry of Labour4 found that out 
of the 40 Spaniards and Portuguese who had been interviewed, all of whom 
had been living in Brazil since 2008, 35% had an irregular legal status.5 This 
is a new important aspect which should not be ignored in the relationship 
between South America and the EU. 
With this in mind, I would like to discuss successively three key issues: 
irregular migration, access to rights and the role of migrants’ rights. 
First, the Expert Seminar’s programme states that “in other parts of the 
world the perception that racism and xenophobia are on the rise in Europe 
                                                   
1 European Commission (2009). 
2 Council of the European Union (2010). 
3 Córdova Alcaraz (2012); there would be around 1.3 million EU nationals residing in 
Latin America and the Caribbean with flows increasing since 2008. 
4 This study was financed by the European Commission and the results were presented 
at a conference in Brussels, 20 November 2013 (www.icmpd.org/ 
CalendarDetail.1587.0.html?&no_cache=1&tx_calender_pi2%5Bentry%5D=601). 
5 Magalhães Fernandes, da Consolação Gomes de Castro and Pena Knup (2013, pp. 225-
270).  
T
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is widespread”. This is true and worrisome. Starting with the adoption of the 
Returns Directive in 2008, South America has been very critical of the EU’s 
policies on migration. This is clear from various documents of its regional 
organisations, such as MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and UNASUR, 
from the final declarations of each of the yearly South American Conferences 
on Migration,6 and from the statements of various presidents and important 
officials in the region.7 The European Union needs to be aware of the 
consequences of being perceived as restrictive and xenophobic, since this 
might have negative effects “in terms of the EU’s own credibility on human 
rights and the principle of solidarity in the world”.8 
Indeed, South American countries have defined their recent migration 
measures in opposition to the EU, notably on irregular migration.9 We can 
observe how in the last 15 years a completely renewed discourse on 
migration and rights has been taking shape in South America. This 
discourse, as the 2013 Buenos Aires declaration of the South American 
Conference on Migrations summarises, emphasises the human right to 
migration, the recognition of migrants as bearers of rights, the respect of the 
fundamental rights of migrants and their families irrespective of their 
migratory status and the opposition to any criminalisation of irregular 
migration.10 
This discourse is affecting all the phases which could be included in 
the governance of migration: agenda setting, consensus building, policies 
and legislation as well as implementation of those policies. It is true, 
however, that there still exists a certain gap between rhetoric and law in 
some countries in the region. That gap is nonetheless being reduced by the 
numerous pieces of legislation at regional level (such as the MERCOSUR 
                                                   
6 The South American Conference on Migrations is a regional consultative process on 
migration in which all 12 countries in South America participate. The conference seeks 
to build consensus aimed at harmonisation of migration polices and the consolidation of 
regional processes at MERCOSUR and CAN level in an intergovernmental non-binding 
forum. 
7 Acosta Arcarazo (2009). 
8 Guild, Carrera and Faure Atger (2009, p. 17). 
9 Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes (2014). 
10 Declaración de Buenos Aires, Posicionamiento de la Conferencia Suramericana sobre 
Migraciones ante el II Diálogo de Alto Nivel sobre Migración Internacional y Desarrollo 
de las Naciones Unidas, Buenos Aires, 28 August 2013; see on this discourse: Acosta 
Arcarazo and Freier (2013). 
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Residence Agreement) or at national level, e.g. new Immigration Laws in 
Argentina (2004), Uruguay (2008) and Bolivia (2013). 
This proves how a rights-based discourse on migration is possible and, 
as the recent debates on free movement of EU citizens in countries such as 
the UK demonstrate, that rhetoric is an important element where the 
Commission can and should take the lead. The Commission seems to be 
aware of this, because in 2013 it rewrote its historical motto, “Fight against 
illegal, then irregular, migration”, to read “A coherent approach to reduce 
irregular migration”.11  
Second, I would like to highlight the importance of access to rights. EU 
migration law is, after more than 10 years of legislation, at a crucial stage of 
development. In 2014, a directive on the rights of seasonal workers has been 
adopted. Also, a new directive on intra-corporate transferees was published. 
In addition, the ongoing interpretation by the Court of Justice upholds many 
of the rights of third-country nationals covered by the directives.12  
Interestingly enough, EU migration law provides for more rights in 
various aspects, e.g. access to permanent residence, than some of the 
outdated legislative migration frameworks in certain countries in South 
America, such as Chile or Brazil. When I present this reality to the 
representatives from the Government in Brazil, to think tanks or academics 
in Argentina or to NGOs in Colombia, the response is invariably the same: It 
is not rights enshrined in the law that matters but rather access to them. 
The European Commission shares this thought in theory but seems to 
be less active in practice. Both reports on the implementation of the Long-
term Residence Directive and the Family Reunification Directive deplored 
their insufficient implementation and eventual infringement proceedings 
were announced.13 This emphasis on the monitoring of the correct 
implementation of EU law had already been the subject of the Commission’s 
first communication on a common agenda for integration as early as 2005.14 
Almost a decade later, it is well known that only one infringement 
proceeding has reached the Court of Justice (Commission v Netherlands on 
the Long-term Residence Directive) and that, in the meantime, many third-
                                                   
11 European Commission (2013, p. 15). 
12 Acosta Arcarazo (forthcoming).  
13 European Commission (2008); European Commission (2011).  
14 European Commission (2005, pp. 6 and 8). 
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country nationals have been denied rights deriving from EU law. Legal 
certainty and access to the rights enshrined in the directives are essential so 
that the EU’s immigration law does not become a ‘revolving door’ system in 
which the possibility of being excluded looms large over the lives of non-EU 
nationals.15 It is time for the Commission to launch infringement proceedings 
where necessary. This could be combined with other strategies such as 
producing clear and detailed implementing guidelines, something 
anticipated in 200816 and mentioned again in 2013,17 but with no results so 
far. National lawyers, NGOs and judges also have a central role to play in 
encouraging national courts to ask for preliminary references. 
Third, and finally, what role do rights play as a determinant for 
migration? This can be perhaps rephrased as follows: is there a need to be 
restrictive with migrants’ rights before allowing them to enter, or to prevent 
their entering in large numbers? EU Commissioner László Andor answered 
this question recently at a meeting at the University of Bristol. It is job 
opportunities, he said, together with other factors such as networks or 
language which produce the movement of people, both within and from 
outside the EU. Sociologists have of course provided a vast amount of 
literature on this. “A careful examination of virtually any historical era 
reveals a consistent propensity towards geographic mobility among men 
and women, who are driven to wander by diverse motives, but nearly 
always with some idea of material improvement”.18 
Have migration flows increased in Argentina, for example, with the 
shift from a very restrictive legislative framework which came from the 
period of the military dictatorship and which had been adopted in 1981, to 
one of the world’s more liberal legislative regimes in many aspects with the 
adoption of its 2004 Law? The answer, according to studies in Argentina, is 
no. Migration has been affected by the economic opportunities in certain 
economic sectors of the country rather than by any legal framework.19 
Indeed, Argentina is a clear example of a country which has received 
                                                   
15 Acosta Arcarazo and Martire (forthcoming 2014). 
16 European Commission (2008, p. 13). 
17 European Commission (2013, p. 16). 
18 Massey, Arango, Graeme, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor (1999, p. 1). 
19 Cerrutti (2009). 
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migration and at the same time has expanded the rights granted to non-
nationals. 
Spain is another good example of that trend. On 31 December 1999, 
there were around 800,000 non-Spanish nationals residing in the country, 
less than half of whom (approximately 380,000) were third-country nationals 
whose status was included in the so-called “Regimen General” and who 
therefore were subject to Spanish migration law.20 Ten years later, the 
increase in the non-Spanish population was notable. On 31 December 2009, 
it numbered 4,791,232, of whom 2,562,032 (or 53%) were included in the 
“Regimen General” and 2,229,200 (47%) in the Community Regime.21 
During the first decade of the century, Spain modified its immigration 
law several times in order to adapt it to changing population trends, various 
European directives and rulings from Spanish courts, including the 
Constitutional Court.22 Whereas the legislation in 2000 was more restrictive 
than the legislation in 2009, this did not impact migration flows. It is only 
with the economic crisis that Spain has gone from being a net receiver of 
migration to having negative net migration in the last two years.23  
Portugal offers a similar example. Indeed, Portugal also has negative 
net migration24 despite having one of the most generous implementations of 
EU migration law and, as in the case of Spain but unlike many other EU 
countries, ordinary regularisation mechanisms which provide ways for 
migrants in an irregular situation to obtain a regular residence permit. As in 
Spain, it has been the availability of jobs that has produced migration flows 
rather than the openness of the legislation. 
In conclusion, rhetoric, law and, most important, correct 
implementation of the EU migration law framework and the rights it 
provides are essential factors in tackling discrimination and in providing for 
                                                   
20 Ministerio del Interior, Comisión Interministerial de Extranjería, “Anuario Estadístico 
de Extranjería 1999”. 
21 See Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración (2010), Extranjeros con certificado de registro 
o tarjeta de residencia en vigor y Extranjeros con autorización de estancia por estudios 
en vigor a 31 de diciembre de 2009. 
22 In 2000, the new Spanish immigration law, repealing the previous and outdated one 
from 1985, was adopted. This law was subsequently amended three times: in 2000, 2003 
and 2009. In addition, the law has been further developed with three different 
implementing regulations: in 2001, 2004 and, finally, 2011. 
23 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, España en Cifras 2013. 
24 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Estimativas Anuais de População Residente, 2013. 
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a society in line with the EU’s values. Certainly, law cannot solve all the 
problems a migrant will encounter in terms of discrimination or adaptation 
to a new society. It is clear, however, that a restrictive legislative framework 
may lead to social exclusion, harsher living conditions and unnecessary 
obstacles, and the establishment of a second class citizenry, which in turn 
affects the values that a society claims to uphold. Migration is not primarily 
determined by legislative frameworks but by economic opportunities. As it 
has done in the case of EU citizens, the Commission could and should play 
a much more vocal role in demystifying discussions on the issue and in 
ensuring the correct application and implementation of the current EU 
migration law. 
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11. LABOUR MIGRATION IN CANADA: A 
MATTER OF ‘SUPPLY’ AND ‘DEMAND’  
CHRISTINA GABRIEL 
Introduction 
At the Expert Seminar, Challenge 3 on Matching Demand and Supply raised 
a number of unstated questions/assumptions that should be interrogated 
and pursued. These included: 
 What do we mean by ‘temporariness’ of labour demand? 
 How do we approach the term ‘credible’? 
 Can the term ‘human capital’ and its desirability be queried further? 
Below I will address these three questions by reflecting on Canada’s 
experience. As outlined below labour migrants are ‘selected’ through a 
points-based system but they also enter the country through a variety of 
other pathways.1 For example, sponsored family members and those who 
are admitted through the refugee category often end up in the labour market. 
This presentation focuses on new directions in the economic categories of 
Canada’s immigration system. 
1. Can labour needs be effectively determined? 
Canadian policy-makers have grappled with this question for some time. 
Canada pioneered the ‘points-based’ selection model in the 1960s and it was 
formally enshrined in the 1976 Immigration Act. Under the terms of the 
model applicants applied directly to immigrate and those who met criteria 
                                                   
1 In 2012 the Economic Class included Federal-selected (Federal Skilled Workers, Federal 
Business, Canadian Experience Class, Live-in-Caregivers); Quebec-selected Skilled 
Workers; Quebec-selected Business; Provincial and Territorial Nominees. Economic 
Class Principal Applicants accounted for 68,266 admissions. Spouses and dependents of 
the Economic Class Applicants numbered 92,553. Other categories of permanent 
residents include: Family Class; Protected Persons, see CIC (2013, p. 14). 
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were admitted. Points were awarded for factors such as age, education, 
language and occupation demand. The number of points a prospective 
immigrant had to earn has varied (initially 50 constituted a ‘pass mark’ but 
this has moved upwards to as high as 70), as has the weight of each element. 
The occupational element was based on a projected list of occupations in 
demand. “The occupations list [was] premised on an understanding that the 
state can play a role in anticipating and meeting the labour market needs of 
the country”.2 Subsequent changes retained the points-based model but 
moved toward an emphasis on flexible, transferable skills. In the 1990s 
increasing emphasis was placed on formal higher education. The 2002 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) consolidated these changes 
and emphasised flexible, transferable skills as embodied in individual 
migrants as opposed to occupations. High-skilled migrants are cast as 
integral to the country’s ability to compete in a global economy.3  
It has been noted that points-based selection models are appealing to 
policy-makers “because they enable government to set clear and transparent 
standards for the human-capital level of incoming immigrants” while 
simultaneously signalling to the public that the government “controls” 
admission of labour migrants. However, admission to a country doesn’t 
necessarily guarantee newcomers a job commensurate with their experience 
and skills. Points-based models “can only access quantifiable skills and 
credentials, and have difficulty distinguishing between qualifications of 
different quality or utility”.4  
Despite the continual fine-tuning of the Canadian selection model, 
including the increasing emphasis on selecting people with higher 
education, skills and experience, there is mounting evidence that the labour 
market experiences of immigrants and most especially recent immigrants 
have not been good. Concerns have been raised about unemployment, 
underemployment and lower earnings. Immigrant skill underutilisation – 
brain waste – is a significant policy challenge.5 
                                                   
2 Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2002, p. 44). 
3 Ibid., pp. 61-100. 
4 Papademetriou and Sumption (2011, p. 3). 
5 Reitz (2004, pp. 117-120); Reitz, Curtis and Elrick (2014). 
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2. What would be a credible alternative to a ‘selective approach’ 
to migration, what are the main obstacles, and what are the 
experiences and practices of third countries? 
The points-based selection model remains in place to select prospective 
immigrants under the Federal Skilled Worker (FSW) programme. However, 
the period from 2008 was marked by a staggering number of policy changes 
to all categories within the Canadian immigration architecture.6 In terms of 
labour migration there is an emphasis on prearranged employment and by 
corollary a growing role for employers and more private actors. In this 
respect the Canadian approach is moving to embrace some elements of what 
Papademetriou and Sumption term a hybrid selection system – which 
“prioritizes employer demand while using a points test or other set of criteria 
to distinguish between applications of differing quality”. While they assert 
“countries dependent on points systems have come to appreciate and 
accommodate the unparalleled advantages that employer selection brings in 
terms of both immigrant integration and firms’ competiveness”,7 concerns 
have been raised in Canada about pursuing this policy direction because of 
the emphasis on short term economic gain.8  
It’s beyond the scope of this presentation to outline all policy changes 
being pursued and given their very recent introduction it would not be 
prudent to comment on their ‘credibility’, however defined. Nevertheless, 
some initiatives are highlighted below because they are indicative of 
Canada’s recent attempt/experience to ‘match demand and supply’. 
 Changes to the points-based selection model9 
There have been a number of significant regulatory changes directed at the 
points-based selection model. These changes have been necessary, according 
to the federal government, to eliminate backlogs and improve processing 
times. The FSW backlog “has been particularly problematic as it constituted 
a major roadblock to Canada’s ability to respond to rapidly changing labour 
                                                   
6 See Alboim and Cohl (2012). 
7 Papademetriou and Sumption (2011, p. 5). 
8 See Alboim and Cohl (2012).  
9 These changes were noted in the oral presentation at the Expert Seminar. I have 
included some additional material that came up in the subsequent panel discussion.  
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market needs”.10 The government first moved to limit the pool of applicants 
in 2008 by announcing the Department of Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC) would only process applications if individuals “have an offer 
of arranged employment or; [are] a foreign national living legally in Canada 
for one year as a temporary foreign worker or an international student, or; 
[are] a skilled worker who has at least one year of experience in one or more 
of [38] occupations”.11 Subsequently, the in-demand occupations were 
reduced; limits were placed on the total number of applications and on the 
number processed in each occupation. In 2012, CIC moved to return all 
applications (and application fees) received prior to 2008 that had not yet 
been determined. These numbered 98,000. Further, there was a temporary 
halt placed on FSW applications with the exception of those individuals with 
prearranged employment and students pursuing Canadian PhDs. “This 
measure enabled CIC to focus its processing resources for the FSW Program 
on the remaining applications received since 2008”.12 This moratorium 
remained in place till May 2013. The adoption of narrower occupational lists 
within the selection model has prompted Koslowski to suggest that Canada 
has shifted away from a human capital model toward a system that 
“increasingly operates like a combination of the Australian and US models, 
i.e. a point system weighted toward an occupational skills list and increasing 
admission of temporary workers (discussed below) who then apply for 
permanent immigration with employer sponsorship”.13  
 Introduction of a new immigration category – Canadian Experience 
Class 
The Federal Government introduced the Canadian Experience Class (CEC) 
in 2008. Under the terms of this new category international students and 
some categories of temporary workers (professional, managerial and high-
skilled) with Canadian work experience are eligible to apply for permanent 
residence. Current requirements demand applicants have “12 months of full-
time Canadian work experience, or the equivalent in part-time work, in high-
skilled occupations and (applicants have)…up to 36 months, to accumulate 
                                                   
10 CIC (2013, p. 6). 
11 CIC (2009). 
12 CIC (2013, p. 7). 
13 Koslowski (2013, p. 10). 
LABOUR MIGRATION IN CANADA: A MATTER OF ‘SUPPLY’ AND ‘DEMAND’  73 
their experience”.14 In 2012, 9,359 people were admitted through this stream 
making it the “fastest growing immigration program”.15 This said, a number 
of concerns have been raised in respect to this category. First, as some non-
governmental groups noted at the outset the required work experience 
criteria renders workers vulnerable to employer abuse and less likely to 
report any abuses so as not to compromise their chance of obtaining 
permanent residence.16 Second, this stream excludes temporary workers in 
low-skilled occupations that offer no path to permanent residence. It has 
been speculated that when their temporary employment ends some of these 
workers may go underground as irregular migrants, “increasing their 
vulnerability and subjecting Canada to problems like those European 
countries experienced with their guest workers”.17 Lastly, analysts have 
argued that the current immigration system makes Canada an attractive 
destination. People are selected, enter the country as permanent residents 
and are able to access full social rights. In contrast, the CEC establishes a 
“two-step” immigration process that delays integration because temporary 
migrants cannot access settlement services and many are not eligible to bring 
their families to Canada. For this reason, they argue, “two-step immigration” 
should not be the norm.18 
 Provincial Nominee Programs 
Constitutional provisions mandate that immigration is an area of shared 
jurisdiction and responsibility between the provinces and the federal 
government. For most of the post-war period provinces, with the exception 
of Quebec, were not active players in immigration policy. This changed in 
the 1990s when the federal government established Provincial Nominee 
Programs (PNPs). Beginning with Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British 
Columbia in 1998 provinces entered into agreements with the federal 
government. While the specifics may vary from one province to the next in 
general under PNPs provinces nominate individuals who meet 
local/regional labour market needs. In some cases a minimum criteria must 
be met and some provinces, such as Manitoba, also have a provincial points 
                                                   
14 CIC (2013, p. 6). 
15 Ibid., p. 15. 
16 Gabriel (2011, p. 54). 
17 Alboim and Cohl (2012, p. 45). 
18 Ibid., p. 44. 
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system. Some jurisdictions also prioritise nominations in certain occupations 
and permit nominations for low-skilled workers.19 According to CIC these 
programmes are the second largest economic immigration stream after the 
Federal Skilled Worker Program.20 However, Alboim and Cohl point out that 
one evaluation for CIC noted “over time, federal skilled workers have better 
economic outcomes”, leading them to argue that “Canada is achieving short-
term economic gain through provincial nominees as opposed to long term 
gain through federal skilled workers”.21 It has to be emphasised that the 
emergence of PNPs provide an alternative avenue of entry for labour 
migrants to the federal government’s FSW and CEC programmes. They have 
also prompted a “gradual shift from a centralized model of immigrant 
selection toward devolution of federal authority to provinces”.22 
 Temporary Foreign Workers Programs (TFWPs) 
There has been a massive expansion of temporary labour migration in 
Canada since 2000. From 2006 on, the number of temporary migrant workers 
exceeds the number of economic immigrants who receive permanent 
resident status.23 Employers of migrant workers entering under the 
provisions of the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP), Live-In 
Caregiver Program (LCP), the Low Skilled Pilot Program24 and Other 
Temporary Workers (LMO required) have to obtain a Labour Market 
Opinion (LMO) detailing that there is a genuine job, the employer meets 
programme requirements and there is a labour market need. Further, 
employers have to demonstrate that an attempt was made to hire Canadians 
or permanent residents.25 However, a full 60% of workers received work 
permits under categories requiring no LMO. Their work permits derive from 
“international agreements such as NAFTA or other international reciprocal 
                                                   
19 Baglay (2012, pp. 126-127). 
20 CIC (2013, p. 16). 
21 Alboim and Cohl (2012, p. 24). 
22 Baglay (2012, p. 123). 
23 Faraday (2012, p. 5). 
24 For a discussion of the dynamics of these specific programmes see Lenard and Straehle 
(2012). 
25 Alboim and Cohl (2012, p. 46). 
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arrangements, youth exchange programs, intra-company transfers, or post-
doctoral research fellowships”.26 
As Faraday notes the “greatest proportionate growth has been among 
low-skilled, low-wage migrant workers primarily from the global south who 
are employed in sectors such as caregiving, agriculture, hospitality, food 
services, construction and tourism”. She points out that the legal status of 
low-skill migrant workers affords them fewer rights and protections than 
other workers and positions them in such a way that it is difficult to exercise 
the rights they are entitled to.27 
3. Concluding observations 
Labour migration in Canada has been marked by a number of profound 
policy changes including changes to the points-based selection model, the 
introduction of Provincial Nominee Programs and the expansion of the 
temporary worker programme. These changes are characterised as short- 
term and directed at addressing specific labour market pressures and skills 
shortages.28 However, the “long run economic outcomes of immigrants and 
their children and the broad impact of immigration on standards of living” 
also need to be taken into account.29 
Recent changes have been enacted through the use of Ministerial 
Instructions. As a result key measures have been enacted with little public 
consultation, debate or legislative scrutiny.30 Lastly, the increasing emphasis 
on temporary migrant workers to meet labour market demands tends to 






                                                   
26 Ibid., p. 53. 
27 Faraday (2012, p. 5). 
28 Picot and Sweetman (2012). 
29 Ibid., p. 1. 
30 Alboim and Cohl (2012, pp. 9-12).  
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12. AN OVERVIEW OF LABOUR 
MIGRATION POLICIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES  
MARYELLEN FULLERTON 
he United States has a robust immigration policy and a robust anti-
discrimination legal framework. Together with a strong commitment 
to labour mobility and to family unification, these elements create an 
environment that is attractive to labour migration. This commentary will 
situate labour migration within the overall US legal framework for 
immigration, note some of the social and legal policies that enhance its 
attractiveness to migrants, and conclude by identifying the laws that 
migrants can use when discriminatory and racist acts occur.  
Annually, the United States admits approximately one million 
immigrants as lawful permanent residents. These immigrants have the right 
to live permanently in the United States and to apply for citizenship after 
five years of residence.1 In addition, more than 50 million non-citizens enter 
the United States each year as temporary visitors.2 As Box 1 illustrates, the 
lion’s share of lawful permanent residents enter based on their family 
relationship with a US citizen or with a US lawful permanent resident. 
Congress has imposed an annual numerical limit of 140,000 on employment-
based immigration and 50,000 on immigration via the diversity lottery. There 
is no cap on the number of immediate relatives (spouses and unmarried 
                                                   
1 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §316; the residence requirement is reduced to 
three years for immigrants married to US citizens (INA §319); lawful permanent 
residents (but not naturalised citizens) may be deported for certain criminal convictions, 
on national security grounds, and for a limited set of other reasons (INA §237).  
2 There were 53,887,286 non-immigrant admissions in Fiscal Year 2012, see US 
Department of Homeland Security (2013a); this number reflects entries to the United 
States, rather than individual non-citizens. A non-immigrant may enter more than once 
in a year.  
T
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children under 21) of US citizens who may immigrate every year; a 226,000 
annual limit applies to other relatives of US citizens and lawful permanent 
residents. As a result, as Figure 1 shows, labour migration accounts for 
roughly 14% of annual immigration.3 
 
Box 1. Immigrant Admission Category Overview (approximate number of 
annual admissions) 
Total Annual Immigrant Admissions 1,016,000 
Employment-based 140,000 subtotal 
 1: Priority workers 40,000 
o 1A: Extraordinary ability  
o 1B: Outstanding professors and researchers  
o 1C: Multinational executives and managers 
 2: Advanced degrees or exceptional ability 40,000 
 3: Bachelor’s degrees or workers in shortage occupations 40,000 (unskilled 
workers limited to 10,000/year) 
 4: Special immigrants 10,000 
 5: Investors 10,000 
 
Family-sponsored 726,000 subtotal 
 Immediate relatives of US citizens 500,000  
 Other relatives of US citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents 226,000 
 
Diversity lottery 50,000  
 
Humanitarian 100,000 subtotal  
 Overseas refugee admissions 70,000  
 Asylum 30,000   
 
 
                                                   
3 Family-sponsored immigrants are authorised to work and contribute to the labour 
force, but their admission to the United States is not premised on their labour skills. 
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Figure 1. Legal Permanent Residence by Major Category, FY 2012 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Legal 
Permanent Residents. 
As Box 1 shows, US legislation further subdivides permanent labour 
migration into five categories, each with an annual numerical limit. The first 
category, with an allotment of 40,000 individuals per year, includes priority 
workers, defined as outstanding or extraordinary workers. The second 
category, also with a 40,000 annual quota, includes workers with advanced 
educational degrees and those who can demonstrate exceptional ability. The 
third category, also allotted 40,000 per year, focuses on professionals holding 
baccalaureate degrees as well as skilled and unskilled workers. The statute 
specifies that no more than 10,000 of this quota can be filled by unskilled 
workers.4 The fourth category, comprised of religious workers and former 
employees of the US government and of international agencies, has an 
annual allotment of 10,000. Similarly, the fifth preference, reserved for 
individuals who will invest $1 million and create 10 jobs for US workers, 
receives an annual quota of 10,000.5 
                                                   
4 Actually, subsequent legislation limited this number even further, to 5,000 per year for 
the foreseeable future, due to an effort to ‘borrow’ some admissions for beneficiaries of 
the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) of 1997.  
5 INA §203(b)(5). The required investment is reduced to $500,000 in targeted areas (INA 
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Labour migration in the United States is largely employer-driven. That 
is, in most instances a US employer must initiate the immigration process on 
behalf of a non-US citizen employee.6 This links labour migrants to specific 
jobs that are available and that employers want to fill. In an effort to protect 
US workers, the immigration law imposes several requirements on 
employers. Employers who petition for the admission of workers in the 
second and third preference categories, a total of 80,000 migrants, must 
demonstrate that there are no qualified US workers for the jobs that the 
migrants will fill and that the employers will pay the prevailing wage, a 
process known as labour certification.7 Box 2 below identifies the numerical 
allotments for each of the five employment-based categories, the categories 
of migrants who need an employer to petition for their admission, and the 
categories that require the successful completion of the labour certification 
process.  
 
Box 2. Employment–Based Immigrant Categories & Processes 
Annual Employment-based Immigration 140,000 Total 
 Preference 1: Priority workers 40,000 
o 1A: Extraordinary ability Self-petition 
o 1B: Outstanding professors and researchers Employer petition 
o 1C: Multinational executives and managers Employer petition 
 Preference 2: Advanced degrees or exceptional ability 40,000 Employer petition & 
labour certification (prevailing wage & no qualified US workers) 
               Note: exceptional ability can self-petition IF national interest waiver  
 Preference 3: Bachelor’s degrees or workers in shortage occupations 40,000 
Employer petition & labour certification (prevailing wage & no qualified US 
workers); expedited process for physical therapists & professional nurses 
 Preference 4: Special immigrants 10,000 Self-petition 
 Preference 5: Investors 10,000 Self-petition 
                                                   
6 Labour migrants in two of the three subcategories of the first preference and all of those 
in the second and third categories must have a current job offer from an employer who 
petitions on the migrant’s behalf.  
7 Some employees who satisfy the second preference criteria can demonstrate that it is in 
the national interest to waive the labour certification process (INA §203(b)(2)(B)). For 
example, medical doctors who will work for five years in designated underserved 
communities are eligible for a national interest waiver from undergoing the labour 
certification process (INA §203(b)(2)(B)(ii)).  
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Figure 2. Employment-based LPR Admissions, FY 2012 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Annual Flow Report, LPRs. 
As Figure 2 indicates, the fourth and fifth preferences have been 
undersubscribed; the numbers not used in these two categories have been 
absorbed by the other categories. Nonetheless, some of the other preference 
categories remain seriously oversubscribed. For example, in March 2014, the 
waiting time for migrants in the skilled workers category, the third 
preference group, was almost one and a half years; skilled workers from the 
Philippines faced a seven-year backlog, while skilled workers from India 
faced a nine-year wait.8   
Figure 3 reveals major differences in labour migration from different 
countries. It demonstrates that India, China, and South Korea are 
particularly important labour-exporting countries for the United States. It 
should be noted, however, that Figure 3 must be interpreted with an 
important fact in mind: many of the migrants who arrive in the United States 
based on their family relationship rather than employment skills do enter the 
labour market and contribute substantially to the US economy. 
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Figure 3. Top ten countries of origin of lawful permanent residents arriving in the 
US, 2012 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Legal 
Permanent Residents. 
Thus far the discussion has focused on migrants who arrive in the 
United States as immigrants, with permission to remain permanently. The 
labour migrants who arrive for temporary employment, however, dwarf in 
number those who come as permanent residents. As Figure 4 shows, roughly 
2 million entered as temporary workers and trainees, 3 million entered as 
business visitors, and 380,000 entered as intra-company transferees in 2012, 
along with 25 million tourists, 2 million students, and many others.  
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Figure 4. Non-immigrant admissions in selected categories, FY 2012 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Annual Flow Report: Non-immigrant 
Admission to the U.S.: 2012 (August 2013). 
The variety of non-immigrant workers is revealed in Box 3 and Figure 
5. Box 3 shows the many different categories of temporary workers and intra-
company transferees. It also demonstrates that as many visitors for business 
arrived through the visa waiver programme as travelled with a visa, for a 
total of 5.7 million in that category. The total number of business-related 
temporary admissions amounted to 8.7 million in 2012. Figure 5 depicts the 
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Box 3. Non-immigrant admissions (work-related), FY 2012 
Visitors for business  5,705,106 
Temporary visitors for business, visa B1 2,972,355 
Temporary visitors for business, visa waiver 
programme WB 2,729,775 
Treaty traders and investors, spouses and 
children E 386,472 
Temporary workers and trainees, spouses and 
children H, O, P, Q, R, TN 2,128,219 
Temporary worker in a specialty occupation H-1B 473,015 
Temporary worker performing agricultural 
services H-2A 183,860 
Temporary worker performing other services H-2B 82,921 
Person with extraordinary ability in the sciences, 
art, education, business, or athletics, and their 
assistants O-1, O-2 70,611 
Spouses and children of temporary workers and 
trainees 
CW-2, H-4, O-3, P-4, 
R-2, TD 227,637 
Intra-company transfers, spouses and 
children L 717,893 
Intra-company transferee (executive, managerial, 
and specialised personnel continuing 
employment with international firm or 
corporation)  498,899 
Spouses or child of intra-company transferee  218,994 
TOTAL  8,754,525 
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Figure 5. Non-immigrant admissions (work-related), FY 2012 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Annual Flow Report: Non-immigrant 
Admission to the U.S.: 2012 (August 2013). 
The magnitude of temporary labour migration in the United States is 
visible in Figure 6, which shows the number of temporary employment visas 
issued each year from 1994 to 2012. The annual numbers range from 400,000 
in the early 1990s to more than 1 million in 2007. Remember that throughout 
this period and continuing to today there is a limit of 140,000 permanent 
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Figure 6. Temporary employment-based visas issued, 1994-2012 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs Data. 
The last figure reveals the dirty secret of labour migration in the United 
States. Figure 7 displays how many of the 140,000 annual permanent labour 
migrants were already in the United States as temporary workers when they 
officially became permanent immigrants. The technical term, adjustment of 
status (AOS), describes the process by which a non-immigrant currently 
present in the United States changes his or her legal status into that of an 
immigrant, also known as a lawful permanent resident (LPR). Although the 
US legal framework is predicated on noncitizens obtaining their immigrant 
visas overseas at a US consulate, Figure 7 makes clear that only a minuscule 
number of individuals coming to the United States as permanent labour 
migrants are overseas when they seek permanent resident status. Rather, 
almost everyone who satisfies the employment-based immigrant categories 
is already working in the United States.9 Indeed, almost everyone is already 
working – as a temporary non-immigrant worker – for the employer who 
petitions to have the worker become a permanent immigrant.10 
                                                   
9 The exception is the fifth preference category, which is comprised of investors who will 
create jobs for 10 or more US workers. See footnote 5 above and accompanying text for 
details about immigrants who qualify under the fifth preference labour migration 
category. 
10 In 2010 92% of employment-based immigrants obtained their status via the adjustment 
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Figure 7. LPR status obtained through adjustment of status in the US vs. through 
application abroad, 2010-2012 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Lawful 
Permanent Residents. 
The significant role that temporary labour migration plays as the 
doorway to permanent labour migration brings issues of labour mobility in 
the United States into high relief. As noted earlier, US labour migration is 
employer-driven. Most employment-based immigration permits result from 
US employers petitioning for the permanent admission of the particular 
named migrant in order to perform the specific job the employer has certified 
no qualified US worker wants. Once the petition is approved and the 
immigrant visa issued, however, there is no requirement that the immigrant 
actually work for the employer. Indeed, many do not, presumably because 
they find other employment more to their liking. A U.S. Labor Department 
survey reported that 11% of the labour migrants did not work at all for the 
employer after the approval of their petitions; an additional 17% more left 
their employment within six months of the approval of their permanent 
status.11  
                                                   
home countries. In contrast, only 3% of the immigrants based on the diversity lottery 
relied on AOS, as did 12% of family-based immigrants, and 53% of immediate relatives 
of US citizens, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, Table 6).  
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The situation of individuals who entered on temporary work permits 
is starkly different. Most of the temporary work visas are initiated by 
employers, and they can be renewed for multiple years.12 The beneficiaries, 
of course, need to stay in the good graces of the employers in order to keep 
and renew their visas.13 Furthermore, as many temporary workers wish to 
seek permanent immigrant status, they often must rely on their ‘temporary’ 
employers to file petitions testifying to the permanent need the US economy 
has for their skills.14 As a practical matter, temporary workers have little 
bargaining power and little labour mobility. If they become lawful 
permanent residents, though, their labour mobility is unlimited. 
The laws that provide protection against discrimination towards 
migrants is another feature that makes the United States attractive to labour 
migrants. The fundamental civil rights legislation outlaws discrimination in 
employment or in public accommodations on the basis of national origin, as 
well as on race, colour, religion, or sex.15 And it provides that successful 
litigants are entitled to powerful remedies, including monetary payments 
and job reinstatement. As a consequence, access to the courts, and the general 
cultural norms in favour of litigation, afford labour migrants some 
protections against exploitation by employers. All migrants – even those 
unauthorised to be present – can file suit in US courts to seek the protection 
of labour legislation and other US laws.16 Those working in unlawful status 
                                                   
12 Visitors for business seek their own visas (or visa waivers) and do not need to rely on 
petitions filed by employers. The premise is that they are merely accomplishing some 
temporary business goal, and are not employed in the United States. In contrast, 
employers initiate the H-1B temporary worker visa process. These visas can be renewed 
for up to six years, and in some instances for even longer, see discussion in Aleinikoff, 
Martin, Motomura and Fullerton (2011, pp. 402-405). 
13 Recent legislative changes allow temporary workers to change employers while in the 
process of adjusting their status to become permanent immigrants, but this depends on 
the agreement of the new employer (INA §204(j)); see discussion in ibid., pp. 381-382.  
14 The U.S. Department of Labor found that 74% of those for whom employers sought 
labour certification were already working for the employer. U.S. Department of Labor, 
Office of Inspector General (1996).  
15 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Titles II, VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, § 2000e.  
16 In addition to the employment-related litigation, there is a substantial body of US 
constitutional law limiting the circumstances in which state governments can treat non-
citizens differently from citizens, see, e.g. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).  
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are limited, however, in their ability to receive certain forms of relief, such as 
back pay.17   
Other social norms and economic realities – such as an entrepreneurial 
tradition and the great concentration of venture capital – also create strong 
incentives for labour migration to the United States. These topics are beyond 
the scope of this commentary, but they should not be ignored. Together with 
the generous family reunification policies and the total labour mobility 
accorded permanent residents granted entry based on their employment 
skills, they contribute enormously to the attractiveness of the labour 
migration policies of the United States.  
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17 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). The 
Hoffman Plastic opinion denied back pay to workers unauthorised to be in the United 
States who had been fired for labour union activities. Other courts have awarded back 
pay to unauthorised workers who had not been paid the amount mandated by the Fair 









13. WHICH WAY FORWARD WITH 
MIGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
IN THE EU? 
KEES GROENENDIJK 
1. Three constant elements 
A look into the future may well be informed by first looking back. Over the 
last 30 years, the development (or creation?) of Community and Union rules 
on employment of immigrants from outside the EU can be characterised by 
three constant elements: firstly, the opposition of Germany and some other 
member states to the transfer of competence to the Union; secondly, the 
granting of free access to the labour market to third-country nationals 
admitted for purposes other than employment; and, thirdly, the 
development of a dual system of parallel national and EU statuses for several 
categories of third-country nationals admitted for employment.  
2. Opposition to transfer of competences to the Union 
The opposition of Germany and four other member states (Denmark, France, 
Netherlands and the UK) to a minimal Community interference with 
national policies on immigration of third-country nationals was first visible 
in the case in which those member states asked the Court of Justice to annul 
the Commission’s decision that obliged member states to provide the 
Commission with information on their national policies regarding migration 
from third countries. The case ended in a partial and temporary victory for 
the member states in 1987.1 The Single Market, developed between 1986 and 
1992, and the related abolition of controls at the internal borders of the 
Schengen, eventually led member states to accept Union competence on this 
issue in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Germany’s desire to retain its 
competence with regard to the admission of third-country nationals for the 
                                                   
1 CJEU Joined Cases 281, 283, 284, 285 and 287/85 Germany and Others v. Commission 
[1987] ECR I-3203. 
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purpose of employment was reflected in the Europe Agreements with the 
future member states in Central Europe. Those agreements provided for 
equal treatment of the workers from those countries and some rights for their 
admitted family members, but did not cover admission for employment. The 
agreements made explicit reference to bilateral agreements on access to 
employment and mobility of workers.2  
The opposition was also reflected in the last minute effort of German 
Chancellor Kohl in the negotiations in Amsterdam to delete the words “and 
work” in Article 63(3) of the EC Treaty,3 as well as in the current provision 
that states that Article 79(5) TFEU “shall not affect the right of Member States 
to determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from 
third countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or 
self-employed”. That provision, being an exception to the general rule of 
Article 79, must be interpreted in a restrictive way: it does not relate to the 
conditions or the branches of employment and it does not cover third-
country nationals coming from another member state. The exception only 
relates to the number of third-country workers coming to a member state 
from outside the Union. German opposition was also visible in the reaction 
to the Commission´s 2001 proposal for a general directive on migration for 
employment.4 During the negotiations on the early proposals for directives 
on migration or asylum of third-country nationals, Germany argued that the 
EU did not have the competence to rule on the access to employment of 
third-country nationals who were admitted for other purposes. However, 
that battle was lost in 2002 during the negotiations on the Reception 
Conditions Directive in the Council.5 Once the Union legislature has 
exercised the competence granted in the Treaty, as it has in many directives 
on legal migration and asylum, member states bound by the relevant Union 
instruments lose their competence to make and apply national rules that are 
incompatible with the secondary Union law.  
                                                   
2 See e.g. Article 37(1) and Article 41 of the 1994 EC-Poland Association Agreement.  
3 See Hailbronner (1988, p. 1052); Peers (1999, p. 101). 
4 European Commission (2001); European Commission (2006). 
5 Council of the European Union (2002) with the opinion of the Council’s Legal Service 
on the question raised by one member state whether “the EC had powers regarding the 
access to the labour market”; and Article 11 of Council Directive 2003/9 of 27 January 
2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers. 
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3. Access to employment of third-country nationals admitted for 
other purposes 
This brings us to the second constant element: practically all other categories 
of third-country nationals admitted for other purposes, such as family 
members, refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, asylum seekers, 
students, long-term residents, have free access to employment in the host 
member state, either immediately after admission, on acquisition of EU 
residence status or after a short waiting period. Moreover, they are entitled 
to equal treatment in their employment relationship.6 Thus there is strong 
opposition to transfer of competence regarding admission of one group, 
third-country workers, whilst practically all other groups get free access to 
the labour market immediately, or at least after one year. This is all the more 
surprising since the first group (those admitted for employment) makes up 
only a small minority of all third-country nationals admitted by member 
states. Of course, the main reason for this rather paradoxical situation is that 
employment supports integration of the immigrants and prevents them from 
becoming a burden on the national social security system of the member 
state. Moreover, Article 79 of the TFEU instructs the Union legislature to 
make rules that ensure fair treatment of third-country nationals legally 
staying in the territory of member states. Finally, the wish to avoid a 
repetition of the ‘guest-worker policy’ may explain the opposition to transfer 
of competence regarding admission of third-country workers. 
4. Parallel Union and national statuses 
During the last decade one can also observe the development of a practice of 
dual statuses. Member states continue to issue national permits rather than 
the permit provided for in Union law. In certain member states this is clearly 
related to resistance to loss of national competence regarding the admission 
and legal status of third-country nationals. In other member states a 
competition has developed between national and EU statuses. In some 
member states third-country nationals are forced to choose between Union 
status and national status. Such a forced choice is a problem where Union 
law explicitly or implicitly allows a third-country national to have both 
Union status and national status. The application of the Blue Card Directive 
2009/50 and the Long-Term Residence Directive 2003/109 in some member 
states results in such a dual system of permits. A similar development may 
occur with regard to the Directive on Seasonal Employment, adopted in 
                                                   
6 Groenendijk (2005, pp. 141-174). 
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February 2014. Of course, member states can avoid a practice of dual permits, 
if they stop issuing national permits to the relevant category of migrants.  
The Blue Card Directive was adopted in 2009.7 Member states had to 
transpose the directive in their national law by June 2011. According to 
Eurostat data, by January 2014 a total of 3,538 Blue Cards had been issued in 
21 member states; two-thirds of those cards (2,584) were issued in Germany, 
461 in Spain and 124 in Austria.8 In the Netherlands only one Blue Card was 
issued, whilst 6,000 to 7,000 third-country national workers received a 
residence permit as a “knowledge worker”, i.e., a highly qualified worker, 
on the basis of Dutch law in each of the years from 2010 to 2012.9 Of course, 
it is too early to conclude that the Blue Card Directive is a failure. But the 
tendency of certain member states to continue to issue national permits 
rather than the Union permit creates complexity and confusion, undermines 
the effectiveness of the directives and often will deprive third-country 
nationals of rights granted to them under Union law.  
The official instructions of the German Federal Ministry of Interior to 
the local immigration authorities for many years explicitly stated that a third-
country national could only obtain a German permanent residence permit 
(Niederlassungserlaubnis) or an EU long-term residence permit, but not both 
permits. A third-country national applying for the EU status had to give up 
his German permit. The Commission stated in its 2011 report on the 
application of this directive that similar problems occurred in several 
member states:  
where third-country nationals are not allowed to hold a LTR permit and 
another residence permit at the same time and must choose between the 
two permits. Such a choice is not in accordance with Articles 4(1) and 
7(3), which provide that Member States should grant LTR status when 
the applicant fulfils the conditions of the Directive. In addition, this 
situation creates a risk of competition between national and EU permits, 
which will not necessarily result in more favourable provisions being 
applied to the third-country national, given that the comparison of the 
advantages respectively granted by the two kinds of permits is often a 
                                                   
7 Strik and Grütters (2013); Eisele (2013). 
8 See Eurostat, Dataset details on EU Blue Cards by type of decision, occupation and 
citizenship. 
9 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2013-2014, p. 90). 
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delicate issue requiring in-depth knowledge of immigration law and a 
thorough assessment.10  
National authorities should provide correct information rather than 
block access to the EU status. In 2013 the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, the 
highest administrative court in Germany, ruled that long-term residents 
(LTRs) could be entitled to both the German and the EU permits at the same 
time.11 
5. Risk of misuse of the new Directive on Seasonal Employment 
At the time of this writing two proposals regarding access of third-country 
nationals to employment are the subject of negotiations between the 
Parliament and the Council: the proposal on intra-corporate transfers [which 
was adopted in May 2014]12 and the recast merging the Students Directive 
and the Scientists Directive.13 A third proposal, the Directive on Seasonal 
Employment, was adopted in February 2014.14 I see the risk that this directive 
will be misused in two ways. The directive allows for seasonal work for up 
to nine months per year,15 and since it is unlikely that there will be proposals 
in the near future for new EU legislation on admission for employment, I am 
afraid that this directive in practice may develop into the EU directive on 
temporary employment. Since the level of rights granted to workers under 
this directive is rather low, clearly lower than the rights under the 
Framework Directive 2011/98,16 there will be a temptation for employers 
                                                   
10 European Commission (2011, par. 3.6). 
11 Federal Administrative Court of Germany (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), BVerwG 1 C 
12.12 of 19 March 2013. 
12 Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of 
an intra-corporate transfer. 
13 European Commission (2013). 
14 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
employment as seasonal workers. 
15 Article 14(1) of Directive 2014/36/EU. 
16 Compare for example Article 23 of the Directive 2014/36/EU relating to housing, 
educational training and social security with Article 12 of Directive 2011/98/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application 
procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the 
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(and for member state authorities) to give an expansive interpretation of 
what is defined as seasonal work. The EU standards for work defined as 
temporary will then become rather low. This worry is heightened by the fact 
that the many policy statements of EU institutions on circular and temporary 
migration over the last years have produced little, if any, hard EU rules on 
this issue.  
My second worry is that the directive will allow eternal employment of 
“seasonal” workers. The third-country worker is employed for nine months, 
has to return for three months to his country of origin and returns the next 
year to work for the same employer for nine months again. The directive 
leaves member states free to provide the third-country worker with a more 
stable residence permit or not.17 However, seasonal workers are excluded 
from the personal scope of the LTR Directive.18 Thus there is a clear risk that 
the directive will allow for a revival of the Swiss model of employment of 
the 1960s and 1970s, where Italian workers were employed for nine months 
a year for many subsequent years without ever obtaining a more stable 
residence status. In my view that is not an attractive prospect. The statement 
in the Council’s press bulletin on the adoption of this directive – “With a 
view to promoting circular migration, re-entry of third-country nationals 
who return every year to the EU to do seasonal work is facilitated” – 
probably inadvertently pointed to a revival of the old Swiss model.19 
6. A positive development: Intra-EU mobility of workers under 
Directive 2003/109/EC 
For two reasons the LTR Directive rather than the Blue Card Directive 
probably will become the basis for intra-EU movement of third-country 
nationals. The LTR Directive grants those who have acquired long-term 
resident status the right to live and work in another member state, bound by 
that directive, once certain conditions are fulfilled.20 In contrast, under the 
                                                   
territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers 
legally residing in a Member State. 
17 Article 14(1) Directive 2014/36/EU. 
18 Article 3(2)(e) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the 
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. 
19 Council of the European Union (2014).  
20 Articles 14-17 and 21(2) of Directive 2003/109; Denmark, Ireland and the UK are not 
bound by this directive. 
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Blue Card Directive there is no right to admission to another member state.21 
Admission to another member state depends on a decision of the authorities 
of that state. Moreover, the number of EU long-term resident permits issued 
is far greater than the number of Blue Cards. According to Eurostat data at 
the end of 2012, seven years after the LTR Directive had to be implemented 
by member states, more than 5 million third-country nationals had acquired 
LTR status, as compared with 3,500 Blue Cards issued by 2014. However, in 
certain member states the number of LTR permits issued is surprisingly low: 
only 6,300 in Germany and 17,200 in France.22 This is a clear indication of the 
important role of member states authorities in applying or disregarding a 
directive in practice. Practising Dutch lawyers tell me that they are 
increasingly contacted by third-country national clients who acquired LTR 
status in Italy or Spain. For immigrants from outside the EU who are unable 
to acquire the nationality of their member state of residence due to the 
restrictive naturalisation policies of some member states, Directive 2003/109 
may become the basis for intra-EU mobility. Those living in member states 
where nationality is more easily acquired, in the long run, will be able to 
acquire the nationality of a member state and then realise intra-EU mobility 
on the basis of the rules on free movement of Union citizens.   
7. The years ahead: Monitor and enforce correct transposition 
and application of existing Union law 
For the post-Stockholm five-year period no new legislative initiatives should 
be proposed in this area. The need for both low- and highly skilled workers 
cannot really be managed at the EU level, considering the large differences 
between the labour market situations in member states. It is now time for 
monitoring the correct application of the existing EU legislation and for 
focusing on those member states that do not live up to their obligations. 
Moreover, yet another series of new EU directives will neither enhance the 
credibility of EU migration law nor the inclination of national immigration 
authorities to take that law serious. At this moment stability, continuity and 
reliability are far more important than further harmonisation of Union law 
on migration and on employment of migrant workers from outside the EU. 
                                                   
21 Article 6 and Article 18(7) Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
highly qualified employment. 
22 Eurostat, Long-term residents by citizenship, 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europe.eu/nui. 
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14. AN EU IMMIGRATION CODE: 
TOWARDS A COMMON IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 
STEVE PEERS 
1. Introduction  
The latest multi-year programme for EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
policy, the Stockholm Programme, was adopted in December 2009.1 In the 
area of immigration law, it calls, inter alia, for the Commission to submit a 
proposal for the “consolidation of all legislation in the area of immigration, 
starting with legal migration, which would be based on an evaluation of the 
existing acquis and include amendments needed to simplify and/or, where 
necessary, extend the existing provisions and improve their implementation 
and coherence.”2 Along with an evaluation and possibly a review of the EU’s 
existing Family Reunion Directive, this consolidation would implement the 
objectives set out in the Stockholm Programme to “ensure fair treatment of 
third-country nationals who reside legally on the territory of [the EU’s] 
Member States”, to develop a “more vigorous integration policy” which 
“should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of 
citizens of the Union”. This “objective of a common immigration 
policy…should be implemented as soon as possible, and no later than 2014”.3 
While the Stockholm Programme does not refer to the planned 
consolidation as a “code” of EU immigration law, such codes have been 
                                                   
1 European Council (2009). 
2 Ibid., point 6.1.4.  
3 Ibid., point 6.1.3 concerning labour migration, which invites the Commission, inter alia, 
“to assess the impact and effectiveness of measures adopted in this area with a view to 
determining whether there is a need for consolidating existing legislation, including 
regarding categories of workers currently not covered by Union legislation.” 
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adopted in the related fields of visas and border controls,4 and the 
Commission’s subsequent Action Plan on the implementation of the 
Stockholm Programme assumes that the consolidation would take the form 
of a code.5 The Annex to this Action Plan calls for a proposal for a code on 
legal immigration in 2013, following a proposal to amend the Family 
Reunion Directive in 2012.  
The adoption of an EU code on legal immigration would be a key event 
in the development of a common EU immigration policy, and would also 
raise fundamental questions about the amendment of the existing rules in 
this area. While the key roles in the adoption of a code will ultimately be 
played by the EU institutions, the purpose of this paper is to launch an 
advance discussion of the content of a future code, by proposing a draft text.6 
This text is prefaced by an explanation of the background to such a code, a 
discussion of the key parameters for its content, an overview of the proposed 
code and detailed commentary on it.  
2. Background  
The EU’s first measures in the field of legal migration took the form of “soft 
law” resolutions adopted first of all by member states’ ministers, and then 
by the Council following the start of the “Maastricht era” of JHA integration. 
These resolutions concerned family reunion, admission of workers, 
admission of the self-employed, admission of students and the status of 
long-term residents (LTRs).7 A proposed Convention on Migration Law was 
not successful.8  
                                                   
4 See respectively Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas; Regulation (EC) No 
562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code).  
5 European Commission (2010a).  
6 See full text of proposed immigration code: Peers, Statewatch Analysis: 
www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-167-immigration-code-steve-peers.pdf. 
7 The Family Reunion Resolution is set out in SN 2828/1/93, not published in the OJ; see 
Guild and Niessen (1996); Bunyan (1997, p. 98). The other resolutions are set out in OJ 
1996 C 274 (admission for employment, for self-employment and of students) and OJ 
1996 C 80/1 (long-term residents).  
8 European Commission (1997).  
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Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
provided for the adoption of Community measures on these issues (subject 
to unanimity in the Council, an opt-out for the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark, and limited roles for the Court of Justice and the European 
Parliament),9 the Council first of all adopted directives on family reunion 
and LTRs (the “Family Reunion Directive” and the “LTR Directive”), then 
on students (along with school pupils, unpaid trainees and volunteers: the 
“Students’ Directive”) and researchers (the “Researchers’ Directive”).10 An 
initial proposal which would have regulated admission for almost all forms 
of employment or self-employment was unsuccessful and was subsequently 
withdrawn,11 but the Commission later relaunched discussions on this issue, 
starting with a Green Paper and policy plan,12 and subsequently proposing 
a number of separate directives. In practice, this revised approach has 
resulted in the adoption of the “Blue Card Directive” and the “Single Permit 
Directive”, which respectively set out rules on admission for highly qualified 
employment13 and establish a single work and residence permit for 
employment migration, along with a common core of rights for migrant 
workers.14 Two Directives on the admission of seasonal workers and intra-
                                                   
9 See the former Articles 63(3) and (4) and 67 EC Treaty, and the Protocols relating to the 
UK, Ireland and Denmark.  
10 Respectively Directives: Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the 
right to family reunification; Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 
concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents; Council 
Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-
country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training 
or voluntary service; Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific 
procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research; 
for analysis of this legislation, see particularly (with further references): Wiesbrock 
(2009); Hailbronner (2010); and Peers, Guild, Acosta, Groenendijk and Moreno Lax (2012, 
Chapters 3-10).  
11 European Commission (2001); for an analysis of this proposal, see Peers and Rogers 
(2006, Chapter 21).  
12 European Commission (2004); European Commission (2005). 
13 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment. 
14 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to 
reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for 
third-country workers legally residing in a Member State. 
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corporate transferees (ICTs)15 have been adopted in 2014. The LTR Directive 
was also amended in 2011, to extend its scope to refugees and beneficiaries 
of subsidiary protection.16  
In the meantime, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 
December 2009 changed the institutional framework for the adoption of 
measures in this area, introducing the full jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
as well as the ordinary legislative procedure, i.e. qualified majority voting in 
the Council and co-decision with the European Parliament, to this area, as 
well as revising the EU’s competence on legal migration, inter alia, to specify 
that “[t]he Union shall develop a common immigration policy”, including 
the adoption of measures on “the conditions of entry and residence, and 
standards on the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence 
permits, including those for the purpose of family reunification” and “the 
definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a 
Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of movement 
and of residence in other Member States”. However, the EU’s powers in this 
area “shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes of 
admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their 
territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed.”17  
It should be noted that the first four directives on legal immigration, 
along with the Single Permit Directive, set only minimum standards, leaving 
member states entirely free to establish more favourable standards in their 
national law for the persons concerned, without a requirement that such 
                                                   
15 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
employment as seasonal workers; Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer.  
16 Directive 2011/51/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council  Directive 2003/109/EC to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international 
Protection; on this directive, see Peers (2012). For the sake of brevity, the six adopted 
directives (including the amendment to the LTR Directive) and the proposed seventh 
and eighth directives on legal migration are referred to as the “existing legislation” or 
the “current legislation” in this chapter. 
17 See Article 79 TFEU; for an overview of the impact of these changes, see Peers (2011).  
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higher standards be “compatible” with the EU legislation.18 On the other 
hand, the Blue Card Directive, the Seasonal Employment Directive and the 
ICT Directive, in principle establish fully harmonised rules, with options for 
member states to establish or retain more favourable rules only as regards 
specified provisions.19 
3. Key parameters of an EU immigration code 
The possible adoption of an EU immigration code has three key parameters: 
the degree of harmonisation entailed, including the substantive legal rules 
set out in the code; the simplification, consistency and quality of the relevant 
legal rules, i.e. the “better regulation” agenda);20 and the “publicity effect” of 
adopting a code.  
On the first point, while an EU immigration code could restrict itself to 
codification of the existing legislation in this field with no substantive 
amendments, or even reduce the extent of EU harmonisation in this area, the 
Treaty obligation to establish a “common immigration policy” clearly 
suggests that an EU immigration code must necessarily establish a more 
ambitious level of harmonisation than the status quo. This higher level of 
ambition could have three different aspects: extension of EU law to cover 
more categories of persons; a greater intensity of harmonisation; and higher 
standards for the persons concerned. The latter two aspects are necessarily 
connected, because in many areas of immigration law, the EU’s standards 
are arguably relatively low,21 due to the low common denominator 
established as a result of the unanimous voting rule which applied prior to 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It follows that a fuller degree of 
harmonisation in this field could only be justified if standards were raised 
significantly. 
On the second point, the current EU immigration legislation often 
contains differently worded provisions dealing with the same legal issue, 
                                                   
18 In contrast, such a “compatibility” requirement does apply to EU asylum directives; 
on the interpretation of such requirements, see CJEU Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09 
Germany v B and D [2010] ECR I-10979. 
19 See Article 4 of each directive. 
20 Note that the Stockholm Programme refers expressly to “amendments needed to 
simplify…the existing provisions and improve their…coherence”. 
21 See in particular the criticisms in Wiesbrock (2009); Peers, Guild, Acosta, Groenendijk 
and Moreno Lax (2012); Boeles, den Heijer, Lodder and Wouters (2009). 
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such as core admission criteria or procedural safeguards. In some cases, an 
issue (like fees for applications) is dealt with in one or more directives, but 
not in other similar directives. Some provisions of the existing directives are 
unclear and have led to divergent implementation in practice.22 A simplified 
and more consistent set of rules should reduce costs for national 
administrations, and a clearer set of rules should make life easier for third-
country nationals residing (or intending to apply to reside) legally within the 
EU, along with their (would-be) employers where relevant. 
Finally, on the third point (publicity effect), a single source of EU rules 
on legal migration would likely become better known and considered to be 
more accessible in practice than the existing disparate measures, in particular 
because such a code would likely be compared to national comprehensive 
“Aliens Acts”, and in part due to the public debate that might result from the 
process of adopting the code. The broader impact of adopting an EU 
immigration code might be the ‘rebranding’ of EU law in this area, which 
does not currently have a public profile comparable to (for example) the 
Schengen rules on visas and border controls, even though the current EU 
immigration legislation is applicable to a significant proportion of 
immigrants to the EU.23  
How should these three parameters be addressed? First of all, the third 
parameter will, to a certain extent, take care of itself: it might be expected 
that an EU immigration code would have a publicity effect even if it confined 
                                                   
22 See in particular the Commission’s reports on the implementation of the various 
Directives: European Commission (2008); European Commission (2011a); European 
Commission (2011b); European Commission (2011c). See also the Green Paper on Family 
Reunion: European Commission (2011d) and the analysis of the implementation of the 
Long-Term Residence Directive by K. Groenendijk in Chapter 10 of Peers, Guild, Acosta, 
Groenendijk and Moreno Lax (2012). 
23 According to the Commission’s 2010 annual report on immigration and asylum 
(European Commission (2010b, p. 3), 27% of first residence permits issued to third-
country nationals in 2009 concerned family reunion, and 22% concerned education. This 
means that 49% of such permits fell within the scope of EU immigration law. From mid-
2011, some proportion of the migrants admitted for employment (24% of the total in 
2009) have fallen within the scope of the Blue Card Directive, and from Christmas Day 
2013, most of the remaining applications for labour migration will fall within the scope 
of the Single Permit Directive. Some of the other permits issued also fell within the scope 
of EU legislation in other areas (asylum law, and presumably family reunion with EU 
citizens exercising free movement rights), but these permits will not fall within the scope 
of the proposed immigration code.  
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itself to a codification of the existing EU legislation in this area, without any 
substantive amendments.  
Next, as for the substantive content, the proposed code advocated here 
does not suggest a radical overhaul of the existing legislation, but rather 
focusses on removing the most problematic provisions in the current 
legislation – particularly (but not only) the directives on family reunion, 
long-term residents, students and researchers, inter alia, in light of the 
various Commission recommendations in its reports on these directives. As 
noted above, the Commission intends to propose amendments to the Family 
Reunion Directive in 2012; it has also announced plans to propose 
amendments to the Students’ and Researchers’ Directives, respectively, in 
the same year.24 It would be possible for the process of amending these 
directives to get underway before the start of negotiations on the 
immigration code (as planned by the Commission in its Action Plan), with 
the results of that process then subsequently integrated into the final code.25  
As regards the extension of EU immigration law to more categories of 
persons, the proposed code focusses essentially on extending EU family 
reunion rules to new categories of persons, rather than (in particular) 
suggesting new rules to cover more categories of economic migrants.26 While 
a more ambitious approach (for example, adopting EU rules to facilitate the 
immigration of job-creating investors) could be justified in principle, there is 
a risk that the codification process itself would be jeopardised by suggesting 
too many changes to the existing substantive law. It would always be 
possible to agree to schedule a future discussion of such possible changes in 
                                                   
24 See the Commission’s reports on the implementation of the various Directives; see also 
the Annex to the Commission’s 2012 work programme (European Commission (2011e). 
25 For example, see Regulation (EC) No 390/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 amending the Common Consular Instructions on visas for 
diplomatic missions and consular posts in relation to the introduction of biometrics 
including provisions on the organisation of the reception and processing of visa 
applications, which was shortly afterward integrated into the visa code. The Commission 
released the proposal for the former measure (European Commission (2006a)) shortly 
before its proposal for the visa code (European Commission (2006b)), and in practice the 
negotiations on the former proposal initially took priority. 
26 Arguably the exhortation to consider new rules on more categories of workers, set out 
in point 6.1.3 of the Stockholm Programme, referred to the planned proposals on ICTs 
and seasonal workers, which had not yet been issued at the time that programme was 
adopted. 
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the near future, pursuant to a so-called ‘rendez-vous’ clause which would 
require the Commission to report back on certain issues by a specified date. 
Such clauses are already common in EU immigration legislation.27 As for the 
even more ambitious prospect of a complete harmonisation of immigration 
law, it must be recalled that – along with the limit on EU competence set out 
in Article 79(5) TFEU – although the EU is obliged to establish a “common 
immigration policy”, this area is still a shared competence, so the principle 
of subsidiarity applies (Articles 2(2) and 4(2)(j) TFEU). At the very least, this 
must mean that the EU is not prima facie obliged to undertake such full 
harmonisation.  
The fate of the Constitutional Treaty – a previous attempt at 
simultaneously amending, rebranding and consolidating existing rules – is 
surely instructive. The Treaty of Lisbon subsequently dropped the attempts 
to consolidate and rebrand the existing EU primary law, settling instead for 
a slightly less ambitious set of amendments to it. But such a solution is not 
possible as regards an EU immigration code, since the essential nature of 
such a measure is to consolidate and rebrand the existing law. It follows that 
the codification process, if it aims to be successful at all, must limit its 
ambitions as regards amending the substantive law. With this in mind, it 
would be particularly sensible to begin a separate process of amending the 
Family Reunion, Students’ and Researchers’ Directives before starting the 
process of adoption of a migration code, in order to remove the debates on 
those issues (particularly family reunion) from the discussion of the rest of 
the code, also thereby limiting the substantive amendments being 
considered as regards the code.28 However, some further possible desirable 
changes to the existing legislation are signalled in the commentary to the 
proposed code. 
Finally, as regards the simplification, consistency and quality of EU 
immigration law, the proposed code does its utmost to remove unjustified 
divergences and to clarify or remove unclear provisions of the existing 
legislation. In some cases, this results in raising standards as compared to 
some of the current legislation. But some divergences in rules still remain in 
the proposed code, where considered necessary either to take account of 
factual differences between different categories of persons, i.e. there is no 
                                                   
27 See, for instance, Art. 19 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC.  
28 As with Regulation (EC) No 390/2009 and the visa code, the amendments to the Family 
Reunion, Students’ and Researchers’ Directives, once agreed, could be integrated into 
the text of the immigration code during the final phase of negotiations on the code. 
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need for rules concerning the initial admission of LTRs, or where different 
treatment can be objectively justified, i.e. the stronger equality rights for 
LTRs as compared to persons initially admitted.  
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15. RETHINKING THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF 
EU LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY: 
CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES  
SERGIO CARRERA, ELSPETH GUILD AND 
KATHARINA EISELE 
hat are the determinants and challenges pertaining to the EU 
priority promoting the attractiveness and selectiveness of labour 
immigration policies for ‘wanted’ or ‘welcomed’ third-country 
workers? This book has critically studied from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives and comparative approaches the EU’s attractiveness and 
selective policy paradigm of immigration policies. It has revisited some of 
the premises and questions that are too often taken for granted both in policy 
and scholarly discussions dealing with factors of cross-border human 
mobility for the purposes of employment and education-related activities.  
This chapter synthesises the main issues, findings and controversies 
that have been covered in the various contributions to the book. It starts by 
contextualising the state of play and featuring components of EU 
immigration policy as it stands today. We then focus on rights, non-
discrimination and openness issues, and summarise in a next step the 
challenges for the EU when further developing a common immigration 
policy in employment domains. Subsequently, the issues and obstacles 
pertaining to the recognition of qualifications and skills as well as the 
questions raised by selective policies based on labour market needs are 
discussed.  
1. State of play and featuring components of today’s EU labour 
immigration policy  
Since the adoption of the Tampere Conclusions and the entry into force of 
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 we have witnessed 15 years during which the 
EU has tried to build an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In the field 
of immigration different pieces of legislation have been adopted that are 
W
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applicable to various categories to third-country nationals. Annex 1 of this 
book provides a detailed list of the most relevant legal and policy 
instruments composing EU labour immigration from 1999 to the present.  
While important European law acts and agreements have been 
adopted in recent years, the current picture is one where a common EU 
labour immigration policy is still lacking. Indeed, the legislative framework 
that has been developed so far reveals a number of deficits or unfinished 
elements affecting its normative and political configurations. Some of these 
have been identified in various chapter contributions of this book and can be 
synthesised as follows.  
EU immigration policy is first affected by fragmentation and dispersion 
dynamics, which lead to legal complexity and uncertainty. This is partly the 
result of the Council’s failure to reach agreement on the Commission’s 2001 
proposal for a directive on the conditions of entry and residence for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employment – which intended to 
(horizontally) regulate the entry and residence conditions for all third-
country nationals exercising paid and self-employed activities.1 Following 
an open consultation procedure2, the Commission presented the Policy Plan 
on Legal Migration in which the way forward and policy strategy for the 
years to come was outlined.3 The Policy Plan stated that the public 
consultation confirmed “the need to develop EU common rules in this field” 
and  
…possible advantages of a horizontal framework covering conditions 
of admission for all third-country nationals seeing entry into the labour 
markets of the Member States. However, the Member States themselves 
did not show sufficient support for such an approach. Moreover, there 
is the need to provide for sufficient flexibility to meet the different 
needs of national labour markets.4 
The main result of the Policy Plan on Legal Migration has been the 
emergence of a hierarchical, differentiated and fragmented EU legal 
framework on labour immigration granting a variable set of rights, 
standards and conditions for entry/residence to different migrant worker 
                                                   
1 European Commission (2001); European Commission (2006); European Commission 
(2007a). 
2 European Commission (2004).  
3 European Commission (2005). 
4 Ibid., p. 5. 
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groups and countries of origin.5 The rationale behind this fragmented policy 
approach was in fact driven by the attractiveness and selective policy 
paradigm, i.e. to ‘attract’ categories of third-country nationals who were by 
then deemed to be needed in the EU, in particular ”highly skilled workers” 
and “seasonal workers”. The Commission recognised in the Communication 
that the intention was “to strike a balance between the interests of certain 
Member States – more inclined to attract highly skilled workers – and of 
those needing mainly seasonal workers”.6 It therefore decided to adopt a 
target set of complementary legislative measures, a general framework 
directive and four specific directives.7 
Nine years later, the package of sectoral legislative initiatives has been 
adopted. The implementation of the Policy Plan has included the adoption 
of a directive on a common application procedure for a single (work and 
residence) permit and a common set of rights for legally residing third-
country nationals, and three legislative proposals covering different 
categories of third-country workers: First, the EU Blue Card Directive,8 the 
Seasonal Employment Directive9 and the ICT Directive adopted in May 
2014.10 This has been furthermore accompanied by the recast of the 
Researchers’ and Students’ Directive.11 To the rules and standards now 
foreseen in these directives we need to add those provided in international 
                                                   
5 Carrera, Faure, Guild and Kostakopoulou (2011).  
6 European Commission (2005, p. 6). 
7 According to the Commission, “this package aims thus to develop non-bureaucratic 
and flexible tools to offer a fair, rights-based approach to all labour immigrants on the 
one hand and attracting conditions for specific categories of immigrants needed in the 
EU, on the other”, ibid., p. 5. This was later on recognised in European Commission 
(2007b, p. 4): “A category-by-category approach...currently seems to be the only way to 
move out of the impasse and beyond the Member States’ reservations regarding a matter 
they view as falling within national jurisdiction.” 
8 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment. 
9 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
employment as seasonal workers. 
10 Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of 
an intra-corporate transfer. 
11 European Commission (2013). 
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agreements and mobility partnerships between the EU and third countries, 
some of which foresee employment or education-related provisions (see 
Annex 1 of this book). 
A second featuring component characterising the first generation of 
EU labour immigration policies is that of discrimination or inequality of 
treatment in respect of categories of workers. This can be seen as one of the 
main results of the Commission’s policy approach adopted by the above-
mentioned Policy Plan.12 Indeed, when the Commission proposed to adopt 
a sector-by-sector approach, actors such as the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) expressed concerns on the consequences from the 
perspective of the workers. The EESC concluded that “if the European 
Council were to opt for a sectoral approach (geared towards highly skilled 
migrants), it would be discriminatory in nature. This might be easier for the 
Council, but it moves away from the Treaty provisions”.13  
A similar issue has been pointed out by Cholewinski’s contribution in 
Chapter 4 of this book. In his opinion the internationally recognised principle 
of non-discrimination and equality of treatment has been challenged in the 
EU through the implementation of a ‘sectoral policy approach’ in the 
legislative process of EU migration policy, as opposed to the Commission’s 
original ‘horizontal approach’. Indeed, extra Union labour immigration 
policy heralds the allocation of different rights to third-country workers 
depending on their perceived value to the EU labour markets, so “the 
economically stronger should be privileged and the equally needed but 
economically weaker migrant workers should be deprived of rights”.14 
A third featuring component affecting the current normative shapes of 
the EU’s immigration policy is the multi-layered nature and multiplicity of legal 
statuses for third-country workers and migration policy systems across the EU. The 
issue of parallel Union and national migration statuses has been pointed out 
by Groenendijk in Chapter 13. He has identified a practice of dual or multiple 
migratory statuses and the member states’ practice of continuing to issue 
national residence and work permits rather than the permits provided for in 
Union migration law. For example, the EU Blue Card Directive, which – as a 
previous CEPS NEUJOBS research paper has shown – has led to a competing 
and complex multi-level system of statuses and schemes for “highly 
                                                   
12 See Carrera, Faure, Guild and Kostakopoulou (2011). 
13 European Economic and Social Committee (2004, point 2.1.4). 
14 Guild (2011). 
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qualified third-country nationals”.15 The Blue Card Directive has established 
minimum standards that provide “for a common floor, not a common 
ceiling”. The possibility given to member states to keep their national 
migratory schemes for highly qualified immigrants has not been conducive 
to a genuine European scheme and even raises the question of the added 
value of the Blue Card system.  
A final featuring component characterising EU immigration policy 
relates to barriers towards accessibility to EU standards and rights under EU 
immigration law as experienced by third-country nationals. EU immigration 
law already provides a supranational set of rights concerning various 
aspects, including access to long-term permanent residence, family 
reunification or highly qualified employment as emphasised by Groenendijk 
in Chapter 13. However, as Acosta Arcarazo rightly points out in Chapter 
10, “it is not rights enshrined in the law that matters but rather access to 
them”.  
This fragmented, non-transparent, discriminatory and complex multi-
layered system resulting from the first generation of EU immigration policy 
produces a number of accessibility challenges. Not only third-country 
nationals who consider the EU as a potential destination and who are eligible 
under existing EU immigration statuses are confronted with such challenges; 
national practitioners also have to face and deal with such challenges with a 
view to ensuring the implementation and litigation vis-à-vis regional/local 
administrations and relevant courts. 
2. Rights, non-discrimination and openness: A trade-off? 
The relationship between rights, equality of treatment and the degree of 
openness in immigration policies has received much attention and been the 
subject of debate in scholarly and policy venues. Is there a trade-off between 
the openness of migration policies and the granting of rights? This issue was 
covered by Section I of this book.  
In Chapter 2 Ruhs argues that one of the main reasons why states often 
hesitate to ratify international migrant rights instruments lies with the ways 
in which they affect their sovereignty/national interests at times of granting 
or restricting migrant rights. In his view it is important to focus on the ‘costs 
and benefits’ to receiving countries of granting specific rights to third-
country workers. Ruhs’ starting premise is that migrants’ rights perform an 
instrumental role as determinants in international labour migration. His 
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main argument is that there are ‘trade-offs’ in high-income countries 
between ‘openness’ to admitting migrant workers and the ‘rights’ granted to 
them after admission.  
The equation between ‘equality of rights’ and ‘restrictive immigration 
policy’ has been, however, subject to extensive discussion.16 Ryan’s Chapter 
3 examines the case of the UK and argues that there is no evidence in 
immigration policy debates of a linkage between openness and rights. In his 
opinion, “the recent British experience suggests that increased numbers are 
a more important constraint upon – or driver of – changes to rights regimes 
than the openness of policy per se.” Also, he argues that for non-lower-
skilled workers the logic is actually the opposite, “with rights given (or 
denied) in order to make the UK more (or less) attractive…while the highest 
level of rights has been accorded to the most sought-after migrants 
(previously the highly skilled, now investors and entrepreneurs), in order to 
attract them to Britain”. 
Some of these rights are minimum labour standards foreseen in ILO 
instruments. Indeed, one of the more problematic aspects inherent to the 
‘more openness, less rights’ logic is that it may challenge the set of 
international labour standards developed by organisations such as the ILO. 
This is an issue emphasised by Cholewinski in Chapter 4, which highlights 
how the current emphasis on temporariness and rights trade-offs can be 
problematic from the perspective of ensuring the protection of the migrant 
workers’ rights and labour standards as well as their right to non-
discrimination. In Cholewinski’s opinion, the trade-offs framing device is 
inappropriate as it locks individuals into a “zero-sum game” (rights vs. 
numbers). They also lead to a “race to the bottom” and frame third-country 
workers as “commodities with economic utility”. In his opinion, this kind of 
discourse can only depress the wages and working conditions of all workers.  
Ruhs advocates in Chapter 2 for “the liberalisation of international 
labour migration, especially of lower-skilled workers, through temporary 
migration programmes that protect a universal set of core rights…by 
restricting a few specific rights that create net costs for receiving countries”, 
which he denominates as a ‘core rights approach’. One of the issues that 
emerged during the discussions in the Expert Seminar was the extent to 
which those costs are based on objective and independent evidence – or are 
they just assumed or presumed to be ‘costs’? That is, are these real costs or 
only perceived costs? Moreover, when looking at cost-related 
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considerations, the debate highlighted the need to consider another kind of 
cost inherent to the trade-offs discussion, and that relates to the creation of a 
society that has members with different rights and benefits. Do we want a 
society granting different sets of rights? What is the impact on and costs to 
social cohesion? 
Furthermore, in Ruhs’ opinion ‘non-core rights’ are ‘extensive social 
rights’ (such as access to income-based benefits, including social housing and 
low-income support). This creates a similar dilemma concerning the extent 
to which a ‘core rights approach’ may actually lead to restricting rights. 
Which rights are not core for human beings? What place would family life 
play in that ‘trade-off’ framework? Is family life not a core right? Such an 
approach could potentially justify limiting family reunification on the basis 
of net costs for the receiving state. It could also justify arriving at a lowest 
common denominator in terms of social rights in the name of openness. It is 
also national workers who are affected by lowering down rights for third-
country workers. ILO instruments aim to address the unequal international 
competition for labour, so that countries cannot exploit workers for 
economic purposes. The boundary between what can and cannot be defined 
as ‘core’ is blurry.  
This book incorporated a comparative approach by including 
international experiences on similar debates. Chapter 10 by Acosta Arcarazo 
illuminates experiences from South American countries on the ‘rights vs. 
numbers’ rhetoric and comes to the following conclusion: in countries like 
Argentina, migration has been affected mostly by the economic 
opportunities in certain labour market sectors rather than by any specific 
legal framework restricting third-country nationals’ rights and benefits. It is 
in his view far from clear whether it is rights or job availability that matters 
the most. The higher or lesser degree of restrictiveness of an immigration 
policy does not seem to be the most decisive factor in determining 
immigration or emigration. Yet in Acosta Arcarazo’s view, it may lead to 
social exclusion, harsher living conditions and unnecessary obstacles to 
human mobility.  
What role does discrimination play in the framework of attractiveness? 
States frequently legitimise inequality of treatment in their policies on the 
basis of ‘quotas’, ‘skills’ or ‘needs’ that are too often politicised and short-
sighted. The question arises who benefits from discrimination in such 
policies and who loses out?  
The US labour immigration system is also illustrative. Labour 
migration to the United States is mainly employer-led and a large majority 
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of non-US citizens enter the country as ‘temporary visitors’ or ‘non-
immigrants’. Fullerton’s analysis in Chapter 12 shows that temporary 
foreign workers have a weaker legal status concerning bargaining power 
and labour mobility, including limited options to change employers, 
compared to migrants who benefit from permanent pathways. This 
demonstrates the vulnerability of cost/benefits and selective migratory 
schemes. Fullerton’s contribution highlights the importance of the legal 
protection that migrant workers enjoy from non-discrimination, which 
makes the US migration system more ‘attractive’ to immigrants. She says 
that “access to courts and the general cultural norms in favour of litigation 
afford labour migrants some protections against exploitation by employers.”  
A similar scenario has been described by Gabriel in Chapter 11. 
Temporary labour immigrants in Canada constitute the greatest proportion 
of immigrants. Gabriel highlights that this ‘temporariness’ imposes a 
vulnerable legal status on low-skilled migrant workers, which ties them to 
“a single employer, affords them fewer rights than other workers and 
positions them in such a way that it is difficult to exercise the rights they are 
entitled to.” Similar to the concerns raised above when looking at current 
debates on rights trade-offs in the EU, she describes the latest policy changes 
in the domain of labour migration in Canada as “short-term focused” and 
mainly “directed at addressing specific labour market pressures and skill 
shortages”, without due consideration to the long-term perspective and 
impact on workers protection and society at large. 
3. Matching demand and supply: A revamped ‘guest worker’ 
model at EU level? 
A major dilemma raised by the trade-off discussions relates to the degree of 
‘temporariness’ that the emerging EU labour immigration policy displays; it 
thereby promotes implicitly a revamped and unspoken ‘guest worker’ 
model. As Groenendijk has identified in Chapter 13, the adoption of the 
Seasonal Employment and Intra-corporate Transferees Directives reflects a 
worrying trend towards ‘temporariness’ that resembles too closely the 
former failed guest worker programmes of Germany and Switzerland, 
including the underlying rationale. A central issue pointed out by 
Groenendijk is the extent to which the EU Directive on seasonal employment 
will develop in practice into ‘the EU Directive on temporary employment’ 
and provide only for very low EU standards.  
One of the main challenges facing the current and next generation of 
EU immigration policy is not to repeat the mistakes of failed guest worker 
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programmes, but instead to learn from them. ‘Attractiveness’ of migration 
policies is in the eye of the beholder: by focusing on the ‘attractiveness’ of a 
foreign labour force purely from an economic and utilitarian perspective – 
that of ‘the needs’ of the receiving state – the ‘attractiveness’ of policies from 
a migrant worker’s viewpoint is relegated to a secondary policy concern. For 
migrant workers, ‘attractiveness’ might well translate into issues related to 
security of residence, non-discrimination, access to fundamental social rights 
and compliance with international labour standards.17 The academic 
literature underlines the importance of taking account of ‘historical 
experiences’ of and ‘lessons learned’ from previous policies. Contributions 
such as those of Castles (2004),18 Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield (1994),19 
Bigo and Guild (2005),20 or Guild and Mantu (2011)21 are only a few examples 
that show the inherent ‘policy failure’, ‘policy gap’ or ‘fallacy’ when the 
actual outcomes of cross-border labour mobility make a mockery of the 
publicly stated goals and objectives of states’ migration control policies.22 
This gap may become even larger when a supranational migration policy 
actor, such as the EU, is at stake.  
With a view to future EU policy-making it is therefore central to 
consider the fact that more often than not migration control policies have 
achieved precisely the opposite effects of what was originally intended by 
national policy-makers. Castles23 highlights the well-known example of the 
German guest worker recruitment policy between 1955 and 1973, which 
resulted in permanent settlement, family reunion and the emergence of 
diverse societies in Germany. Is the emerging EU immigration policy 
likewise prone to fail? As Castles points out “migration policies may fail if 
they are based on a short-term view of the migratory process…it is necessary 
to analyse the migratory process as a long-term social process with its own 
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18 Castles (2004). 
19 Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield (1994).  
20 Bigo and Guild (2005).  
21 Guild and Mantu (2011), the authors argue, “The fallacy between the needs of the 
economy and the frameworks designed by states is increasingly problematic as control 
paradigms build around the conceptualisation of migration as a security issue, ignore 
the human aspect of the phenomenon”, p. 10; in same publication, see also Bigo (2011). 
22 See also Czaika and de Haas (2013).  
23 Castles (2004, pp. 205-227). 
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dynamics”, as a ‘societal process’ which cannot be imprisoned in law in 
liberal democratic regimes.24 ‘Short-termism’ (short-term perspective) in 
policy-making tends to be a commonly shared trend in this area.  
Several contributions in this book illustrated how the phantom of the 
guest worker model may in fact come back in different narrative shapes and 
policy framings that identify temporariness as a central component of EU 
immigration policy.  
From an economic viewpoint, Kahanec shows in Chapter 8 how ‘skills-
based selective frameworks’ that give preferential treatment to certain 
migrants based on a “narrowly defined measured demand for skills” is a 
self-defeating policy option. This is also the case from the perspective of 
financial costs. In his view, “identification of skill needs and regular 
adjustment, fine tuning and monitoring of the system involve significant 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs”. Moreover, the criteria for ‘selection’ are 
based on “a small set of observable characteristics that are only proxies for 
the true determinants of migrants’ employability and labour market 
potential”. 
Moreover, international experiences are offering similar deficits. The 
failure of temporary migration programmes is illustrated by the contribution 
by Fullerton on the US. In Chapter 12 she shows how “although the US legal 
framework is predicated on non-citizens obtaining their immigrant visas 
overseas at a US consulate…only a miniscule number of individuals coming 
to the US as permanent labour migrants are overseas when they seek 
permanent resident status. Rather, almost everyone who satisfies the 
employment-based immigrant categories is already working in the US”.25  
A similar move towards a system said to combine the US and 
Australian model has been identified in Canada by Gabriel’s Chapter 11; one 
which increasingly functions as a points-based system geared toward 
specific skills (points-based selection model) and mainly focuses on 
temporary admission of foreign workers. When examining the so-called 
“Canadian Experience Class” Gabriel highlights that the system focuses 
purely on the interest of the state, and the economy renders vulnerable 
temporary workers in “low-skilled occupations that offer no path to 
                                                   
24 Ibid., p. 207. 
25 See Chapter 12 of this book where Fullerton concludes: “The significant role that 
temporary labour migration plays as the doorway to permanent labour migration brings 
issues of labour mobility in the US into high relief”. 
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permanent residence” and lead to irregularity of stay, thus “subjecting 
Canada to problems like those European countries experienced with their 
guest workers”.26 
4. Skills, qualifications and labour market needs 
Debates on matching ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ of foreign labour force are also 
at the heart of current policy discussions in the EU. Most EU policy 
documents give priority to immigration policies that follow a national 
labour-market needs rationale, which is mainly economic in nature. Such 
policies often set aside wider political, societal, historical and legal questions 
underlying the framing of human mobility as a migration policy issue. Can 
labour market “needs” be effectively determined? Is it actually possible to 
have a functioning labour market matching system in light of the 
temporariness of labour demands and individuals’ changing intentions?  
This book has pointed out that a fundamental challenge behind these 
debates is the central role played by obstacles affecting the recognition of 
qualifications and skills, as well as informal barriers that non-EU nationals 
face to entry into EU labour markets. As Desidero’s Chapter 6 underscores, 
the opportunities that countries grant to skilled individuals to make full use 
of their qualifications and competences constitute a central determinant 
fostering attractiveness, competitiveness and growth. In her view, efficient 
systems for the recognition of foreign-acquired diplomas, skills and work 
experience represent a key instrument for realising this potential.  
Recognition of qualifications and diplomas, and lengthy 
administrative recognition procedures, continue to be major obstacles to 
international mobility and the inclusion of third-country workers in 
domestic and international labour markets. The EU is not an exception in this 
respect. According to Desiderio, “the lower returns to foreign education and 
work experience are, together with the limited mastery of the host country’s 
language, the two main reasons explaining higher over-qualification rates 
for immigrants relative to the native-born”.  
This point has also been raised by Kahanec in Chapter 8. He argues 
that “Europe is losing in the global competition for skilled migrant workers 
and migrants tend to downgrade into jobs below their level of qualification”. 
Kahanec explains how amongst the various options available in respect of 
migration policy frameworks to be devised, one which may be more 
interesting is the selection of skills in shortage in a given labour market. In 
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his view, however, a key challenge characterising such a policy is the 
feasibility in identifying skills shortages in a method which is not ‘political’ 
in nature and takes due account of market failures. Kahanec explains how 
the academic literature has proposed a number of alternatives in this respect, 
which include “the unemployment-vacancy ratio, wage premium, elasticity 
of labour supply, or [taking into account] difficulties to fill vacancies 
reported by employers”.27  
The contribution by Popova in Chapter 7 has also underlined skill 
identification, anticipation and monitoring as challenges. Accessibility to 
skills recognition remains very limited in practice. A key point is that no 
commonly shared definition of ‘skill’ exists; nor does a definition exist for a 
‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ skill or talent. These are too often poorly and 
artificially framed in terms of “occupational skills” or “educational 
attainment”, or even in terms of the receiving country’s “needs”. Kahanec 
has also referred to some of these challenges. He argues in Chapter 8 that 
there are a number of conceptual and practical dilemmas inherent to these 
kinds of policies. How to assign a particular worker to a specific skill group? 
How to address the fact that ‘needs’ for specific skills are time-dependent 
and vary in short-, medium- and long-term perspectives? What may be 
needed now may not be tomorrow. Time-dependency and politicisation 
therefore constitute two main obstacles that challenge the effectiveness of 
skills recognition and matching policy attempts.  
Here the experience of Canada is illuminating. In Chapter 11 Gabriel 
illustrates the uncertainties as to whether ‘labour needs’ can be effectively 
determined by the state. As she points out “admission to a country does not 
necessarily guarantee newcomers a job commensurate with their experience 
and skills”. In her view, “points-based systems” face a common challenge 
consisting of the difficulty in differentiating between qualifications of 
different quality and utility. Gabriel criticises a selective approach (to match 
demand and supply) in Canadian migration policy and states that “the 
labour market experiences of immigrants and most especially recent 
immigrants have not been good”, with “immigrant skill underutilisation” 
and excessive focus on “short-term economic gain” constituting central 
policy challenges for Canada. 
Discussions on skills and labour market needs are too often trapped by 
a narrative that assumes the categorisation of ‘low’ and ‘high’ skills and the 
workability of these categories in domestic and supranational contexts. They 
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also tend to neglect the ‘medium’ skills. Yet as it is demonstrated in several 
EU member states, the labelling of an individual as a ‘highly skilled’ third-
country national – which is now also made possible by the EU Blue Card – 
does not always relate to the specific ‘skills’ or actual qualifications or 
experience of the person involved, but rather, first, to the ‘utility’ of the 
worker in a labour market sector that has been considered as suffering from 
‘gaps’, and, second, to the actual salary level that the worker will receive in 
the receiving country.  
So, when official discourses refer to a ‘mismatch’ or lack of ‘supply’ 
and ‘demand’, what precisely are they referring to? Moreover, an interesting 
development is that the ‘temporary’ or ‘guest worker’ migration 
management models are now shifting their target group of ‘the good’ 
immigrant to be attracted. While formerly European countries were mainly 
focused on the ‘low skilled’, now the logic of temporariness expands across 
the various levels of skills of the migrant worker. There is an increasing 
number of states that are shifting their policies on ‘attractiveness’ and 
‘permanent settlement’ or even granting nationality to ‘investors’ and 
‘entrepreneurs’ with golden visa programmes and/or citizenship-for-sale 
schemes.28 
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16. THE NEXT GENERATION OF EU 
LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY: 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
SERGIO CARRERA, ELSPETH GUILD AND 
KATHARINA EISELE 
he EU policy paradigm of attractiveness calls for careful 
reconsideration and critical reflection. The various chapter 
contributions comprising this book have provided a wealth of 
arguments, dilemmas and comparative perspectives when considering the 
determinants and challenges characterising discussions focused on the 
attractiveness of labour migration policies in different supranational and 
international settings. There are at least five preliminary questions that can 
be raised and that call for further research when examining some of the 
commonly held premises underlying the narratives of ‘attractiveness’ and 
‘global competition of talent’.1  
First, ‘attractive’ in comparison to whom? The rhetoric of attractiveness 
presupposes that other ‘developed’ world economies such as the US or 
Canada seem to be in conscious competition with the EU over a certain kind 
of desired foreign labour force, the so-called ‘talented’, ‘highly qualified’ or 
‘brightest’. This competition is in turn used to justify differential treatment 
in relation to the desirable labour migrant. Yet is there such a ‘race’? It is also 
often assumed that these countries may even constitute ‘good examples’, 
embodiments of ‘lessons learned’ or even ‘models’ for the EU to follow in its 
currently ongoing internal deliberations on how to frame and further 
develop immigration policies and policy regimes. This book, however, does 
not support this presumption and actually shows that the US and Canadian 
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immigration systems face similar dilemmas and are not as ‘attractive’ as 
often portrayed in the EU policy discourse.2 In fact, such systems offer a 
number of ‘lessons not-to-be learned’ when further developing immigration 
public policies in the EU.  
Second, attractive for whom? Another uncritically examined assumption 
is that immigration control policies can be designed or made in such an 
especial manner that may attract or even convince those wanted or needed 
third-country workers (‘the good’ labour migrants) to choose one particular 
international destination over another. It is still based on the illusion that the 
state can in fact fully control human mobility and the complex set of 
sociologies inherent to this human phenomenon. The addressee of these 
policies seems to be therefore primarily the ‘foreign worker-to-be’ or the 
individual who is still in her/his country of origin to be covered by migration 
regulations and meeting ‘the high skills’ or ‘new talent’ supposedly needed 
by EU and member states’ labour markets.  
Third, how can an immigration policy be ‘attractive’? What are the incentives 
at play for making any immigration policy more attractive? Among the factors 
making a certain immigration policy attractive, reference is often made to an 
improved set of rights and benefits conferred to the foreign workers, and 
other incentives such as the ease of (fast-track) administrative procedures for 
admission and residence, unrestricted access to the labour market, provision 
of information/employer sponsorship, etc. While these rights and benefits 
are indeed non-negotiable core components of international and European 
instruments with which EU member states abide, little evidence alludes to 
their determinant effects for emigration. It is also difficult to argue that there 
is a direct correlation between granting rights and openness. An underlying 
problem in any trade-offs framework is legitimising inequality of treatment 
on the basis of dubious grounds related to ‘quotas’, ‘skills’ or ‘needs’, which 
are often highly politicised and short-term-centred. 
Fourth, which kind of foreign worker is to be ‘attracted’ by an immigration 
policy? The paradigm of attractiveness often refers to a selection logic focused 
on only those individuals considered to embody the ideal kind of migrant 
worker: ‘the talented’, ‘the brightest’ or ‘the highly skilled’. The framework 
for discussion therefore takes as the starting principle a utilitarian and 
economic approach that justifies inequality of treatment amongst workers. 
The argument appears to assume that it is in fact feasible to achieve a perfect 
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match between immigrants’ skills and national labour market needs and 
priorities. A number of chapters in this book have challenged this 
assumption.  
Finally, there are fundamental dilemmas in the process of artificially 
categorising a person as a ‘wanted migrant.’ Who are those highly skilled and 
talented individuals? On the basis of what criteria can a specific worker be assigned 
to a specific skill group? It is here equally assumed that there are exact 
methodologies to identify what and locate where these ‘skills’ and ‘needs’ 
actually are in national labour markets, in particular by national 
governments or the state. Yet the matching demand and supply theory is 
also affected by profound methodological caveats. Are the needs of the 
member states’ labour markets only related to specific or limited set of skills? 
How to address the inherent time-dependency of specific skills and needs? 
Is the definition of ‘highly’ or ‘low skilled’ only related to the actual 
qualifications and competences of the person involved? How do formal and 
informal barriers to qualification and skills recognition, and discrimination 
in the receiving country, play into this equation?  
On the basis of the discussions and findings presented across the 
various contributions of this book, this final chapter identifies the main 
issues and sets priorities for policy formulation and design in the next 
generation of this policy domain in respect of EU labour migration policies. 
In particular, it highlights important initiatives the new Juncker European 
Commission should focus on in the years to come. What are the possible 
policy suggestions or priorities for the new Commission?  
1. Consolidating EU immigration standards: Time for an 
immigration code?  
The state of affairs of EU’s immigration policy is one revealing a framework 
affected by fragmentation, legal uncertainty, discrimination and competing 
multi-layered migratory statuses. This scenario calls for further 
consolidation, streamlining, and transparency of standards and rights. How 
can this be done? The preceding authors have, to a degree, disagreed. 
Groenendijk, for instance, argues in Chapter 13 that the new European 
Commission should not envisage or present any new legislative initiatives 
during the next five years of EU policy programming. In his view the priority 
should instead be given to better monitoring and enforcing the correct 
implementation of existing EU migration law and standards. 
Peers, by contrast, suggests in Chapter 14 considering the idea of an 
EU immigration code (or code on legal immigration), previously proposed 
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by the European Commission on a few occasions,3 which has, however, not 
seen the light as originally programmed during the last five years. In his 
view, the code should “establish a more ambitious level of harmonisation 
than the status quo”, first by raising existing EU standards, and second by 
introducing a simplified and more consistent set of common regulations. 
Behind this debate is the mistrust among certain EU member state 
authorities regarding the maintenance and safeguarding of already existing 
EU standards and rights in EU migration law. Amending current EU 
directives and regulations as proposed by Peers could indeed potentially 
open up the possibility of lowering existing EU standards and rights of third-
country nationals, and therefore defeat the purpose and added value of 
‘more EU’ in this policy area. While the priority could be in removing the 
most problematic provisions of current legislation, it is unlikely that there 
would be an agreement between EU institutions and national governments 
as to which of those provisions are ‘problematic’ and ‘why’. 
The idea of codification remains, however, in some Commission 
corridors. In its Communication “An Open and Secure Europe: Making it 
Happen”,4 the Commission outlined its vision on the future priorities to 
guide the next phase of EU immigration policy and stated:  
The existing EU rules on admission of migrants and on their rights 
must be implemented in an effective and coherent way by all Member 
States. An evaluation of current legislation on legal migration would 
help to identify gaps, improve consistency and assess the impact of the 
existing framework. Further steps could be taken to codify and 
streamline the substantive conditions for admission, as well as of the 
rights of third-country nationals. This would be a step towards a ‘single 
area of migration’, with the aim of facilitating intra-EU mobility of 
third-country nationals, including through mutual recognition of 
national permits.5 
Should codification be the way forward? And should a ‘code’ or the 
consolidation of existing instruments take the form of a new legally binding 
                                                   
3 European Commission (2009); European Commission (2010), in which the Commission 
stated, “The EU must strive for a uniform level of rights and obligations for legal 
immigration comparable with that of European citizens. These rights, consolidated in an 
Immigration Code, and common rules to effectively manage family reunification are 
essential to maximize the positive effects of legal immigration for the benefit of all 
stakeholders and will strengthen the Union’s competitiveness”, p. 7. 
4 European Commission (2014). 
5 Ibid., p. 4. 
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instrument? This book has demonstrated the need to address current deficits 
and featuring components of the first generation of EU immigration policy. 
This should not necessarily be seen as a zero-sum game. There exist different 
options to explore at times of consolidating existing EU legislation without 
necessarily reopening or amending the current set of EU standards. The 
priority should indeed be in carrying out an independent evaluation of what 
is already there, streamlining current EU standards and rights, providing 
further guidance on problematic or unclear issues identified in previous 
evaluations of current EU directives and highlighting gaps for future 
consideration while keeping the current level of harmonisation.  
An EU immigration code could be an interesting step forward. Careful 
attention should be paid, however, to the way in which this could be done 
in practice. A non-legally binding corpus or compendium of existing EU 
rules and statuses could be a first step towards that direction. The focus 
should be to improve a concerted policy of what already exists but also 
ensure accessibility to the common EU standards and rights foreseen. Any 
proposal for codification should be firmly anchored on a rights-based and 
non-discrimination approach.6 Measures on promoting intra-EU mobility 
and addressing obstacles in member states should also be a priority. This 
should go in parallel with an independent inventory of ‘what is there’ and 
the factors challenging the intended public goal or expected added value of 
EU legislation, in particular in what concerns member states’ uses of national 
migration status versus EU statuses. 
2. Recognition of qualifications and diplomas: Optimising the 
socio-economic inclusion of skills 
Another priority should be addressing and overcoming current formal and 
informal obstacles for the recognition of qualifications and diplomas, as they 
constitute barriers to international mobility and the inclusion of third-
country workers in domestic and international labour markets. The need to 
facilitate and ensure the recognition of qualifications has been recognised on 
several occasions by the European Commission. The Commission 
Communication “An Open and Secure Europe” states:  
To attract talents, the EU should further encourage and enhance the 
recognition of foreign qualifications and professional skills; this will 
also help in putting to good use the skills and qualifications of legally 
                                                   
6 Carrera, Faure, Guild and Kostakopoulou (2011, p. 7). 
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resident migrants. To this effect the EU could also open discussion with 
its international partners. As part of the attractiveness of the EU, 
students and researchers should benefit from easier and faster visa 
procedures.7 
Desiderio has in this respect proposed in Chapter 6 a number of 
measures that could improve the use of foreign-acquired skills: First, 
measures facilitating access to information on recognition procedures and 
their outcomes; second, measures to facilitate early and timely recognition; 
third, credentialing procedures tailored for foreign-trained professionals 
and allowing early labour market access; and fourth, mutual recognition 
agreements between receiving and sending countries. 
When reviewing existing NQF in Europe, Popova’s Chapter 7 calls for 
the establishment of “sector occupational requirement committees with 
trend-setting companies in each sector”. Popova calls in addition for a 
“lifelong learning perspective”, with people having equal and open access 
to quality learning opportunities, putting vocational and general secondary 
education on a convergent path, and continuous/adult training and 
improved recognition of prior (informal) learning. Multi-actor coordinated 
efforts should be prioritised to bring about country-specific challenges and 
experiences. 
3. Enforcement, evaluation and strategic partnerships 
Better enforcement of current EU standards should be also a priority. As 
Acosta Arcarazo highlights in Chapter 10 the priority for a better 
implementation has been present since long ago, yet while sharing this 
priority in theory, the European Commission seems to be less active in 
practice. During the last five years only one infringement proceeding has 
reached the Court of Justice of the EU. In the meantime third-country 
nationals are denied effective and non-discriminatory access to standards 
foreseen in EU immigration law. The new European Commission should 
therefore focus and invest capacity in better utilising infringement 
proceedings where necessary. Here, common EU guidelines addressed to 
                                                   
7 European Commission (2014, p. 4); see also European Commission (2013) where the 
Commission points out, “With increasing international (labour) mobility, work needs to 
be stepped up in areas such as recognition of foreign qualifications, exploring the 
portability of pension rights and other welfare entitlements, including, where possible, 
at international level. For example, the Social Protection Inter-Agency Board, which was 
agreed in the G20 in 2011, should consider addressing the issue of social protection of 
migrants”, p. 11. 
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national practitioners and civil society organisations to better ensure the 
implementation by relevant regional and local administrations and litigation 
before relevant courts could be also a priority.  
Enhancing and consolidating the dialogue and inputs by the social 
partners and civil society organisations should become a central priority. 
These could play a more active role in monitoring and evaluating the 
intended and unintended consequences and impacts of EU migration 
policies on the ground, and when identifying current gaps and deficits in 
member states implementation and practices. An EU level forum on 
immigration, integration and asylum, bringing together civil society and 
migrants’ organisations, and a permanent EU platform for dialogue on 
labour immigration between the social partners (business and trade unions)8 
could be a positive step forward at times of ensuring an evidence-based 
migration debate.  
Strategic partnerships could prove to be particularly useful in this area. 
The EU is not alone at times of monitoring EU member states’ migration 
policies and their impact on supranational commitments, standards and 
rights. A Strategic Partnership should be concluded with relevant actors in 
the Council of Europe, e.g. the Human Rights Commissioner, and the United 
Nations, e.g. the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, 
the UN Human Rights Commissioner and the ILO. As the Commission has 
previously underlined significant efforts are still required to better 
implement internationally agreed frameworks and better enforce the 
protection of human rights of migrants.9 The EU should therefore also 
                                                   
8 See European Commission (2014) where the Commission prioritised the need “[t]o 
better identify economic sectors and occupations that face recruitment difficulties or 
skills shortages, a joint assessment of needs should be put in place via structural 
dialogues with Member States, businesses and trade unions on the demand for labour 
migration and trade related mobility. Recognising that different needs may exist in 
Member States, a platform of coordination at EU level would be useful to ensure that 
migration and mobility have a positive impact on the EU economy”, p. 4. 
9 See European Commission (2013) in which “the human rights of all migrants” were 
identified as one key component of EU policies, p. 5; the Communication stipulates, 
“However, significant efforts are still required to better implement internationally 
agreed frameworks and enforce the protection of human rights of migrants, in particular 
at national and regional levels. In this context, it would be important to develop policies 
and take actions to promote the human rights of people in an irregular situation...EU 
Member States have not signed the 1990 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrants Workers and Members of Their Families...in the longer term, there may 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  133 
become a more active promoter of international human rights and labour 
standards, and their implementation by EU Member States, in particular in 
respect of those immigration policy dimensions now falling within the scope 
of EU law. 
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Group since its foundation in 2010.  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
AOC Adjustment of Status 
AOS Adjustment of status 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BQFC German federal law on the recognition of foreign 
qualifications (Berufsqualifikationsfeststellungsgesetz) 
Blue Card Directive Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
highly qualified employment. 
CEACR ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations 
CEC Canadian Experience Class 
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies 
CIC Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
CJEU, Court of Justice Court of Justice of the European Union 
CMW International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
COMPAS Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society at Oxford 
University 
DG Home Directorate General for Home Affairs 
DGs Directorate-Generals of the European Commission 
EC, Community European Community 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EESC European Economic and Social Committee 
EMN European Migration Network 
EP, Parliament European Parliament 
EU European Union 
EU Charter  EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
FSW Canadian Federal Skilled Worker Program 
FY Fiscal year 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy and 
Development 
ICT Intra-corporate transferees 
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ICT Directive Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals in the framework of 
an intra-corporate transfer. 
ILO International Labour Organization 
ILPA Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association 
INA US Immigration and Nationality Act 
IOM International Organization for Migration 
IRPA Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
IZA Institute for the Study of Labor 
JHA Justice and Home Affairs 
LCP Live-In Caregiver Program 
LMO Labour Market Opinion 
LPR Lawful permanent resident 
LTR Directive  EU Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residence status 
LTRs EU long-term residents 
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur) 
MPI Migration Policy Institute 
NACARA Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act 
NEUJOBS Creating and Adapting Jobs in Europe in the Context of a 
Socio-Ecological Transition (Commission-funded FP7 
research project) 
NGOs Non-governmental organisations 
NQF National Qualifications Framework 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OJ The Official Journal of the European Union 
PES Public Employment Services 
PNPs Canadian Provincial Nominee Programs 
SAWP Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program 
SIEPS Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TFWPs Temporary Foreign Workers Programs 
UN United Nations 




PROGRAMME OF THE EXPERT SEMINAR 
 
14 FEBRUARY 2014 
09.00 – 09.30:  WELCOME AND OPENING 
 Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera (CEPS) 
 Laura Corrado, DG Home Affairs, European Commission 
 Cristina Marcuzzo, DG Research, European Commission 
 
09.30 – 11.00:  CHALLENGE I: Rights and Discrimination 
In other parts of the world the perception that racism and xenophobia are on the rise in 
Europe is widespread. This panel concentrates on how the EU can be made more attractive 
to migrant workers and the role of rights and discrimination as determinants for migration. 
Chair: Eva Schultz (DG HOME, European Commission)  
 Bernard Ryan (University of Leicester)  
 Martin Ruhs (University of Oxford) 
 Ryszard Cholewinski (International Labour Organization) 
 Maryellen Fullerton (Brooklyn Law School)  
 Diego Acosta (University of Bristol)  
Discussant: Alvaro Oliveira (DG JUST, European Commission) 
Open Discussion 
 
11.00 – 11.30 Coffee Break 
 
11.30 – 13.00 CHALLENGE II: Qualifications and Skills  
The recognition of foreign qualifications and skills is of vital importance for making labour 
markets and economies more attractive and accessible to third-country workers. This panel 
discusses the challenges and remaining obstacles regarding the recognition of foreign 
qualifications and professional experiences, as well as the insufficient integration of skills 
in the EU Member States. 
 
Chair: Fiorella Perotto (DG EAC, European Commission) 
 Maria Vincenza Desiderio (Migration Policy Institute - Europe)  
 Katharina Eisele (CEPS) 
 Daniel Hiebert (University of British Columbia)  
 
Discussants: Anna-Elisabeth Thum (DG ECFIN, European Commission) 
Open Discussion 




13.00 – 14.00 Buffet Lunch 
 
14.00 – 15.30 CHALLENGE III: Matching Demand and Supply 
The issue of better job matching and filling labour market shortages of Member 
States has been a priority for policy makers in the EU. In this context, labour migration 
policies that are “needs-based” have caught special attention and interest. This panel 
focuses on the challenges characterising the devising and implementation of job matching 
systems in the EU that attracts migrants and meets the “needs” of all actors involved, 
including social partners and migrants.  
 
Chair: Doede Ackers (DG EMPL, European Commission) 
 Christina Gabriel (Carleton University)  
 Martin Kahanec (Institute for the Study of Labor, CEU and CELSI)  
 Wolfgang Müller (German Federal Employment Agency) 
 Natalia Popova (International Labour Organization) 
 
Discussant: Sebastian Stetter (DG HOME, European Commission) 
Open Discussion 
 
15.30 – 16.00 Coffee Break 
 
16.00 – 18.00:  CHALLENGE IV: The Way Forward in the EU – A Post-
Stockholm Programme Strategy 
During the last 15 years the EU has developed a body of legislation governing the 
conditions of entry and residence for third-country nationals, including some employment-
related dimensions. This last panel concentrates on challenges concerning possible future 
EU legislative developments and practical mechanisms to better ensure coordination and 
support for EU labour migration policies.  
 
Chair: Laura Corrado (DG HOME, European Commission)  
 Kees Groenendijk (University of Nijmegen)  
 Steve Peers (University of Essex)  
 Anna Triandafyllidou (European University Institute)  
 
 
Discussant: Sergio Carrera (CEPS) 
 
Open Discussion 
